Peter Robinson: David Kennedy is the Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History at Stanford. Dr. Kennedy received his undergraduate degree from Stanford before performing graduate work at Yale. He is the author of a number of books including "Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929 to 1945" for which he won the Pulitzer Prize. Dr. Kennedy is now working on a book about the American character. Edwin Meese III received his undergraduate education at Yale and his legal degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He served as Chief of Staff to Governor Ronald Regan and Counselor to President Ronald Regan. From 1985 to 1988, he served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Meese is now a fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington and of the Hoover Institution here at Stanford. The mercenary military, under President Nixon in 1973, the United States abolished the draft moving to all volunteer armed forces. Now some, not a lot but some most notably New York Congressman Charles Rangel, who is soon to become the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee have called for a reinstatement of the draft. Our text today will be the writings of Dr. David Kennedy, first quotation, you'll write nicely, so I'll just stipulate that about all these quotations. Everything here flows just beautifully, it's been a pleasure just to feel the words coming through my mouth but you pay attention because you're supposed to be critical of this stuff, right. [Laughter] "Forty-two percent of today's army enlistees are ethnic or racial minorities, 42 percent. In the general population of 18 to 20 year olds, nearly 50 percent have had some exposure to college education. In the US military today, the percentage of who had some kind of exposure to college education is 6.5 percent. So, our society has in effect hired some of the least advantage of our fellow citizens to conduct some of our most dangerous business." Att. Meese is that not so?

Edwin Meese III: No. [Laughter] Why not so? Actually the studies that have been done by both the General Accounting Office and by the Center for Data Analysis in here had showed that by enlarge the army and the military, generally, represents a pretty -- is pretty proportional to the income and the wealth, if you will, of the general population. Also that in terms of the racial component of the military, the Blacks, for example, are only slightly greater in the army than they are in the civilian population largely because the army is the most diverse meritocracy that we have in this country, and Blacks find a very good place in which they can show their merit and succeed.

Peter Robinson: You mean the army. You are not using army as proxy for the military in general?

Edwin Meese III: Well you can talk about the military in general because the army is pretty much a -- the situation is pretty similar in the army to the other 3 branches. But in addition to that, what you find is that actually if you compare populations, Asians are underrepresented.

Peter Robinson: Underrepresented.

Edwin Meese III: Underrepresented. Hispanics are underrepresented, and Whites are almost directly represented in the army in proportion to their representation in the
population. You also found an interesting thing that since 911, and since actually hostilities have taken place in which our troops are in combat, that there is a higher percentage of people from wealthy backgrounds that have been enlisted in the military. And you have a lesser percentage of people from the poorest segments of the population. So that actually, the military is fairly proportional, but if anything in terms of education, for example, the military, if you look at a high school education, the military exceeds the civilian population by quite a bit. Something like 96 percent to 75 percent.

>> Peter Robinson: As a matter of principal, I'll come to David in a moment, but as a matter of principal, if the military did seize to resemble the wider population in terms of race and socioeconomic standing, would that make you quizzy that tend to undermine the project of the all voluntarial military in your mind?

>> Edwin Meese: Well, that's a hypothetical, it doesn't meet the facts. But in essence, no. I think the fact that the military is providing an opportunity for those -- for example if they were more from the lower income groups, they were coming into the military, it's because they have an opportunity there that they don't have elsewhere in society. The military provides some of the best leadership opportunities, some of the best training opportunities. It's a very good job for many people, and that's why people are volunteering. You can look at this from several standpoints. You can look at it from the standpoint of the individuals who go into the army or into the military generally. They see it as an opportunity for them. You can look at it from the standpoint of the country, it's far better to have people who want to be in the military than those who are constricted. You can look at it from a philosophical standpoint and that is, unless there was some general mobilization as we have in World War 2, there is no basis for the government to feel that it can just -- conscript someone's life when you have the opportunity as you have with the all-volunteer force, people who really wanna be there and wanna be into the -- in the military forces.

>> Peter Robinson: David, that's a -- choose one of the ways were looking at it.

