Beijing’s Views of Taiwan and the United States in Early 2002:
The Renaissance of Pessimism

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This essay will address the decline in Beijing’s optimism about cross-Strait relations following the December 2001 legislative Yuan elections, and how that shift may have affected Beijing’s views toward a range of security issues. In what follows, I discuss Beijing’s disappointment over the Taiwan election; Beijing’s concern about the United States’ stance on cross-Strait relations, particularly following President Bush’s trip to China in February; and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) increasingly critical posture on the war on terrorism and U.S. security policy more generally.

In my opinion, these issues are related. When Beijing is frustrated by trends in cross-Strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations, it tends to view in a much darker light other aspects of U.S. security policy. Those aspects include various regional initiatives associated with the war on terrorism, changes in the alliance relationship with Japan, and the development of new defensive and offensive military options by the United States.

In January 2002, I participated in an entourage based at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center. The group held interviews with leading government scholars, military analysts, and government officials responsible for cross-Strait relations and relations with the United States. Much of the analysis in this study will be based on what we learned on that trip.

Beijing’s Response to the December 2001 Taiwan Elections: Pessimism and Realism

Our interviews in Beijing revealed the following mix of attitudes. On the negative side, there was a marked renewal of pessimism and caution about trends in cross-Strait relations, particularly among military scholars. Although civilians and military officers alike continued to view growing economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait as a factor in Beijing’s favor, the renewed pessimism manifested itself in a greater emphasis on the need for mainland military strength as a check on trends that could eventually lead to Taiwan independence. With a few exceptions on both sides, military officers tended to be more pessimistic than their civilian counterparts and more emphatic about the need for a strong military hand. However, almost all of our interlocutors viewed China’s buildup across the Strait as a necessary component of a successful effort on the part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to bring Taiwan to the table on Beijing’s terms. When members of our entourage called for the PRC to reduce forces in the Nanjing Military Region across from Taiwan in order to build confidence in Taipei and Washington, these suggestions were roundly dismissed by military and civilian analysts alike.
On the positive side, there was clearly a growing realism and sophistication about Taiwan politics and a recognition of the need to engage the traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over the longer term. Taiwan experts in Beijing seemed more sobered than shocked by the DPP’s strong showing in the legislative Yuan elections. But judging from their shift from high degrees of optimism in January 2001 to a mix of relative pessimism and much more cautious optimism in January 2002, the elections indeed had a big impact on their analysis. In most of 2001, the general belief seemed to be that President Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party would eventually suffer at the polls because of economic troubles on the island, growing interdependence across the Strait, and President Chen’s inability to improve relations with the mainland. According to the same experts, the parties most in favor of accommodating the mainland, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP), would, on the other hand, do increasingly well in future elections. Many experts in Beijing believed that this would portend a one-term presidency for President Chen, who would be replaced by someone with whom Beijing could negotiate more effectively.²

At the risk of understatement, the December elections did not go according to plan from Beijing’s point of view. Despite all of the negative economic trends in Taiwan and positive economic trends in cross-Strait relations that were outlined in my last contribution to CLM, the elections provided a major boost to the DPP and a shattering blow to the more unification-oriented KMT. The DPP gained 17 seats in the election for a total of 87 of the 225 seats in the legislature. In addition, the newly formed party of former president and now KMT-exile Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), won 13 seats. From Beijing’s perspective, pro-independence forces of varying degrees of zealotry now occupy 100 seats, and the trend lines suggest that a majority is not out of the question in the future. Also negative from Beijing’s perspective was the crushing of the KMT. Members of that party had apparently been fueling Beijing’s confidence about trends in Taiwan politics by visiting the mainland and promising better cross-Strait relations once they had improved their position vis-à-vis the DPP. The KMT dropped from 123 seats in 1998 to 68 seats in 2001. A final piece of bad news for Beijing was the devastating results for the New Party (NP), the only party to explicitly advocate reunification, which held on to only one seat.³

As discussed in the last issue of CLM, the outcome was not all bad from Beijing’s perspective. On the positive side, the relatively accommodationist PFP under former KMT member James Soong won an impressive 46 seats. The percentages of popular votes held by so-called “green parties” (more independence-minded parties like the DPP and TSU) and “blue parties” (more unification-minded parties like the KMT, PFP, and NP) remained about the same as in the previous few years, with both groups holding around 40 percent of the popular vote.⁴ But it is important to note that this means only that nothing had changed in the popular vote percentages in Taiwan. According to the optimistic theory prevalent on the mainland earlier in 2001, economic trends, particularly in the last quarter, should certainly have hurt the green parties and helped the blue parties. This trend was supposed to make Taiwan more willing to accept a return to the alleged “1992 consensus” in which, according to Beijing, both sides accepted that there is “one China” but agreed to disagree on what that meant. Eventually,
growing economic interdependence was also supposed to lead to Taiwan’s acceptance of the “one country, two systems” formula. It is fairly clear, however, that despite the most desirable conditions imaginable for these predictions, no such trend emerged.5

