

## STALIN'S LAST PLAN

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The Soviet Union entered the postwar period as a major contributor to the Allied victory over Hitler's Germany. The presence of Soviet troops was used to create a new Soviet empire, covering most of Central and Southeastern Europe. The communist party was victorious in China. The Soviet economic system had survived the crises of the 1930s and had provided most of the resources to defeat the Nazi war machine. World War II spelled the end of colonial empires, leaving poor countries in Asia and Africa free to choose between democratic capitalism and Soviet socialism. The Soviets' promise of rapid economic growth held considerable appeal for such poor countries. The Stalinist system was put in place in the early 1930s amid confusion, experimentation, and a conviction that industrialization must take place quickly. This hastily conceived economic system (described in earlier chapters) had demanded much of the population in terms of sacrifice, hunger, and political terror.

Since its inception, Soviet leaders had not had a period of normalcy in which to consider how the system should work under "normal" conditions. As the Soviet Union entered the postwar era, at long last it had an opportunity to reevaluate its priorities and to make changes in the economic and political system it had

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cobbled together in the 1930s. The immediate postwar period, 1945–1950, was not a time for such reflection. Planning priorities were simple— recovery from wartime destruction. The first postwar plan, the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1945–1950), restored most branches to their prewar levels, with most resources going to those with the most war damage.

### **RETHINKING THE SYSTEM AFTER THE WAR?**

Stalin and the Communist Party had used party congresses to address weighty issues. The prewar history of the Soviet Communist Party shows that party congresses were convened only after internal power struggles had been resolved. For example, the XVI Party Congress of 1930 was delayed until Stalin's conclusive victory over his remaining potent rivals within the Politburo (Bukharin and Rykov). This congress stilled opposition to the Stalin leadership and embarked on a course of temporary partial liberalization.<sup>1</sup> The convening of the first postwar party congress would therefore signal that the internal power struggle concerning Stalin's eventual successor had been resolved (Stalin died in March of 1953) and that the party leadership was ready to take on major issues. The convening of the XIX Party Congress in 1952, thirteen years after the XVIII Congress in 1939, indicated a new political equilibrium and the party's readiness to address issues of postwar economic and political strategy.

The published official record of the XIX Party Congress is relatively uninformative.<sup>2</sup> We are fortunate, however, to have the secret file of all documents relating to the XIX Congress, preserved in a special fond, which includes the very first discussions

1. For an account of this period, see O. V. Khlevnyuk, *Politburo: Mekhanizm politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-e gody* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996).

2. *Direktivy XIX Sezda partii po piatomu piatiletnemu planu razvitiia SSSR na 1951–1955 gody* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952); *Ob itogakh vypolneniia piatovogo piatiletnego plana razvitiia SSSR i soiuznykh respublik na 1951–1955 gody* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956).

of convening the congress, all preparatory documents, drafts of speeches and reports, as well as the plans and reports drawn up by planning agencies for use in the congress. These documents were circulated to a limited group of the highest state and party officials; most were addressed directly to Stalin, who at that time was chairman of the Council of Ministers (the head of government) and General Secretary of the Communist Party. This chapter is largely based on the XIX Party Congress file located in the archives of the Hoover Institution.<sup>3</sup> This fond contains all materials associated with the preparation and execution of the XIX Party Congress, including the preparatory documents for the Fifth Five-Year Plan, which constituted its most important agenda item. The XIX Party Congress fond permits us to look behind the scenes of the Party Congress. We pay special attention to the reasons for the lengthy delay in convening the congress and to the preparation of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, which constituted the first real opportunity to reexamine economic priorities for the postwar era.

### *The Five-Year Delay*

The Hoover archives reveal the little-known intent of the Politburo to call the XIX Party Congress at the beginning of 1947, assigning A. Zhdanov the major organizational role. At this time, Zhdanov was second only to Stalin in the party, heading its secretariat. This Politburo assignment clearly established Zhdanov as Stalin's intended successor. On January 7, 1947, the Politburo approved a decision to call a plenum of the Central Committee on February 21, which included as a main agenda item the convocation of the XIX Party Congress and assigned Zhdanov responsi-

3. XIX Congress file (RTSHINDI, fond 592, 113 files) is a collection of documents very different in origin, all documents that had any connection to or made any reference to the XIX Party Congress. This collection came to the Hoover Institution archives as a part of a joint Hoover-Rosarchiv project and is located in films 2.2590-2.2602.

bility for the agenda.<sup>4</sup> The XIX Party Congress was eventually convened five years later under the direction of G. Malenkov, Zhdanov's rival. Why the five-year delay?

The January 1947 Central Committee plenum was only the second meeting of the Central Committee since 1941. Following the January 1947 plenum, there was a seven-month break, until August 15, when a short meeting took place to approve the Politburo decision to call the XIX Congress. Official descriptions of this meeting describe primarily discussions of agricultural issues with no mention of the convocation of the XIX Party Congress, which was (again following the Politburo's directive) to be the main item on the Plenum's agenda.<sup>5</sup> The official records, therefore, conceal the fact that the calling of the XIX Party Congress was discussed in 1947, but Zhdanov's personal collection of materials does indeed contain his speech at the 1947 plenum, in which he proposed a new party program and a new party statute as the main items of the XIX Party Congress agenda. He scheduled the congress to take place at the end of 1947 or at least in 1948.<sup>6</sup> The XIX Party Congress archives then fall silent without a single mention of the XIX Congress until December 1951, when the Politburo again set the date for the Congress for October of 1952.<sup>7</sup>

The delay in calling the party congress, although ignored in official accounts, caused apprehension among party members, as reflected in a note from a party member: "I request that you give an answer as to why a congress has not been called for so long. There are harmful rumors, such as this is Stalin's last congress . . . that he is aging."<sup>8</sup> Although there is no official explanation for the five-year delay in calling the congress, the answer lies in the fact that party congresses cannot be called in the midst of internal

4. Hoover film 2.2590 (592-1-1)

5. See Khrushchev's detailed description in N.S. Khrushchev, *Vospominania: Vremya. Liudi. Vlast'* (Moskovskie Novosti, 1999), p. 12–13.

6. Zhdanov's Personal Fond, 77-3-173.

7. Film 2.2590 (592-1-1), Protocol N 84, December 7, 1951, Meeting.

8. Film 2.2592(592-1-27), Letters to XIX CPSU Congress.

dissension within the Politburo. The power struggle that delayed the XIX Party Congress was the intense battle over Stalin's successor.