>> David Kennedy: Well, I would say it's a remarkable commentary on the larger structures of our society. If it's true, I believe it is true, that for many individuals in our society, the only or certainly the best way to advance themselves educationally, socially, occupationally, and so on is service in the Armed Forces. That says something about the deficiency of other avenues to those kinds of ends. It means there must be deficiencies in the educational system in certain areas that leave people with few alternatives to this quite high transactional cause that they have to pay in order to advance themselves socially.

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, I would disagree.

>> Peter Robinson: [Stuttering] Can I -- hold on to this, there's just one question. Was I -- I'm quoting there I think from a piece that you wrote in the New York Times or you published in the New York Times in 2005?
>> David Kennedy: That's correct.

>> Peter Robinson: Have this -- have this -- [stuttering] it is simply impossible in the conversation like this to adjudicate facts. But have the statistics changed in the last year or so?

>> David Kennedy: The numbers that I've quoted actually can't -- were the best I had available at the time. They came from a historian at Boston University by the name of Andrew Vasovich [phonetic]. And those numbers dated from immediately before the Iraq invasion, I believe, 2002.

>> Peter Robinson: I see, I see -- okay. I have read that the numbers that there has been higher educational intake and also somewhat higher in income intake. Alright.

>> Edwin Meese III: Well not necessarily education. There has always been a very high educational ability, in other words the army doesn't take people or very rarely takes people, and when I say the army I mean the military forces, generally.

>> Peter Robinson: Okay.

>> Edwin Meese III: They don't take people without a high school education, now what you -- and the idea that somehow these are the only opportunities open to this people is not the case at all. They would have a lot of opportunities, but the military is a very good career. I have a son who's in the military, he's been in the military 25 years, he view this as a very important and a very good career. There is a sense of patriotism. There's a sense of altruism that you get among military people. All the studies that have been done, the books that have been written, for example, about the Marine Corps show that there is a higher level of what you might call integrity, loyalty and patriotism among people in the services than there is in the general population, which indicates one the reasons why people go into military service.

>> Peter Robinson: David, I want to establish some bonafides on your part. I've not read anything that you've written that would suggest you are a pacifist, or that you have -- I just want to get this on the table because you are a professional academic. But you're not a pacifist. You don't think there's anything remotely dishonorable by bearing arms. You're not --

>> David Kennedy: I do not.

>> Peter Robinson: This is not an argument against military service.

>> David Kennedy: Absolutely, absolutely.

>> Peter Robinson: Even in the fringes, there's no coloration you're arguing with.
>> David Kennedy: I agree with Meese that it's an honorable career. It's an honorable profession.

>> Peter Robinson: Okay.

>> David Kennedy: But I have no dispute with that whatsoever. I don't dispute the patriotism as a motive for many people to join the Armed Forces. Actually, my central reservation about the volunteer force is really less a matter of the numbers of whether it equitably reflects the profile of the society at large, that's an issue perhaps. But it seems to me that there's a deeper issue here, it has to do with political accountability. And the relationship between the four structures we have and the capacity of the civilian leadership, that means effectively, the president, to make the decision to resort to arms. And one of the characteristics of the large-scale citizen army of the kind that we and other countries put in the field for quite a long time from the early 19th century to the mid-20th century are most conspicuous example being World War 2, is that an army organized on that basis which compelled the deep and broad participation of millions of people in the arms services. And in addition, the kind of warfare that those armies wage compelled the deep mobilization of the economy and the social resources down to a level that we don't see today. That those characteristics -- historical characteristics of Armed Forces configuration, and war fighting doctrines in the past, compelled a level of responsibility, prudence, judiciousness, restraint in the -- as people approached -- political leaders approach the decision to wage war. There is something about the structure of a small highly effective all volunteer force of the sort we have today that relaxes that discipline a bit. It doesn't do away with it entirely, I don't mean to say that it underwrites recklessness in foreign policy or military intervention but there is a certain discipline that has been relaxed.