In January 2002, the PRC’s Taiwan experts often seemed unwilling to recognize frankly that they had misread the electoral trends the previous year. However, most were willing to admit that they had not expected the KMT to perform nearly as badly as it had in the election. They also admitted freely that it seemed quite likely that President Chen Shui-bian would win a second term, a prospect that had seemed much less likely to many of them one year earlier. Finally, they expressed a resigned acceptance of the fact that the CCP would have to open up better and more direct channels of communication with the DPP, rather than relying as heavily as it had in the recent past on contacts with the opposition parties on Taiwan.6 This belief would be reflected in a key policy speech by Vice Premier Qian Qichen on January 24. In that speech, on the seventh anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s eight point plan of 1995, Qian argued that the majority of the DPP members were not independence activists and that only the minority of fundamentalist “splittists” in the party would continue to be shunned by Beijing. Qian called for more contacts with the alleged moderates in the DPP as long as the contacts were with people at an appropriate level in the party.7

In addition to the election results themselves, Beijing elites found concerning the subsequent policy initiatives of President Chen’s government, which they saw as part of a “creeping independence” campaign. Those policies included a proposal to add the word Taiwan to the cover of the Republic of China (ROC) passport, the removal of the Chinese map from the Government Information Office seal in Taipei, and a reshuffling of top military officers to the advantage of native Taiwanese officers and the disadvantage of “mainlander” officers on Taiwan.8 There was general concern expressed about the local identity project (bentuhua) being pushed in schools, at government-sponsored cultural events, and on signage and symbols in Taiwan, among other places. So, analysts in the PRC believe that, while an outright declaration of independence is still not likely in the foreseeable future, Chen’s confidence is already manifesting itself in policies that are detrimental to the prospect of cross-Strait unification talks on Beijing’s terms. One oft-repeated concern was that, if Chen were to win a second term in 2004, Taipei might push provocative diplomatic initiatives just prior to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing under the theory that China would not dare retaliate with military force and thereby spoil the international environment for the Games. Another concern in Beijing was that Taiwan might try to use its new membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) not only for the resolution of trade and investment problems, but for political purposes as well.9

Levels of pessimism about the dangers of eventual independence, however, apparently had not reached the level of early 2000, when there were fairly universal and fairly severe doubts that peace could be maintained across the Taiwan Strait over the long term. At that time China published its provocative Taiwan White Paper, suggesting growing impatience with current trends in cross-Strait relations and warning Taiwan about the danger of indefinite stalling in accepting China’s terms for negotiations. In 2002, increasing pessimism was still tempered
by recognition of increasing mainland economic leverage over Taiwan in the form of tens of billions of dollars of annual trade ($35-40 billion) and several tens of billions of dollars in overall Taiwan investment on the mainland. Moreover, that investment was up sharply in 2001.10

The pessimism about current trends ranged from rather severe levels among our military interlocutors to more moderate levels among our generally more optimistic civilian interlocutors. (And again, nowhere did pessimism seem quite as strong as it did in early 2000, when I conducted similar interviews in Beijing.) From these findings, we can better understand why Qian Qichen sent out moderate feelers to Taipei on January 24. In that message, he suggested that economic problems, such as the “three links” (trade, postal, and transportation), could be discussed by nonpolitical actors, such as business elites. Qian also separated the alleged “great majority” of DPP members from the alleged minority who are hard-core independence activists. He thereby opened the door to more public engagement of DPP members by high-ranking CCP members, even if he did not accept the restoration of high-level cross-Strait governmental dialogue along the lines of the 1994 Singapore talks. The prerequisites for those contacts remain the same: Taipei’s acceptance of the 1992 consensus and some public recognition of a one China principle, preconditions that were rejected by our high-level interlocutors in Taipei, who wanted the dialogue to resume without conditions.11