### *The Succession Struggle*

Stalin, owing to declining health and perhaps declining interest, was no longer in active control of the economy and of his subordinates at the turn of the decade of the 1950s. He spent less time in Moscow and more time in the south, receiving fewer and fewer visitors. "As is shown by Stalin's appointments journal for meetings in his Kremlin office, the circle of his appointments diminished. If he met with 2,000 visitors in 1940, then in 1950 the number diminished to around 700, and in 1951 and 1952, less than 500 per year. He did not appear for months in his Kremlin office. In 1950 he did not receive visitors for almost five months."<sup>9</sup> Stalin himself mentioned the succession issue, at least in principle. One of the few surviving senior party leaders from the purges of the 1930s, L. Kaganovich, stated: "Stalin generally considered that comrades should drop the task of direct rule after reaching the age of seventy. They can be advisers but not rulers."<sup>10</sup>

Stalin's successor was not to be drawn from the old political elite that survived the Great Purges. By the end of the war, the old political elite had shrunk to four: V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan, and L. Kaganovich. This group appeared to be more interested in its physical survival than in power and did not appear to represent a cohesive political force. It had been generally regarded that Molotov, on account of his earlier experience as prime minister and foreign minister (somehow Stalin thought that the prime minister had to be Russian in origin), would be Stalin's successor, but Stalin effectively removed Molotov (along with Mi-

9. R. Pikhov, "Sotsialno-politicheskoe razvitiie i bor'ba za vlast' v poslevoennom Sovetskom Soiuzie (1945–1953)," MIZh, no. 6 (1999); <http://www.machaon.ru/>.

10. Ibid., p. 498.

koyan) from contention.<sup>11</sup> Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs: “Whereas earlier we, people of the prewar times, had regarded Molotov as the future leader of the country after Stalin’s death, we now understood that that would not be the case. At every regular meeting, Stalin attacked Molotov, attacked Mikoyan, devouring them. These two were in disgrace; their very lives were in danger.”<sup>12</sup>

To replace the ranks of the old leaders depleted by the Great Terror, Stalin brought in new faces to the Politburo. Although Stalin had earlier refrained from consolidating party and state power, he himself assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in 1940 in addition to his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party. He added five younger party leaders: Beria, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Kosygin, and Khrushchev; they would vie to become Stalin’s successor after the war. These new leaders were assigned different responsibilities: Zhdanov, Voznesensky, and Kosygin were assigned party, ideology, and planning; Beria and Malenkov, who served together on the State Committee for Defense (GKO) during the war, were responsible for the military and security. Zhdanov served as the head of the party apparatus. Malenkov became Stalin’s deputy and eventually deputy prime minister. Voznesensky also served as deputy prime minister, carrying out the lion’s share of work in the state apparatus, including the chairmanship of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). According to a Politburo decree of March 29, 1948, Voznesensky and Malenkov alternatively chaired meetings of the Council of Ministers. They formed two competing groups—Zhdanov-Voznesensky (also known as the Leningrad group) and Malenkov-Beria—that engaged in the war of succession.

Zhdanov, the former first secretary of Leningrad and member of Politburo since 1939, served as secretary of the Party’s Central Committee and was clearly second only to Stalin in the party or-

11. Khrushchev, *Vospominania*, p. 96.

12. *Ibid.*

ganization in the late 1940s. It was in this capacity that the Politburo assigned him in February 1947 to make preparations for the XIX Party Congress. Apparently, the counterweight of his rivals Malenkov and Beria stalemated the first call for a party congress. Eighteen months later, before any congress had been convened, Zhdanov died (August 31, 1948), from an apparent heart attack, although foul play cannot be ruled out. Zhdanov's death disrupted the fragile political equilibrium and initiated a series of political events that led to the defeat of surviving members of his Leningrad group, of which Voznesensky remained the most influential. First, three prominent Leningrad party officials were accused of anti-party activities. In February 1949, Malenkov, the main rival of the Leningrad group, was sent to Leningrad to investigate, where he ordered arrests. Voznesensky, though not directly implicated, was faulted for lack of vigilance and in September 1949 was fired as head of Gosplan after a series of setbacks engineered by his opponents, starting with an accusation of having deliberately disobeyed an order of Stalin.<sup>13</sup> Voznesensky's fate

13. Oleg Khlevnyuk, "Sovetskaia ekonomicheskaia politika na rubezhe 40–50 godov i delo gosplana," Working Paper, Florence, Italy, March 2000, describes the power struggle as follows: In November of 1948, Stalin proposed that Voznesensky work out a plan to eliminate the usual seasonality of the first quarter. According to Mikoyan, Voznesensky agreed, even though he knew this was an impossible task. Voznesensky agreed to the necessary increases in the first-quarter production plan, but the plan change was never made. Pomaznev (the head of Gosplan) informed Stalin in February as part of the attack on Voznesensky. Stalin gave an order to the Council of Ministers to investigate, and it sided with Pomaznev. Beria, through his agent in Gosplan, found a memo of Voznesensky stating that it was unrealistic to eliminate seasonality of the first quarter—and wrote on it "v delo" (in processing), which effectively stopped the order. Beria placed this memo on Stalin's desk on March 5, 1949. A 1949 decree "About Gosplan," which bears marks of Stalin's participation, states: "The government of the USSR not once declared that the most important task of Gosplan is the assurance in state plans of the growth and development of the economy, as indicated by existing reserves of productive capacity and battling against any kind of agency tendency toward lowering of plans. As the general state organ for planing the national economy, Gosplan must be an absolutely objective and one hundred percent honest organ. In its work, there should be no kind of influence or manipulation of figures. On the basis of an investigation of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, it was established that Gosplan allows nonobjective and dishonest approaches to the questions of planning and evaluation of plan

was sealed when his opponents fabricated a case showing that Gosplan had mishandled secret documents. He was arrested along with a number of his relatives and was executed on October 1, 1950, on the basis of the directive "On responsibility for distribution of government secrets and loss of documents containing government secrets." The ensuing 1949 purge of Gosplan was narrow, showing that Voznesensky, not Gosplan, was the real target. There was no general accusation of counterrevolutionary groups within Gosplan; of Gosplan's 1,400 employees, 130 were fired and more than forty of those were transferred to other work; of twelve deputies of Voznesensky, only one was imprisoned.

The Soviet leadership thus entered the 1950s with the Malenkov-Beria group victorious as a consequence of the physical elimination of Zhdanov and Voznesensky and with an ailing Stalin. The Politburo announced the convening of the long-awaited XIX Party Congress in December 1951 and named Malenkov to deliver the keynote address.