>> Peter Robinson: Let me quote you again, David, your own argument here. "The United States today has a military force that is extraordinarily lean and lethal. By some reckonings, the Pentagon's budget is greater than the military expenditures of all the nations combined. It buys an arsenal of precision weapons for highly trained troops who can lay down a coercive footprint in the world larger and more intimidating than anything history has known." Let's take a case study as best I can remember the details of this case of our intervention in Kosovo. When we were flying, where was the -- where were the long-range bombers based out in Kansas somewhere, as I recall, flying missions over volunteer officers of airmen flying missions dropping bombs from a height of which they could not see the effect they were having and then returning to Kansas and Clinton -- President Clinton said very early on in the engagement that our ground troops were simply not an option. We were just not going to take casualties in that endeavor. Now, your argument would be that there's something about both the volunteer aspect of the -- of the military as of the soldiers involved and the extraordinary impersonalization, the lethality and impersonalization that ought to make Americans queasy. Is that a good case study of what bothers you?
David Kennedy: Again, it's less the volunteer character enforced than is small scale, and its ability to wield extraordinarily lethal firepower. So it's a revolution of skills. It's called the revolution in military affairs. It's a product of the last decade and half or so.

Peter Robinson: So it's too easy for us to go to war, too easy for our leaders to make the decision?

David Kennedy: It's possible for our leaders today to make the decision, to use military force without having to exact a very large price from the civilian population in terms of either the contribution of personnel or of economic sacrifice.

Edwin Meese III: I think history doesn't bear that out, however, because when we had a draft, we went into two wars. We went into Korea. We went into Vietnam. Both of which were at that time when we had -- we didn't have at all the volunteer force. We have -- I don't think that that's a factor in determining whether we go into combat. I've been in the decision making process of deciding whether we'd go into combat in a very small way in Granada and I can assure you that the president at that time and those of us who are in the national security council were extremely reluctant to do it unless it was absolutely necessary. In that case, it was absolutely necessary because of our commitment to the eastern Caribbean nations and so we did commit the military force. Now, at the same time, if you look at the -- at the two wars of the larger scale that we've had since we've had an all volunteer force, one was the Gulf War when Iraq had invaded Kuwait.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Edwin Meese III: And had -- was threatening Saudi Arabia. And the other one was when the president, on the basis of all unanimous intelligence from all the countries, felt that Saddam Hussein, even though it turned out not to be correct, had weapons of mass destruction. I don't think either of those could be choked up at the time the decisions were made to a president just 'cause he had an army using it in a frivolous or in a less than thoughtful manner. So I don't think that -- I think in the United States, having an effective military force is not simply something that's going to be used. I think that if there's anything knowing general is having served in the army myself -- I was there when we had a draft. I've been in the army when we had the draft. I've been in the army when they had all volunteer force, and I can assure you that from a standpoint of military capability, it's true an all volunteer force is more capable and is better. But at the same time, I can assure you that it is the military that's the last ones that wanna go to war.

David Kennedy: I agree.

Peter Robinson: You agree with that?

David Kennedy: Yeah I agree. But -- and far beyond for me to disagree or to argue with the former attorney general the nice days about the constitution, but this is an issue that has been around for over 200 years and it is expressed in the constitution, article 1
section 8 paragraph 11, where the war making power is delivered into the hands of the congress. And it's an early recognition of the fact that the founders, and everybody since, has been very worried about the -- where the war making power should be located and how it should be properly informed by democratic participations and so on. The congress has the power to declare war. It's only exercised that power 5 times in all of American history.

>> Peter Robinson: Most recently for the Second World War. Is that correct?

>> David Kennedy: That's right.

>> Peter Robinson: Not since the Second World War. Historical question, David, when we went to the all volunteer force in 1973, and now of course the whole Vietnam venture was collapsing about then, but did you see any change in the temper of the country? I mean I've often heard this said this cannot be true. At least this cannot be the whole truth, but often here it's said that Nixon wanted an all volunteer force just to end the protest in the street.

>> David Kennedy: Well, that was surely an element in it. It did relax the political pressure on him and indeed the record is pretty strong and unambiguous that that is in fact what happened.