It was noted by civilian analysts and political elites that broad economic forces were still in the mainland’s favor. For example, one leading civilian official with a Taiwan portfolio emphasized that, because of economic trends, time was still on China’s side. He even went so far as to suggest that political reform on the mainland would make the mainland more attractive over time. He said that the name of the country could just be “China” after unification, as opposed to the People’s Republic of China. He stated that the three links would have great benefits for Taiwan (even estimating that $1.5 billion a year is lost on waste because the three direct links are not up and running). He said that Taiwan’s south, the region most associated with pro-independence sentiments, would derive the most benefit (up to 85 percent) from Taiwan’s accommodation with the mainland. He was tougher, however, on the issue of what constitutes the status quo in cross-Strait relations, and he demanded that there must be acceptance of the one China principle in Taipei before high level talks can be allowed. Still, even here, he made distinctions between the bulk of the DPP and the pro-independence “fundamentalists” in the DPP, and he emphasized that many economic problems could be handled by nonpolitical actors. With these statements, he was clearly foreshadowing Qian’s January 24 speech, which occurred later that week.12

Other moderating influences in Beijing included the perception that, although he “cannot be trusted” and “would like to pursue independence if he could,” President Chen is a “practical politician” more than a “fundamentalist” and therefore is less likely to take brash actions. The basis of comparison, as it was in 2001, seemed to be Lee Teng-hui, who, as an individual, is seen in Beijing elite circles as more risk-acceptant and more of a “fundamentalist” on independence than is Chen Shui-bian. On a particularly optimistic note, one high-ranking foreign ministry official stated something to the effect that individuals come and go but the
mountains and rivers stay the same. This seemed to be a statement of diplomatic confidence that China’s structural hand remained strong. This hand includes both economic and military cards, however.  

As the only consistently solid performer in the region since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Beijing is feeling very good about its regional economic leverage. One relatively optimistic civilian analyst also emphasized that Taiwan had no choice but to rely on the mainland economically and that the whole phenomenon of the Taiwan and Japan miracles was dependent on a closed mainland. Those days, he suggested, were over for good.

There were several sources of frustration that tempered the optimism regarding economics, however. Otherwise optimistic civilian elites noted the “strange” nature of Taiwan politics and the fact that people did not seem to vote based on the normal economic incentives. One of the more interesting discussions along these lines took place at a military think tank, where the Chinese interlocutors stated that they did not know how this combination of factors would play out. They said that as a practical politician committed to independence in an economy increasingly dependent on the mainland, President Chen would eventually face a stark choice. Would he try to improve relations across the Strait and abandon his desires for independence, or would he abandon practicality to try to break out of the trap, with disastrous consequences for both sides of the Strait? In 2001 many people stated with confidence that he would choose the former path if he somehow were able to survive politically at all; in 2002 there was much more uncertainty.

The change in thinking of one leading civilian Taiwan scholar was most striking on this score. In 2001 he gave a rich and relatively optimistic analysis of long-term peaceful convergence across the Strait, although he certainly listed several potential problems down the road that could derail the process. In 2002 he was much more pessimistic, claiming that the “forces for independence” were growing considerably faster than he had expected. He predicted President Chen’s reelection and expressed concerns about referenda in the years 2006 or 2007, in the lead-up to Beijing’s Olympics. He said that these referenda might not consist of bills regarding outright independence, but might well consist of bills that are seen on the mainland as allowing for “near independence” and that, therefore, could still spark conflict. He said that “tacit independence” is unacceptable and that he, as a civilian, supported continuing military buildups across the Strait to prevent it. He was quite concerned about increasing military-to-military contacts and cooperation between Washington and Taipei. He warned that this development is a potential “time bomb” in U.S.-China relations.

As always, among the most sensitive issues in Beijing is U.S. relations with Taiwan, particularly sales of weapons that can create peacetime linkages between the two militaries through interoperability. In particular, future sea-based theater missile defense systems and F-16 data links were seen as creating real-time cooperation between the two militaries that could be interpreted as constituting a renewed alliance. Several CCP analysts emphasized that U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on “software” was seen as very detrimental, even more so than many
aspects of cooperation on military hardware. This observation seemed to be an attack on Pentagon initiatives started under the Clinton administration. One civilian analyst expressed quite a bit of frustration about the United States’ failure to reward the PRC for its allegedly beneficent, nonconfrontational posture toward Taiwan over the past two years. As he put it, “China has tried to act like a good boy, but is still being punished (*chengfa*) by the United States.”