### THE XIX PARTY CONGRESS

The "new call" for the XIX Party Congress reflected the outcome of the succession struggle between the Malenkov-Beria faction and the defeated Leningrad faction. Whereas Zhdanov had announced the agenda of the XIX Party Congress in 1947, the 1952 agenda gave Malenkov the highly visible role of delivering the keynote address, while Stalin limited himself to a short appearance. The Hoover fond contains copies of the various draft versions of Malenkov's speech along with the version that was actually delivered, and various commentaries on Malenkov's draft speech, especially those by Stalin, permit us to determine the degree of consensus and particularly Stalin's own stance. We

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fulfillment, which expresses itself in the manipulation of figures with the goal of obscuring the real state of affairs. It was also discovered that Gosplan has joined ranks with separate ministries and agencies to lower productive capacities and economic plans of ministries."



know from Khrushchev how carefully Stalin prepared his papers and speeches.<sup>14</sup> It was therefore to be expected that Stalin would review the important Malenkov address with great care.

In his memoirs, Kaganovich confirmed that there was widespread discussion of the Malenkov report: "The draft version of Malenkov's speech was discussed under the direction of Stalin on the presidium and several times corrections were made."<sup>15</sup> The XIX Congress file contains the version of Malenkov's report on which Stalin's corrections and handwritten comments were made.<sup>16</sup> It is noteworthy that these comments were largely editorial in nature, although some of them obviously reveal differences in Stalin's and Malenkov's views. First, Stalin edited to "soften" Malenkov's critical tone concerning the failures of the economy. He deleted adjectives like "frequent" or "numerous" as applied to errors and mistakes in the economy; "numerous" cases of bad-quality production became "cases of bad-quality production."<sup>17</sup> Second, Stalin showed his flair for colorful terminology: Malenkov's "evil persons who want to overthrow the regime" became Stalin's "those who want to stab us in the back."<sup>18</sup> Third, Stalin deleted some references to "Stalin-hero," but he left many such references untouched; he cut two pages glorifying Stalin at the end of the report and put the word "Party" in place of "Stalin." Fourth, Stalin made a number of modest corrections to Malenkov's suggested control figures for the fifth five-year plan (as reported in the chapter by Gregory). Stalin's relatively modest corrections can be interpreted as putting more "social optimism" into Malenkov's speech and as confirming that everything was under control. The best example of the latter is Stalin's editing

14. N. Khrushchev, *Vospominania*, p. 109.

15. L. Kaganovich, *Pamyatnie zapiski* (Moscow:Vagrius, 1996), p. 492.

16. Hoover 2.2590 (592-1-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). All these files contain different versions of Malenkov's report, officially called *Otchetniy Doklad TsK*. File 7 contains Stalin's corrections, dated July 17, 1952.

17. 2.2590 (592-1-6). Subsequent citations give only the pages of the report (following the archival pagination).

18. 2.2590 (592-1-6).

of Malenkov's "After the war the inflow of new party members slowed" to Stalin's "The Party decided to slow down the recruitment of new party members." The only case in which Malenkov did not accept Stalin's correction, with respect to the "social optimism" issue, was the passage on the role of satire in Soviet literature where Malenkov insisted that Soviet artists must "with the fire of satire burn out of Soviet life everything that is negative, rotten, dead." Stalin probably thought it was too harsh a method to be used in optimistic Soviet literature.<sup>19</sup>

Malenkov's report to the XIX Party Congress covered foreign policy, internal policy, and party issues. The speech failed to break new ground, but it did raise the notion of peaceful coexistence; among the traditional invectives against the "American imperialism," Malenkov said: "We are confident that, in peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist system will prove its superiority more strikingly with each passing year. But we have no intention whatever of forcing our ideology or our economic system on anybody. The export of revolution is nonsense, says Comrade Stalin. Each country will make its own revolution if it wants to do so, and if it does not want to do so there will be no revolution."<sup>20</sup> Malenkov was also critical of economic performance, stating, for example, that as a consequence of "unsatisfactory utilization of production capacity and extensive waste due to mismanagement, many industrial enterprises fail to fulfill their assignments in lowering unit cost of output and greatly exceed their quotas of expenditure."<sup>21</sup> In his discussion of the party, Malenkov focused on the need for more inner-party democracy and self-criticism: "The Central Committee has focused the attention

19. In 1955, Khrushchev used this episode in his latter power struggle against Malenkov, causing additional documents on this issue to be placed in the XIX Congress file.

20. English translation here is taken from *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death* (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. 102.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

of Party organizations on the task of consistently practicing inner Party democracy and developing criticism and self-criticism.”<sup>22</sup>

*The Fifth Five-Year Plan: The Main Agenda Item*

Party congresses require a major theme. If the XIX Party Congress had taken place as originally scheduled in 1947 under Zhdanov, its theme would have been the new party program. Under Malenkov-Beria, the major theme became the ratification of the second postwar five-year plan—the fifth five-year plan—for the period 1951–1955. It is for this reason that the XIX Party Congress fond contains extremely rich materials on the origins and preparation of the fifth five-year plan.

The USSR learned that it was living in the fifth five-year plan when *Pravda* published the agenda of the XIX Congress on August 20, 1952. The state's official economic publication—*Planned Economy*—had not included a single reference to a new five-year plan during the period 1949–1952, and the announcement of the existence of the fifth five-year plan in the fourth number of this journal in 1952 was entirely unexpected. Western experts long speculated on the causes of these delays. Naum Jasny suggested that as late as 1951 there was no five-year plan at all, probably because of the Korean War and Stalin's lack of interest.<sup>23</sup> Eugène Zaleski speculated that Gosplan had proposed drafting a long-term plan in the summer of 1947 but that project was abandoned because of the firing of Voznesensky as head of Gosplan, Stalin's own ambitious plans for building communism through large construction projects, and the Korean War.<sup>24</sup>

### PREPARATION OF THE FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The Hoover archives allow us to trace the chronology of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. Its first draft was prepared already at the end of

22. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

23. Naum Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization, 1928–1952* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 250.