>> Peter Robinson: It did happen?

>> David Kennedy: Yeah. But, you know, the big campus protested, disrupted this in other places and more or less went out of business once the draft ended.

>> Edwin Meese III: But of course, that was simultaneous with us pulling out of Vietnam.

>> David Kennedy: Yeah so it's hard --

>> Edwin Meese III: It's hard to say which was the cause.

>> David Kennedy: But something else happened in the immediate way 'cause of Vietnam War.

>> Peter Robinson: Right.

>> David Kennedy: It goes to this general issue and I agree with what you just said that the military leadership by and large are not eager to go to war. They know what price this exacts with the people that they're responsible for. And in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam War, there was put in place something called the total force doctrines. Principal architect was Nixon's--I believe it was his last chief of staff. In terms of [inaudible]. And it was plan to design a force in such a way they will become more difficult to deploy, let's say, for purposes of our even [inaudible] and the key element --
and it was to integrate the reserves and the active forces in a way that any large scale long term deployment would compel the draw up of the reserves, in a way that did not happen on a large scale in Vietnam, and this was thought to constitute a kind of extra constitutional obstacle in the path of the executive f they wanted to make the decision to go to war. That they have to recognize because drawing up reserves, as we know, is more disruptive to civilian society than draft in 18 year olds because they're older people, they're more rooted in their communities and it's just a more disruptive thing to do. So this was a very conscious strategy on the part of [inaudible] and his fellow officers and his cohort who were very disillusioned about the way they felt they've been misused in Vietnam, to induce structurally an element of greater responsibility in the executive when it confronted the decision to resort to arms.

>> Peter Robinson: And that remained in effect how long?

>> David Kennedy: Well it still --

[ Simultaneous Talking ]

>> Peter Robinson: Oh, it's still in effect?

>> David Kennedy: Yeah.

>> Peter Robinson: Are you in favor of that?

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, I think that will -- oh yeah, absolutely. That was part of the reason. There also -- there was part of the reason was what kind of a force you needed and it was the idea that you don't need on a continuing basis, a gigantic -- particularly gigantic logistical tail for your forces, and one of the things that happened was that most of the logistical forces that were not necessary on a day-to-day basis in the absence of war were essentially put in the reserve and then the combat forces were divided between the national guard and the active army.

>> Peter Robinson: David just touched on something which was -- one of the country's leading historians and a former attorney general here, I just cannot resist and that is this question of declaring war. Is it that congress has simply been negligent in insisting on protecting what is its constitutional duties? Are you satisfied -- Well, as legal matter you must be because Ronald Reagan went into Granada but the War Powers Act or the more recent argument that the war making authority is inherent in the chief executive, does the current state of affairs whereby Ronald Reagan's able to go into Granada, George H. W. Bush is able to commit half a million troops, half a world away in the first Gulf War and the current president is able to go into Iraq, all without a declaration of war by congress. Does that make you queasy?

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, you have to look at the situation.

>> Peter Robinson: Constitutionally. Alright.
>> Edwin Meese III: First of all, this is not a new thing.

>> Peter Robinson: No.

>> Edwin Meese III: The first person to use military force without authorization by congress was Thomas Jefferson and he used that against the Barbary pirates and it's been used over 200 times in our history with only a very few as you mentioned, few declarations of war. Now, I think --

>> Peter Robinson: Two historians in front of me here. Alright.

>> Edwin Meese III: I think you have to look at it very carefully. A declaration of war is more than just a military directive. A declaration of war affects the relationship between nations' economic, political, diplomatic as well as military. So it has a particular aspect that is more than just using military force. And as I say, presidents have had as commanders and chief as a constitution sets forth this ability to utilize military force in a lot of situations. In addition to that, you have -- that there's almost always some sort of fig leaf of congressional involvement. For example, you had the authorization to use military force in Iraq. You had the Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions. You had the situation in the Iraq -- first Iraq war where there was a notification of congress send and they're at least acquiescence if not the specific. So, it's not though congress has left out. Now, you have the War Powers Resolution as the congress enacted. Most presidents have followed that in some form of acquiescing in it without every agreeing with the Congress that it was necessary for them to use military force.