There was also concern expressed about the transit diplomacy of key ROC leaders through New York. One well-placed military scholar posited that a visit by President Chen to Washington (then rumored by some in Beijing to be under consideration in Washington) would very likely trigger a military response from the mainland. That response, he predicted, would exceed in scope the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises of March 1996. The officer stated that such a military operation would not necessarily be a military strike against “Taiwan island” itself and would probably be quite different from the March 1996 exercises, but he emphasized it would be of greater scope. He stated that the 1996 exercises were successful as an “inoculation” against independence. But, from time to time, he continued, a “booster shot” is needed. If it actually represents elite thinking (and that is always a big “if”), I believe that his logic demonstrated the danger of Beijing’s pessimism about trends in cross-Strait relations combined with a belief in the efficacy of the military instrument in shaping or reshaping those trends.

The February Sino-American Summit: The End of the Anti-Terrorism Honeymoon?

All in all, in January it seemed that the complaints about the Bush administration’s past statements about Taiwan policy and previous weapons sales commitments were relatively muted. This is fully consistent with the “kiss and make up” atmosphere preceding summits. It is also consistent with the spirit of cooperation caused by the counterterrorism campaign after September 11. That said, we were told by some military analysts that we should not exaggerate how much anti-terrorism cooperation, in particular, will redefine the basic relationship.

One participant in the Harvard entourage raised the issue of the United States presence in Central Asia after September 11 and the potential diminution of China’s role in the region that the U.S. had fostered through the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in the late 1990s. Among military analysts, there was an expressed concern about a protracted U.S. presence, but there were two relatively moderate types of response. One was that we should not see Central Asia as a particularly Chinese concern. Rather, it should be viewed as a Russian concern first and foremost. There seemed to be some hope that Russia would prevent the United States from hurting China’s interests there. The second response was a moderate recognition that interests need not be seen as zero sum in Central Asia, and that what is good for the United States can be good for China too.
Various aspects of the war on terrorism are of concern to Chinese security analysts: increased U.S. security ties with both India and Pakistan; the prospect of long-term U.S. military basing in Central Asia; and, perhaps most important, an invigorated Japanese military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, including naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. These concerns were only exacerbated by President Bush’s statements during his trip to China regarding his adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, and by his avoidance of explicit public reference to the three joint communiqués signed with China by Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. Under these circumstances, any anti-terrorist or presummit honeymoon seemed to be coming to an end. In fact, while President Bush was still on his return trip from China, the PLA Daily criticized recent U.S. security initiatives with India as potentially destabilizing in South Asia.

Since the beginning of the year, the PRC press on the mainland and in Hong Kong has published a fairly steady flow of implicit and explicit criticisms of aspects of the U.S. war on terrorism as it applies to both the immediate region and Southwest Asia. The United States and Japan have been singled out in multiple articles for opportunistically exploiting September 11 to increase their military power projection capacities in areas surrounding China. The running underlying themes of these articles are that Tokyo had planned to break out of the constraints of its peacetime constitution and that the United States had planned to increase its presence in Central Asia and Southeast Asia even before September 11. The attacks on the U.S., the argument runs, only provided a pretext for the United States and its friends and allies to carry out their geostrategic plans, which are aimed as much at gaining hegemony and countering China as they are at countering terrorism.

The apparent deepening of U.S. defense ties with Taiwan in early 2002 has provided a catalyst for PRC concerns about United States activities in the region. Perhaps the most controversial event was the invitation of Taiwan Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming to Florida for a mid-March defense industry meeting attended by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary for East Asia James Kelley, among others. Official and unofficial protests from Beijing branded the invitation of a high-level cabinet member from Taiwan a violation of the 1979 U.S.-PRC normalization agreement. This visit followed the Bush administration’s consistent statements of commitment to Taiwan’s defense since April 2001 (e.g., that the United States would “do whatever it takes” to help Taiwan) and the sale of a robust arms package to Taiwan, which includes a promise to transfer eight diesel submarines to the island. Finally, the DOD’s “Nuclear Posture Review,” leaked to the press in March 2002, led to a backlash in China because it specified a future Taiwan scenario as one in which nuclear weapons might be useful. Moreover, this section was part of a broader document that suggested that U.S. first use of small, bunker-busting nuclear weapons should not be excluded.

It is this author’s opinion that there is a direct relationship between PRC confidence levels on Taiwan and PRC attitudes about the role of the United States and its allies in the region. In fall 2001, when Beijing was very confident that cross-Strait relations were moving in
a positive direction from the PRC vantage point, Beijing provided fairly consistent support for the American war on terrorism. In 2002, CCP elites have grown more concerned about domestic political trends on Taiwan and trends in the United States-Taiwan relationship. So, there was a simultaneous increase in the intensity of criticism of both U.S. and allied activities in the region and the potential for expansion of the anti-terrorism campaign to “axis of evil” states like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.