24. Eugène Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 395–96.

May/beginning of June of 1950—half a year before the formal end of the preceding Fourth Five-Year Plan and almost two years before the calling of the XIX Party Congress. At this time, M. Saburov, the chairman of Gosplan and successor to the executed Voznesensky, submitted three plan documents addressed to Stalin: Report of Gosplan (M. Z. Saburov) “On the draft directives for preparing the plan of the economy for 1951–1955 prepared by order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,” Draft Decree of the Council of Ministers “On directives for the preparation of the five-year plan for the development of the economy for 1951–1955,” and statistical appendixes including the basic indicators for industry.<sup>25</sup>

The June 1950 draft was prepared by Gosplan for ratification by the Council of Ministers; since, as of June 1950, there was no intent to call a new party congress, Gosplan assumed that Council of Ministers (and of course Politburo) ratification would be all that was necessary. The June 1950 Gosplan plan focused on the problems of plan fulfillment from 1946 to 1950: the electricity deficit and its resolution, the need to develop machinery, the oil deficit, the types of machinery to be developed, and rail construction. The 1950 Gosplan report also focused on problems of incomplete capital construction and the failure to reduce construction costs, resulting in incomplete construction. In general, one can say that the 1950 Gosplan draft was a typical five-year plan document that differed little in form and content from earlier five-year plans; in fact, its format perfectly mirrored that of the Fourth Five-Year Plan.<sup>26</sup>

The XIX Party Congress fond contains all subsequent five-year plan drafts arranged chronologically, allowing us to trace the manner in which long-term Soviet plans were formulated and

25. File 16 (2.2591) (592-1-16) contains the original draft of the plan dated June 3, 1950.

26. “Zakon o pyateletnem plane vosstanovleniia i razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1946–1950” in *Bor’ba KPSS za vosstanovlenie i razvitie narodnogo khoziaistva v poslevoennom periode (1945–1953)* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), pp. 47–119.

passed through various state organizations prior to their approval by political authorities. This process allows us to understand the various interest groups at play during the planning process, how they affected the process, and with what success.

### *The Process*

The first draft of the fifth five-year plan was completed on or around the end of May 1950 (see chronology in Table 1). It was finally approved by the Politburo on June 23, 1952, and by the XIX Party Congress on October 14, 1952. In other words, the process of preparation and approval of the fifth five-year plan took more than two years. What happened in this interval? What was the internal process?

We begin by noting two regularities: first, at least at the formal level, all discussions were based on Gosplan drafts, which served as the starting point for all deliberations; second, there appeared to be no direct channel of communication between the main planners. All communications were directed to Stalin, and the various planning bodies would then react to the others' positions directly to Stalin. The Gosplan drafts served as the basis for the discussion of the five-year plan drafts by the two most important alternate planning agencies—the State Supply Agency, Gosplan, headed by one of Stalin's oldest associates, Kaganovich, and the Ministry of Finance, headed by longtime minister Zverev.

A number of conclusions can be drawn based on the chronology of draft plans shown in Table 1. First, the five-year planning process required a great deal of time. The initial Gosplan draft was completed in early summer of 1950 and the final approval at the XIX Party Congress was on October 14, 1952—a time span of more than two years. The chronology shows the vast number of steps in the process, with Gosplan alone submitting eighteen separate documents (plans), Gosplan eight plans, and the Ministry of Finance two commentaries. Second, the chronology shows three major rounds of discussion: May–June 1950, January 1951,

TABLE 1  
CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

<i>Date</i>	<i>Agency</i>	<i>Document</i>	<i>Title</i>
1950			
May 31	Gossnab	Reference material	Tables of the volume of industrial production
May 31	Gossnab	Note	Note of the Chairman of Gosplan
June 3	Gosplan	Report	Report of Gosplan about draft directives
June 3	Gosplan	Draft	Decree of Council of Ministers "About the directives for preparing a plan for the national economy for 1951-55"
June 3	Gosplan	Supplements	Basic indicators of the development of the national economy for 1951-1955
June 8	Gosplan	Notes	Notes of the chairman of Gosplan about the conclusions of Gosplan, Ministry of Finance, and others
June 9	State Labor Committee	Notes	Commentaries of State Labor Committee
June 23	Ministry of Finance	Notes	Commentaries of Ministry of Finance
1951			
Jan. 23	Gosplan	Draft	Decree of Central Committee "About the directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan"
Jan. 23	Gosplan	Report	"About the directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan for 1951-55"
Jan. 23	Gosplan	Notes	Military and special branches of industry
Feb. 2	Gossnab	Draft	Draft decree of the Council of Ministers about the economizing of lead in the national economy (with Stalin's comments)
Feb. 2	Gossnab	Notes	About the draft of Gosplan "About the directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan of the national economy"
Mar. 2	Gossnab	Notes	Note of Kaganovich about the volume of accumulation and state reserves
June 7	Gosplan	Informational material	Basic indicators of the national economy
June 7	Gosplan	Report	About the draft of directives for creating the 5th five-year plan of development 1951-55

June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Appendix	Basic developments of indicators to the draft for preparing the directives for preparing the plan
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Informational material	Basic indicators of development of the national economy according to economic regions
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Informational material	Basic indicators for the development of the most important electrical systems
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Supplement	Basic corrections to the draft directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan presented to the Council of Ministers in January 1951
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Notes	Notes of Saburov concerning the military and special branches of the economy
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Informational materials	Basic indicators of the 5th five-year plan of the development of the national economy
June 7	<b>Gosplan</b>	Draft	Decree of the Central Committee "About the directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan"
July 17	<b>Gosnab</b>	Notes	About the draft directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan
July 17	<b>Gosnab</b>	Informational materials	Preliminary balances
July 17	<b>Gosnab</b>	Informational materials	Tables of resources and requirements
July 27	<b>Ministry of Finance</b>	Notes	Commentary of Ministry of Finance
Aug. 16	<b>Gosplan</b>	Notes	On the draft decree of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee "Directives . . ."
Aug. 16	<b>Gosplan</b>	Draft	Decree of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee "Directives to the preparation of the 5th five-year plan"
1952			
June 23	Politburo	Decision	To prepare "Directives for preparing the 5th five-year plan"
Aug. 15	<b>Central Committee</b>	Decision	Decision of Plenum of Central Committee to approve the draft "Directives"
Aug. 20	Central Committee	Draft	Publication of directives in <i>Pravda</i>
Oct. 14	Party Congress	<b>Directives</b>	Directives of the XIX Party Congress for the 5th five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-55

NOTE: Gosnab apparently used different dating procedures for its files. The Gosplan commentaries refer to the Gosplan drafts dated later than the Gosnab commentaries.

and June 1951. There is no evidence of discussion of the fourth project of August 1951, which appeared in the official Politburo–Council of Ministers document but was not approved. The final “Directives” approved by the XIX Party Congress in October 1952 was basically the same document as proposed one year earlier.

Third, the various planning agencies responded quickly to the other draft plans. The long intervals of inactivity appear to be explained by the delays of political authorities in pushing the process along. These delays cannot be attributed to the need to wait for the convening of the XIX Party Congress, because initially it was expected that this plan would be ratified by the Council of Ministers–Politburo without any benediction by a party congress. Actual approval of the Fifth Five-Year Plan occurred with the decision of the central committee to approve the plan on August 15, 1952, almost two months before the formal approval by the XIX Party Congress.