>> Peter Robinson: This is the War Powers Act of '73.


>> Peter Robinson: This has never been constitutionally tested, isn't it?

>> Edwin Meese III: It's never been tested, but most presidents have -- even in Granada, the night before Granada, when the president was making his decision whether we should proceed with the operation, he had the leaders of congress and advised them, as the War Powers Resolution provides, what he was planning to do so that they would know that. And so, it's kind -- it's not such a clear cut either in operation or in what the constitution provides that you could say with any degree of certainty that presidents and congress have been violating the constitution in this matter.

>> Peter Robinson: But has it -- Well, as a matter of proper governance and the spirit of the constitution, are you happy with the way things operate at the moment?

>> David Kennedy: Well, on balance I'd say no. But look, the basic point I'm trying to make here is simply that the -- the issue of political accountability for the resort to military force was recognized by the founders embedded in the constitution in the
relevant clause that tries to give congress a major voice in this. Perhaps we're in agreement. It's only been exercised formally, kind of formal constitutional sense 5 times. I didn't know the number, it was 200, but I know that's a large number of military engagements that looks now at the field like war, but they never had a war resolution accompanying them, but they have some functional substitute as in Tonkin Gulf and so on. But the point is that the -- this is a 2-century old worry, is how do you make this very, very crucial, important decision -- How do you try to ensure, how do you incline the system so it is done responsibly and with proper attention to in -- the informed consent of the public? If you go back to the so called Weinberger Doctrine which evolves into the Powell Doctrine which also emerges out of the post Vietnam here, the Weinberger Doctrine is actually articulated after the Beirut marine bombing, barracks bombing. But one of its -- I think it's the fifth of its 6 points says that the arm force should not be used without some guarantee of the informed and durable, reliable consent of the congress and the public. So that -- that's the basic issue I'm try to get at here.

>> Peter Robinson: And Ed's argument is, don't worry about it because presidents and the generals take this so seriously. It's such a nerve wrecking, heart rending decision to commit troops to war that they always do take that seriously. Is that your argument?

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, I think that they do take this seriously and I think they do follow the Weinberger Doctrine. I don't think you -- there's no question that there was at the time that we went into Iraq, both in 1991 and in 2003 that there was a popular support for this and they were certainly supporting congress. Now that doesn't mean the people can't make mistakes after the fact and I think let's suppose -- I've always said let's suppose the opposite of that, but let's suppose that the intelligence reports were right and there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the president had decided not to go in and then 2 or 3 months later or perhaps a year later, Saddam Hussein had launched guided missile attacks or weapons of mass destruction on Tel Aviv in Israel or even on one of our allies on Europe for whatever reason. Think of -- when you think of what the recriminations are now for a far less culpable situation than 9/11 when people are saying, "Well, they should have done this. They should have done that." Think of how he would have been pilloried and probably driven from office if that had been the case.

>> David Kennedy: But you know there's another relatively recent historical example that could be used to caricature the position I'm trying to make here which is the Ludlow Amendment which was proposed in the 1930's. It was a proposal for a constitutional amendment to require a popular referendum before the country could go to war. It didn't get very far. I think it nearly passed in the House but that was the end of it, but Franklin -

>> [Inaudible] might want to revive that one.

>> David Kennedy: But Franklin Roosevelt said at the time, "This is about as sensible as requiring a meeting of the city council before the fire department is allowed to go and put out a fire." So there's -- there is the balance.
>> Peter Robinson: Yeah.

>> David Kennedy: I mean that -- that clearly is an absurd application of the principle in political accountability.

>> Peter Robinson: Right.

>> David Kennedy.: I don't wanna be misunderstood as advocating that at all.

>> Peter Robinson: But this is how -- you're concerned because our forces are so lean and so lethal and you're concerned because the volunteer force makes it possible for a disconnection to arise between the people who make decisions to go to war and the people who have to do the fighting from which it does not obviously follow that what you want is a fat, bumbling military and a restoration of the draft, but what do you want?