It is unclear whether these tensions will be eased by the succession process underway in Beijing. The CCP has been careful to include the traditionally domestically oriented Hu Jintao in several major international events, including trips to Europe and the United States. Hu also sat beside Qian Qichen during the latter’s January 24 speech on Taiwan policy. But Hu’s resume is thin on foreign affairs, and he will almost certainly be careful not to appear too weak on Taiwan policy. During his trip to Washington in early May, Hu apparently focused on Taiwan as a key point of difference with the Bush administration. In his dinner speech on May 1, the Chinese vice president complained about how high-level defense contacts and the transfer of sophisticated new weapons were inconsistent with previous U.S.-PRC agreements. When queried about Taiwan policy in the question and answer period, he belied his reputation as someone who handles questions without notes by reading stiffly a pre-prepared and lengthy four-point statement on Taiwan. Although his language was quite moderate and very far from vitriolic, there was little sense of new flexibility or new ideas on Taiwan policy.26

Arms Control, Arms Proliferation, and the Danger to U.S.-China Relations

In addition to the possibility that PRC frustration on Taiwan will eventually precipitate a use of coercive force by Beijing sometime later this decade, there is a serious, near-term danger to bilateral relations. When Beijing is frustrated about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or other aspects of U.S. foreign policy, it has often used arms sales and technical cooperation with countries of concern to the United States as a tit-for-tat response. It is not at all clear that Chinese elites understand how much more dangerous this would be to bilateral relations after September 11, given the changed mood in the United States and the sharply increased possibility that the United States might take military action against countries such as Iraq or Iran. For example, the issue of the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Antibalistic Missile Treaty (ABM treaty) came up at a military think tank in a way that sparked a spirited debate. One colonel argued, in typical fashion, that the withdrawal showed a U.S. unilateralism in international affairs that was dangerous. The colonel said that although China was not a signatory, the ABM treaty was seen in China and elsewhere as the keystone (jishi) of arms control. United States withdrawal would reduce Chinese cooperation on arms control issues such as fissile material cutoffs, missile production, and arms proliferation. I challenged the colonel on the latter point, stating that whereas I can imagine a logical link between U.S. development of national missile defense and China’s domestic missile production, I saw no link whatsoever between that issue and Chinese transfers of weapons to third countries. I warned about the danger of proliferation of any military equipment to certain countries given the domestic atmosphere in the post-September 11 United States.27 I was not impressed that my
protests registered with our Chinese interlocutors in the room.

What is more concerning still is that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty is not as sensitive an issue in China as U.S.-Taiwan military relations. After the defense meeting in Florida, and at a time when criticism of U.S. foreign policy in the war on terrorism is on the rise, President Jiang and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji both made high-profile visits to the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. President Jiang visited two countries of concern to the United States: Iran and Libya. In Tehran he expressed concerns about “random expansion” of the war on terrorism. Whether or not weapons transfers were discussed on this trip, such events must raise concerns, already high, about cooperation between Chinese defense firms and these nations. According to news reports, the United States government is currently preparing sanctions against particular Chinese firms for transferring to Iran missile technology or technology related to weapons of mass destruction. According to the Chinese press, proliferation was also a topic of discussions between Vice President Cheney and Vice President Hu in early May.

Conclusion

In the first half of 2002, Chinese security analysts and Taiwan experts appeared to be not nearly as optimistic as they were in early 2001 about Beijing’s long-term ability to make progress on its own agenda for cross-Strait relations without reliance on the threat or use of military force. On the positive side, levels of pessimism had not returned to those of 1999-2000.