### *Stalin’s Minor Role*

Archival materials relating to the 1930s show Stalin’s intense involvement in five-year planning; Stalin was still actively involved in planning as late as the 1949 annual plan (see the chapter by Gregory). We can get some sense of Stalin’s involvement in the Fifth Five-Year Plan from his written comments and his other communications relating to this five-year plan. All the draft plans and agency discussions are addressed directly to Stalin; the number of copies was limited and all are marked “completely secret,” with the detailed defense budget marked “especially secret.” In the Hoover files, although some documents are accompanied by notes that indicate corrections made by Stalin himself, usually in the form of markings and handwritten comments, few of the documents contain any sign of Stalin’s own corrections; there are only underline marks indicating that the text had been read. Stalin’s few remarks reveal his preferences. In a rare example of per-



sonal intervention, Stalin marked clearly his preference for military over consumer production, when he demanded an increase in aluminum production for aviation and a decrease in “civilian output.”<sup>27</sup> In another isolated comment, Stalin asked about the possibility of decreasing coal imports. Few though they are, these remarks reinforce the standard image of a dictator concerned with the creation of a heavy industry base, self-sufficient from capitalist economies.

Our conclusion is that we do not see the same type of intense involvement by Stalin in the Fifth Five-Year Plan as in the five-year plans of the 1930s. A number of explanations can be offered, ranging from Stalin's growing interest in long-term technological plans, his realization that five-year plans really did not matter, or the simple fact that Stalin was ill and old and not up to the time-consuming job of reviewing all these statistical calculations.

### *The Battle among Agencies*

In the prewar period, no single organization handled supply. Supply contracts were formulated in general terms by Gosplan and the contracts themselves were handled by producer supply organizations or specialized supply organizations. The most important change in the management of the economy was the formation of the State Committee for Material and Equipment Supply (Gossnab) on December 15, 1947.<sup>28</sup> Gossnab was set up to organize the distribution of materials among major wholesale users, such as ministries and territorial organizations. To add

27. Memo of Kaganovich to Stalin (“Ob ekonomii svintsia”), 592-1-19.

28. Kaganovich wrote (*Pamyatuie zapiski*, p. 494) about the founding of Gossnab: “In the end of 1947, Stalin proposed to the Politburo to split Gosplan into two different agencies—Gosnab and Gossnab. Gossnab was to be the independent distributor of all state resources. As justification, Stalin pointed out the growing complexity of the economy. The director of Gossnab was supposed to be one of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and a member of Politburo. The administrative core of the new agency was mostly transferred from former functional supply agencies—Glavneftsbyt, Glavmetallsbyt, Glavuglesbyt, Glavlessbyt, and Glavkhimsbyt.”

weight to Gosnab, one of Stalin's most experienced aides, L. Kaganovich, was named the first director of Gosnab. Gosnab's most important task was to battle the ministries' struggle for excess materials by working out "scientific" norms of materials usage. Beginning in 1948, Gosnab proposed 1800 norms for industry; by 1950, it was using 6000 norms.<sup>29</sup>

Gosnab was thus added to Gosplan and to the Ministry of Finance as the third organization responsible for planning. Importantly, the five-year planning process did not provide a formal venue for the industrial ministries to react to the proposals of Gosplan, as they most obviously did in the case of annual plans. In the five-year planning process only designated state committees were allowed to present their commentaries on Gosplan's drafts.<sup>30</sup> The agency commentaries were signed by the heads of the three agencies, Saburov (Gosplan), Kaganovich (Gosnab), and Zverev (Ministry of Finance), but some specialized reports were signed by department heads. All documents were addressed directly to Stalin; therefore, there was no formal channel from one agency to another (although informal channels may have existed).

### *Gosplan*

Table 2 shows five drafts of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. The core of Gosplan's five-year plan drafts were the physical targets for 127 products (1955 end targets with 1950 figures given for reference). These products included coal, steel, number of automobiles, locomotives, tons of grain and milk products, and so on. Gosplan also provided aggregate figures for national income, gross industrial production (broken down into sectors A and B), gross agricultural production, and the cumulated total of capital

29. E. Lokshinam, "Normirovanie raskhoda syriia i materialov v proizvodstve," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, no. 6, 1950.

30. Other state committees were also permitted a say, such as the Central Statistical Administration, the State Technology Committee, the State Construction Committee, and the Central Committee of Trade Unions.

TABLE 2  
PHYSICAL TARGETS OF THE DRAFTS OF THE FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN  
(JUNE 1950; JANUARY, JUNE, AND AUGUST 1951)

Nomenclature	Measure	GP						GS		MF		GP		Final-1952		Results GKS- 1957
		(6/50)	(6/50)	(1/51)	(6/50)	(6/50)	(1/51)	(1/51)	(6/51)	(6/51)	(6/51)	(8/51)	(Congress)			
Pig iron	Mln.tons	31	36.5	33	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	33.88	33.3	
Steel	Mln.tons	41.5	47	42.7	47.4	46.1	47.4	46.1	46.1	46.1	46.1	46.1	46.1	44.29	45.3	
Rolled steel	Mln.tons	31.5	36	32.5		35.2		35.2		35.2		35.2		34.04	35.3	
Small-section steel	Mln.tons		2.4		2.3	2.3		2.3		2.3		2.3		2.29		
Plate steel	Mln.tons		3.8		3.9	3.9		3.9		3.9		3.9		3.79		
Wire rod	Mln.tons		2.3		1.8	1.8		1.8		1.8		1.8				
Carbon steel, sheet	Mln.tons		1.4													
Carbon steel, sort	Mln.tons		2.7													
Alloyed sort	Mln.tons		1.75													
Structural steel	Mln.tons		0.135											0.07		
Calibrated steel	Mln.tons		0.85													
Reinforcing iron	Mln.tons		0.7													
Broad-brimmed girders	Mln.tons		0.4													
Low-alloyed rolled steel	Mln.tons		0.3													
High-carbon wire	Mln.tons		0.08													
Steel pipes	Mln.tons	4	4.3			3.65								3.5		
Steel pipes, casing	Mln.tons	0.726	611													
Steel pipes, drilling	Mln.tons	0.171	147													
Steel pipes, pump-compressors	Mln.tons	0.226	215													
Steel pipes, oil pipelines	Mln.tons	0.144	380													
Steel pipes, cracking	Th.tons	43	43													
Steel pipes, rolled	Mln.tons		0.6													
Steel pipes, seamless rolled	Mln.tons		0.26													
Steel pipes, ball-bearing	Mln.tons		0.15													
Coke	Mln.tons	46	51			48.2									43.6	
Coke-metallurgy	Mln.tons		45													

TABLE 2 (continued)