>> David Kennedy: Well look, again, I don't wanna be misunderstood as arguing here that this or that or the other decision to resort to force has been foolish or reckless or whatever.

>> Peter Robinson: Uh-hmm.

>> David Kennedy: All I'm saying is that we have structural situation where we ought to worry about the -- the slack that has been cut for the political leadership to resort to force under certain circumstances, and again, I'm not saying specifically about any particular decision that it was the wrong one, but I go back to Thomas Jefferson who's -- and I would acknowledge that leaders do this responsibly. We don't have a bunch of cranks and nuts making these decisions. But Thomas Jefferson said, "When it comes to questions of power, let us hear no more about the goodness of man but bind him down from mischief by the change of the constitution." That's the kind of thing I'm talking about.

>> Peter Robinson: Uh-hmm.

>> Edwin Meese III: And I would certainly agree.

>> Peter Robinson: But can we both agree that we were in favor of going after the Barbary pirates?

>> Edwin Meese III: I think that I certainly would have thought that was a good idea at the time [simultaneous talking] had I been around.

>> David Kennedy: Some historians are --

[ Laughter ]

>> Peter Robinson: You won't even give us that much, David.
Edwin Meese III: But I think -- I think the checks are there and I think the checks are there. We wouldn't want the Ludlow Amendment, I mean that would be -- you can imagine after Pearl Harbor, debating this in congress for 2 or 3 weeks to decide whether we should try to protect against the Japanese and the Germans and the [inaudible] but I think -- I think there is a check, although there's 2 checks really. One is if congress really disagrees, they have the ability to cut off funding and they have the power to purse, and that was part of this balance that the people wrote into the constitution. The second thing is I think there is a political check in the people themselves. It was mentioned for example by my colleague [inaudible] Jordan in the Iraq study group that the president got 2 advisories in the month of November. One was the advisory from the Iraq study group, actually it was in December, and the other was from the American people in the elections and so, I think that there -- I think that the constitution protections against rash actions by a president are not affected by the fact that we have an all volunteer force as that it's other things that could impinge but that the all volunteer force is not a factor in making it easier for the president to do irrational things.

[ Simultaneous Talking ]

Peter Robinson: Sure, go ahead.

David Kennedy: It's volunteer character that is in principal concern to me. It's the smallness of its size. And because we have a 13 trillion dollar economy, the relative smallness of the entire defense budget which is less than 4 percent of GDP.

Peter Robinson: But isn't that an impressive point? We've suffered in Iraq fewer than 3,000 deaths. This is a horrible way to say it, but by historical standards, by comparison with one morning in Normandy or by comparison with any 3-month period in Vietnam, that's a reasonably small number of casualties and we've kept even in this so called war on terror, we've kept the defense budget down to 4 percent of GDP whereas under President Reagan during the Cold War -- well, during the Cold War was it almost averaged 8 percent. It got up to -- or 6 percent.

Edwin Meese III: No, no, no, no.

[ Simultaneous Talking ]

David Kennedy: 8 percent, in the early '50s and it touched 8 percent in the Vietnam but that was [inaudible].

Edwin Meese III: It never touched 8 percent on that up to 6 percent under Ronald Reagan but it was really less than that.

Peter Robinson: But notwithstanding all of that. The public has turned against the war in Iraq. So it's not -- isn't that an impressive datum for you?
David Kennedy: Sure it is. You know, I'm not saying that all our restraint has been abandoned.

Peter Robinson: Okay. Let me quote you to yourself one more time, David. We'll have to move into the final segment here. "The life of a robust, democratic society should be strenuous. It should make demands on its citizens when they are asked to engage with issues of life and death, a universal duty to service perhaps in the form of a lottery or of compulsory national service with military duty as one option among several would at least ensure that the civilian and military sectors do not become dangerously separate spheres." And now because I cannot resist a certain impishness, I'm going to quote -- you're going to be shown to agree with William F. Buckley Jr., David, who wrote in his book, "Gratitude what we owe our country. Materialistic democracy beckons every man to make himself a king. Republican citizenship incites every man to be a knight. National service like gravity is something we could accustom ourselves to and grow to love." Some kind of national service, compulsory national service, you get to choose between America or Bill Clinton's program which John McCain has called--he wants to have that expanded, or John Kennedy's Peace Corps, or Richard Nixon's Volunteer Military. Are you gonna go for that?