If my analysis is correct, revised pessimism in Beijing about Taiwan should have implications for how the CCP elite perceives and reacts to U.S. strategy in the region and the world more generally. There is some preliminary supporting evidence for this view in the forms of the Jiang visit to Iran and Libya, the increasing press criticism of aspects of the war on terrorism, and the continuation of Chinese arms proliferation to countries of concern to the United States. On the other hand, Vice President Hu Jintao’s visit appeared successful and cordial, and the future Chinese leader appeared relatively moderate, albeit stiff, in answering a question about the Taiwan issue after his May 1 dinner speech. Chinese media reported that Vice President Cheney had reiterated the one China policy and U.S. adherence to the three communiqués in an earlier meeting that day with Vice President Hu. If accurately reported, such statements by U.S. leaders should serve to reduce Chinese concerns over the Bush administration’s Taiwan policy. That said, the PRC’s rapid military buildup, begun in 1999, continues apace, and aspects of that buildup continue to suggest a strong focus on future Taiwan scenarios in PRC military planning. There is also little doubt that the Bush administration will answer this buildup with more arms sales to Taiwan and closer coordination between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries. So, even without dramatic flare-ups such as a crisis over a possible future visit by President Chen Shui-bian, there are reasons to expect continued structural problems and tensions in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle. Those tensions can manifest themselves in direct PRC-ROC conflict or in reduced PRC cooperation with the United States.
on weapons proliferation and the war on terrorism.

May 3, 2002

Notes

1 The author would like to thank Michael Glosny for expert research assistance.


3 Interviews, Beijing, January 2002. For a published interview that makes some of the same points, see the comments of Zhou Jianming, a leading Shanghai think tank expert, in “Tenacity and Fragility Coexist in Sino-U.S. Relations—Scholars Comment on Bush’s Visit to China and Sino-U.S. Cooperation,” Hong Kong Ta kung pao (Internet version), February 24, 2002, FBIS-CCP-2002-0225-000027.


6 Interviews, Beijing, January 2002.

7 For coverage of the Qian Qichen speech, see “Quge taidu, Qian huanying minjin Dang Fang Dalu” (Excepting Taiwan independence [supporters], Qian invites the DPP to visit the mainland), Zhongguo shibao, January 25, 2002.


9 Interviews, Beijing, January 2002. National security experts on Taiwan recognized that the Olympics would not necessarily restrain Beijing from using force. Germany in 1936, Mexico in 1968, and the USSR in 1980 were all used as examples of the limited influence that the Olympics have on state belligerence.


11 Interviews with officials and scholars in Taipei, late January 2002. The increased realism about Taiwan politics among our mainland interlocutors went past a simple recognition that the CCP had to be willing to engage the DPP. Civilian experts also emphasized that better regional targeting of Taiwan was necessary on the mainland. Recognizing the strong pull of the DPP and Taiwan independence in the south, analysts emphasized that more had to be done to create positive incentives and increased economic leverage over cities such as Kaohsiung by creating better links to mainland cities such as Xiamen. There was a general sense that the mainland was going to try to be maximally flexible in dealing with local and central Taiwan authorities to deepen such economic and people-to-people contacts. These statements, I believe, foreshadowed the Qian Qichen speech on Taiwan, which was delivered just after we left Beijing.

12 Interviews, Beijing, January 2002.


14 Interview with Chinese intelligence analyst, Beijing, January 2001.


16 Interview, Beijing, January 2002.
17 Comments of a leading scholarly expert on Taiwan. The expert has good ties with military research institutes in Beijing.

18 Interview with PLA officer, Beijing, January 2002.

19 There were important exceptions, however, to this muted criticism. In the latter part of an interview with a leading civilian government analyst, the interlocutor seemed to get a bit emotional after hearing the U.S. scholar’s proposal for a unilateral PRC exercise in tension reduction. He complained about the new offensive strategies (jingwai zhanlue) being adopted by Taiwan through the use of ballistic and cruise missiles and submarines. He emphasized that he did not think that Taiwan could develop these missiles without U.S. support and that this ran against U.S. public rhetoric on Chinese proliferation, on MTCR, etc.

20 This view was pushed by one moderate Chinese military officer (of senior colonel rank) who had demonstrated such calm attitudes about the United States in the past.

21 For PRC reaction to President Bush’s exclusive mentioning of the Taiwan Relations Act, see “Where Lies the Mistake of Bush’s Policy Toward Taiwan,” People’s Daily Online, April 28, 2002; and “Shih Yin-hung Says Bush’s Beijing Visit Mixed with Success and Failure,” Taipei chung-kuo shih-pao (Internet version), February 25, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0225-000043.

22 See, for example, Ding Zengyi, “Yin mei junshi hezuo yin ren guanzhu” (U.S.-India military cooperation draws people’s attention), Jiefangjun bao, February 24, 2002. For more criticism of improved U.S.-India ties, see Qian Feng, “India Wants to be the International Maritime Police of the Malacca Strait,” Beijing Renminwang, April 20, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0420-000026, and “Where Lies the Mistake.”


26 Speech by Vice President Hu Jintao, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002.

27 Discussion with military scholars in Beijing, January 2002.


31 Ibid.