Nomenclature	Measure	Results										
		GP (6/50)	GS (6/50)	MF (6/50)	GP (1/51)	GS (1/51)	GP (6/51)	MF (6/51)	GP 8/51	Final-1952 (Congress)	GKS-1957	
Iron ore	Mln.tons	65.8			74.1		80		75			71.9
Aluminium	Mln.tons	0.4	0.5		0.5	0.57	0.5		0.5		406.25	
Copper	Mln.tons	0.49	0.6						0.44			
Refined copper	Mln.tons	0.4	0.545		0.46	0.62	0.46		0.44		2,387.43	
Lead	Mln.tons	0.325	0.325		0.325		0.325		0.275		278.09	
Zink	Mln.tons	0.4	0.4		0.4				0.35			
Magnesium	Th.tons	18							18			
Tin	Th.tons	20	20		17	70	17		15		12.05	
Nickel	Th.tons	39	69		59				60		59.23	
Tungsten	Th.tons		15						16			
Molybdenum	Th.tons		5.7			8.9	11		9			
Cobalt	Th.tons		1.1			1.15	1.2		1.2			
Stribium	Th.tons		4.3									
Stribium-electrolyte	Th.tons		3.2									
Electric power	Bln.kWh	167	170		169	175	175		166.5		163.77	170.2
Hydroelectric power	Bln.kWh	32	35				32					23.2
Electric power—Ural	Bln.kWh		31.5				27.4					
Electric power—Kemerovo	Bln.kWh		7									
Electric power—Central region	Bln.kWh		31				26.5					
Electric power—South	Bln.kWh		23.4				24.2					
Electric power—Uzbek.	Bln.kWh		3.36									
Coal	Mln.tons	378	400		384	410	384		370		372.61	391.3
Coal-coke	Mln.tons		92						82		77.36	
Peat	Mln.tons	47	47		46				44		44.70	50.8
Petroleum	Mln.tons	60	60		60		60		60		70.25	70.8
Gas	Bln.cbm	13,552	10.7		10.7							10.356
Metal cutting machines	Th.pieces	90	90		90		80		72			117.1
Metal cutting machines—large, heavy, and single-design types	Th.pieces	3.9	4.3		4	4.344	4.3		4.3		3.99	3.54

Instruments	Mln.rub	2,850				4,500	3,500	4,108.70
Vacuum instruments	Mln.pieces					120	100	
Metallurgical equipment	Th.tons	200	220.5	200	232	232	225	210.23
Steam and gas turbines	Mln.qW	6.84	6.84	6.2	6.235	6.235	5.9	5,428.00
Hydraulic turbines	Mln.qW	1.93	1.6	2.77	2.699	2.699	2.58	2,454.15
Boilers	Th.sqm	1,000		962	992	992	900	964.29
Boilers—high capacity	Th.sqm	315	315					
Stream turbine generators	Mln.qW	3.2	5	3.35	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.113
Hydraulic turbine generators	Mln.qW	1.8					2.8	1,412.7
Power transformers	Mln.kW	20	20	25	28	28	26	
Electric motors (AC)	Mln.kW	11.5					11	
Electric motors (less than 100 w.)	Mln.pieces		1.75					
Electric motors (more than 100 w.)	Th.pieces	23	30	23				12.5
Cable	Th.tons	350	310	329			315	
Motor vehicles	Th.pieces	700	700	450			400	436.36
Trucks	Th.pieces	555	555	362			400	329
Trucks with gas generators	Th.pieces		120					
Trucks with gas balons	Th.pieces		60					
Dump trucks	Th.pieces		132					
Diesel trucks (7–10 tons)	Th.pieces		16					
Diesel trucks (10–12 tons)	Th.pieces		4.2					
Tractors	Th.pieces	190	190	129		163.5	225	135.23
Tractors (15 hp)	Th.pieces	396.76					277	321.8
Tractors—gas generators	Th.pieces		28					
Agricultural machines	Mln.rub	7		4	4.35	4.35	3.65	
Grain combines	Th.pieces	50		40	50	50	40	48
Mainline steam locomotives	Th.pieces	1,577	1,577		1,255	1,255	1,025	9.65
Mainline electric locomotives	Th.pieces	0,227	0,227	0,205	0,205	0,205	24	0.194
Mainline freight cars	Th.pieces	41	41	32	28	28	24	34.4
Mainline passenger railroad cars	Th.pieces	2.87		2.8	2.05	2.05	1.8	1.772

TABLE 2 (continued)

Nomenclature	Measure	GP (6/50)	GS (6/50)	MF (6/50)	GP (1/51)	GS (1/51)	GP (6/51)	MF (6/51)	GP (8/51)	Final-1952 (Congress)	Results	
											GKS-	1957
Oil equipment	Th.tons				140		152		150	159.09		
Chemical equipment	Th.tons						200		160	138.95	111.2	
Pumps centrifugal	Th.pieces	90							85			
Pumps—piston	Th.pieces	23							13			
Excavators	Th.pieces	5	5.5						3.75		5.25	
Bulldozers	Th.pieces	6.8	7						3.7		7.511	
Graders	Th.pieces	3							2.4		1.014	
Scrapers	Th.pieces	4	4.5						3.5		2.025	
Spinning machines	Th.pieces	1,050			900		1,000		950		2,040	
Looms	Th.pieces	30.5			30				25		16	
Tug vessels, river	Th.HP	127.95					156.5		141			
Barges with engines	Th.tons	55					45		45			
Barges without engines	Th.tons	904.2			1,047.7		1,084		900.8			
Tug vessels, sea	Th.HP	96.65					61		61			
Ships, sea	Th.tons	324.75					137.5		123.5		337.88	
Ships, river	Th.tons	19.5					42.95		42.95			
Fishing ships	Th.HP	126.4							104.4		56.67	
Ammonia	Th.tons	970	1,240				1,030		930			
Soda ash	Th.tons	1,640	1,900		1,708	1,738	1,708		1,495		1,396.35	
Caustic soda	Th.tons	570	650		570	647	570		536		581.48	563.4
Sulfuric acid	Mln.tons		4.3						4.176			
Inorganic fertilizers	Th.tons	8,050	10,500		9,700		9,700		9,300		9,502.17	9,640
Ammonium nitrate	Mln.tons		1.9									
Superphosphate	Mln.tons		5									
KCl	Mln.tons		1.135									
Ammonium sulfate	Mln.tons		0.735									
Synthetic rubber	Th.tons	300	480		300	422	300		300		300.00	
Natural rubber	Th.tons						22		20			