Edwin Meese III: Not if it's compulsory, no.

Peter Robinson: Alright.

Edwin Meese III: I don't--I don't think the state has the ability to take two ears out of a person's life, at least on a whim because it wants to. I think that people--I think that volunteerism--I think if people wanna volunteer for the Peace Corps, that's great. If they wanna volunteer for AmeriCorps, that's great. If they wanna volunteer for the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, that's great. But I think the idea that just because--that somehow the government has the power to take two years out of a person's life, I think that's a violation of liberty.

Peter Robinson: Can you address your point without compulsion of some kind?

David Kennedy: No, and I'm very nervous about the idea of obligatory national service.

Peter Robinson: That's a problem.

David Kennedy: And I've got enough of libertarian streak in me that it really bothers me a lot and I do think in the end, you have to will the means as well as the end here. And the end that universal obligation of service would serve I think is quite commendable. It give people a sense of shared citizenship, it would have the not so incidental effect of encouraging more political accountability which I've been talking about, but the means to that end, the compulsory, obligatory part of that I think are very difficult for me to will. So, I'm very nervous about that idea.
>> Peter Robinson: Alright. By the way, if we're worried about a disjunction, this is one that just occurred to my little brain. If we're worried about a disjunction between the military and the elites, so to speak, how about this one? Congress passes a law declaring that no college or university in the country may receive a cent of federal funding unless it permits an ROTC program on its very own campus. What do you think of that?

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, that's not exactly a normal idea because for much of our history, the land grant colleges had exactly such a provision.

>> David Kennedy: I believe they still do.

>> Edwin Meese III: And I think they might still have it--they may still have it so the--I think it was the Morrill Act or something like that that provided for that so many of our colleges and universities either had that requirement. Many of them may still have that requirement.

>> David Kennedy: Still do.

>> Peter Robinson: Really?

>> Edwin Meese III: The University of California, I'm sure has it and so, that was not at all unusual but again, I would say that for Congress to pass such an act would again offend my sense of Congress interfering with what private universities do.

>> Peter Robinson: Jeepers, I'm giving you both the chance to fix things at Yale and you won't go for it.

>> Edwin Meese III: Well, I was at Yale when they had ROTC. Since they don't have ROTC now and essentially kicked it off campus, I know they will no longer contribute to the alumni fund which as my room mate once said that it does not materially affect their financial situation. But nevertheless, I think, again, I think Yale should have ROTC. It had a great [simultaneous talking] ROTC. No, but I do believe in Solomon Amendment that if the government is giving them money, then I think the government has the ability then to require certain things to be done and that's why I think the Solomon Amendment was the right amendment in order to take care of the situation where if universities receive money from the government, then they ought to go along with whatever requirements accompanying it.

>> Peter Robinson: David, we'll give you the last word.

>> David Kennedy: Well, when I was a Stanford undergraduate, there was ROTC on this campus too and there is no longer, at least not--there's no official ROTC instruction on campus. We have ROTC--

>> Peter Robinson: You don't see students in uniform, let's put it that way.
David Kennedy: Well, they could wear them if they chose but--and we do have a few but they have to go to San Jose or Berkeley for their actual instruction. My disillusionment is not as good as--as deep as Mr. Meese's. I still contribute to Stanford but I do think it's a mistake on the part of Stanford and Yale and the other elite private institutions that they do not have ROTC. One of the things these institutions pride themselves on gravely and loudly is that they're training the next generation of leaders and they try to select students for leadership capacity and yet they're cutting themselves off willfully from training leaders in one of our most important institutions. So I don't understand the logic of that.

Peter Robinson: David Kennedy, Ed Meese, thank you very much. For the Hoover Institution, I'm Peter Robinson.