Hauling of commercial timber	Mln.cbm	246	300	246	300	246	244	240.91	212.1
Lumber	Mln.cbm	34	90	60	80	60	62		75.6
Paper	Th.tons	1,840	2,300	1,845	2,117	1,845	1,755	1,743.06	1,862
Cellulose	Th.tons	1,900	2,100				1,810		
Cement	Mln.tons	20	20	23.5	25	25	25	22.45	22.5
Window glass	Mln.sqm	100	115	95			80	304.76	99.8
Construction brick	Mln.pieces	30	35	23			30	28,630.71	20.8
Soft roofing materials	Mln.sqm	395	395				460		503.5
Asbestos shingles	Mln.pieces	1,600	1,900	1,600	1,800	1,600	1,600	1,419.80	
Ginned cotton	Mln.tons				2.5	2.38	1.965		
Cotton textiles	Mln.meters	6,500	7,150	7,000	6,600	6,680	7,600	6,268.52	5,905
Woolen textiles	Mln.meters	220	240	220	190	245	300	236.92	252.3
Linen	Mln.meters	500	620	660	550	500	500		305.5
Silk textiles	Mln.meters	200	220	230	240	245	260		525.8
Artificial fiber	Th.tons	113	113	113		133	133		110.5
Leather footwear	Mln.pieces	350	370	324	300	375	350	315.41	274.3
Hosiery	Th.pieces	900	960	850	915	945	900		772.2
Meat	Th.tons	2,800	2,800	2,900		2,900	2,400	2,412.57	2,524
Fish	Th.tons	3,025	3,175	3,000		3,000	2,900	2,828.40	2,737
Butter	Th.tons	600	660	600		600	550	556.47	463
Vegetable oil	Th.tons	1,540	1,540	1,500	1,700	1,500	1,350	1,381.21	1,168
Sugar	Th.tons	4,300	4,300	4,500	4,700	4,500	4,200	4,476.65	3,419
Soap	Th.tons	1,460	1,560	1,425		1,425	1,200		1,077
Crude alcohol, food	Mln.dkl	70	70		76		75		
Flour (centralized resources)	Mln.tons		19	19		19.5	19.5		
Groats	Th.tons	1,600	2,000		2,000		1,700		
Petroleum, refinery	Mln.tons	59	59				60		
Benzine, aviation	Mln.tons	3.72	3.72				3.6		
Benzine, automobile	Mln.tons	13.79	13.79				11		
Kerosine	Mln.tons	8.61	8.61				6.5		
Diesel oil	Mln.tons	7.3	7.3				8.1		
Heating oil	Mln.tons	6.83	6				14.8		
Diesel lubricate	Mln.tons	0.36	0.417						
Ship-oil	Mln.tons	1.55					2.4		

TABLE 2 (continued)

Nomenclature	Measure	Results						GKS-1957					
		GP (6/50)	GS (6/50)	MF (6/50)	GP (1/51)	GS (1/51)	GP (6/51)		MF (6/51)	GP 8/51	Final-1952 (Congress)		
Aviation lubricate	Th.tons	260											
Gas from coal and oil shale	Bln.cbm		2.85										
Compressors	Th.pieces	40			50					50			
Compressors (40-100)	Th.pieces		0.7										
Tires	Mln.pieces		16.3										
Crosstie, large scale	Mln.pieces	75	85						84				
Standard homes	Mln.sqm		5.9										
Paperboard	Mln.tons		0.6										
Asbestos	Th.tons	600	600						690				
Pipes, asbestos	Th.km	15	15										
Pipes, sewerage	Th.tons	350	350						320				
Tiles, metakha	Th.sqm	4,000	7,000						5,980				
Sorlime	Th.tons	8,000	10,000				3,000			3,000			
Gypsum	Th.tons	5,000	8,000										
Stationary oil drainage machines—Uralmash	Th.pieces	0.75	0.38										
Locomotives	Th.pieces		14										
Locomotives, high capacity	Th.pieces		1.2										
Equipment, crushing	Th.tons		40										
Engines, gas generators	Th.pieces		7										
Plywood	Mln.cbm	1.2	1.3				1.2			1.09			
Wood pulp	Mln.tons		0.86										
Press and forging machines	Th.pieces	12.16	12.465						12.465				
									12.465				
										10.3			19.4

NOTE: GP = Gosplan; GS = Gosstab; MF = Ministry of Finance.



investment over the five-year period, all expressed in different prices of 1950 (January 1 and July 1). Other figures that are aggregated in money terms were trade turnover, economies from the lowering of production costs, average annual wages, and the wage fund. The reduction in production costs of industry and labor productivity growth were given in percentage terms, and two labor targets—the total number of workers and employees and the number of students—were also given. Gosplan also provided breakdowns of investment for 52 agencies expressed in constant 1950 prices. Gosplan's defense department provided very detailed defense equipment plans for the five-year period (under the label of completely secret, special importance), broken down for each year of the five-year period for 100 defense products and supplies in physical units. Thus the defense budget listed almost as many products in physical units as did the Gosplan plan for the entire economy. Gosplan's defense budgets also gave monetary aggregates for spending broken down into seven product categories. That there are no recorded discussions of the defense plan by other agencies suggests that it was prepared only by Gosplan for Politburo approval. Various defense plans are presented in Table 3.

The narrative to the Gosplan documents lays out the various directives that the plan is supposed to fulfill. The main targets were the growth of industry (at 12 percent per year), with heavy industry growing at 13 percent and light industry at 11 percent. The plan also gives growth rates for 30 products in physical units ranging from iron and coal to vegetable oil and fish. Capital investment in the Fifth Five-Year Plan was set at double that of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. National income should increase by 60 percent, retail prices should fall by 35 percent, capital investment in housing should double, and so on. Gosplan's 1952 narrative report required 26 pages to cover these priorities, ranging from the most general targets to specific construction projects.

With the exceptions of investment funds to be allocated to specific agencies and the quite detailed defense equipment and

TABLE 3  
DEFENSE PLANS, FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN:  
MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLY FOR 1951-1955

Draft of Jan. 23, 1950, Min. Rub. Prices 1950							
	1950 (results)	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	Total
Aviation	8750	13600	16000	18000	19500	20500	87600
Weapons	2380	3780	5210	6900	8510	9280	33680
Navy (ship construction)	5340	6230	7930	9230	10860	12400	46650
Ammunition	2550	4640	6400	7600	9600	10500	38740
Armored technics	1110	2120	3710	5190	6760	7910	25690
Military-technical equipment	2270	4020	4900	5980	7220	8340	30460
—Radiolocation technics	1100						
Total	24120	36940	47200	56800	66860	74100	281900

Source: 2.2591 (592-1-17)

Draft—1951 (no date available), Min. Rub. Prices Jan. 1, 1951						
	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	Total
Aviation	11000	15000	16530	16700	17310	76540
Weapons	3000	4450	5980	7330	8070	28830
Navy (ship construction)	6450	8200	9450	11350	12780	48230
Ammunition	3990	5660	6770	8630	9460	34510
Armored technics	1460	2320	3870	4660	5060	17370
Military-technical equipment	4000	4800	5600	6900	8000	29300
—Radiolocation technics	1940	4370	6890	8970	11300	33470
Total	32920	43160	51600	60260	66560	254500

Source: 2.2591 (592-1-18)

Explosives (000 tons)						
	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Gunpowder	183	225	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	315-575
TNT	130	225	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	259-290

Source: 2.2591 (592-1-17, 18)

TABLE 3 (continued)

## Equipment Plan—Jan. 23, 1950

	50 Report	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	Five-year
<b>Aviation</b>							
Planes-total	3954	6800	8360	8805	9230	9600	42795
Fighters	2281	3770	4280	4280	4280	4290	20900
jet fighters	2125	3490	4000	4000	4000	4010	19500
training fighters	56	600	600	600	600	600	3000
Bombers	480	910	1320	1420	1420	1420	6490
jet bombers	156	390	700	800	800	800	3490
heavy with piston engines	312	420	420	420	420	420	2100
training bombers	8	100	100	150	200	200	750
Transport planes	301	300	350	400	450	500	2000
Aircraft engines	14063	19070	21550	25230	26100	27110	119060
jet engines	4973	8670	12310	15210	16330	17300	69820
<b>Weapons</b>							
Antiaircraft artillery	882	1600	2418	3460	4300	4700	16478
Antitank artillery		100	200	400	600	700	2000
Troops artillery	2617	2024	2310	2805	2134	1230	10503
Machines guns and automatic carbines, Th.p.	454.6	650	850	1050	1050	1050	4650
Cartridges, 7.62 mm, Mln.p.	1050	1390.5	1495.5	1496.5	1546.5	1546.5	7475.5
Cartridges, 12.7–14.5 mm, Mln.p.	23.6	23.4	39	41	41	46	190.4
<b>Armored weaponry</b>							
Tanks, heavy			340	475	550	635	2000
Tanks, medium	1000	1600	2500	3200	3300	3300	13900
Tanks, amphibious		180	450	650	800	880	2960
<b>Ammunition, Th.pieces</b>							
Aviation shells	10225.2	20050	26700	34450	41600	48850	171650
Artillery shells							
37–57 mm	684.4	2200	2680	3430	4190	4800	17300
85–152 mm	3681.6	5533	7265	7735	8740	9982	39255
203–280 mm	5	2	2.5	2.5	2.5	3	12.5
Mines 160–240 mm	8	110	220	330	340	380	1380
Grenades, PG-2 and PG-82	360	1050	1400	1600	2200	2600	8850
Demolition aviabombs	37.4	57.9	96	142	207	268	770.9
Navy shells							
25–45 mm		101	624	1054	1454	1637	4870
100–152 mm	17.1	132.5	453.5	587	703	743	2619
305–406 mm		0.4	1.737	3.4	3.746	3.834	13.117

Source: 2.2591 (592-1-17, 1-6)

TABLE 3 (*continued*)

Plan 1951	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	Five-year
<b>Aviation</b>						
Planes-total	7260	9510	9525	8250	8855	43400
Fighters	4055	5000	5000	3300	3545	20900
jet fighters	3875	4800	4800	3100	3345	19920
training fighters	500	600	600	600	600	2900
Bombers	910	1400	1420	1420	1420	6570
jet bombers	390	700	800	800	800	3490
heavy with piston engines	420	420	420	420	420	2100
training bombers	100	100	150	200	200	750
Transport planes	300	350	400	450	500	2000
Aircraft engines	19530	22000	25230	26100	27110	119970
jet engines	9130	12800	15210	16330	17300	70770
<b>Weapons</b>						
Antiaircraft artillery	882	1600	2418	3460	4700	16478
Antitank artillery		100	200	400	700	2000
Troops artillery	2617	2024	2310	2805	2134	10503
Machines guns and automatic carbines, Th.p.	454.6	650	850	1050	1050	4650
Cartridges, 7.62 mm, Mln.p.	1050	1390.5	1495.5	1496.5	1546.5	7475.5
Cartridges, 12.7–14.5 mm, Mln.p.	23.6	23.4	39	41	41	190.4
<b>Armored weaponry</b>						
Tanks, heavy	—	100	450	700	757	2007
Tanks, medium	1600	2200	3200	3300	3300	13600
Tanks, amphibious	180	500	900	1100	1220	3900
<b>Ammunition, Th.pieces</b>						
Aviation shells	22040	31900	34300	40900	48700	177840
Artillery shells						
37–57 mm	2750	3820	3900	4190	4800	19460
85–152 mm	5576	7226	7692	8740	9982	39216
203–280 mm	3.6	3.5	4.5	4.5	5	21.1
Mines 160–240 mm	110	220	330	340	380	1380
Grenades, PG-2 and PG-82	1050	1500	1600	2200	2600	8950
Demolition aviabombs	62.7	96.6	138	207	268	772.3
Navy shells						
25–45 mm	101	1370	1400	1500	1600	5971
100–152 mm	135.5	207	300	400	500	1542.5
305–406 mm	0.4	1.6	3.4	3.7	3.9	13

Source: 2.2591 (592-1-18), P.241–247

supplies budget, the Gosplan plan was not an operational plan. Even its targets in physical units were too highly aggregated (only three types of metal products, one type of coal, metallurgical equipment, numbers of tractors, and so on). It was a long distance between such Gosplan plans and actual production operations.

### *Gossnab*

Whereas Gosplan's task was to spell out the production tasks of the economy in general terms and to distribute investment among agencies, Gossnab's job was to ensure that the economy had adequate supplies to meet its production targets. Thus, Gossnab served as the representative of industrial users. As such, Gossnab sought to identify and to prevent bottlenecks and other disproportions.

Gossnab, therefore, looked carefully at Gosplan's production figures to ensure that they provided sufficient production to meet the material input needs of the economy's producers. Because Gossnab's job was to prepare a supply plan for industrial users, it criticized Gosplan for "routine work" that did not address the main problems of the five-year period. Gossnab routinely complained that Gosplan's plans preserved deficits of material inputs and equipment, did not consider interindustry balances, and were indifferent to the problem of building up the substantial reserves for production emergencies that Gossnab favored.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, Gossnab complained that Gosplan did not pay enough attention to cost economies, which would allow investment rubles to stretch further, and did not properly calculate the increased output that could be expected from capital investment.

Whereas Gosplan limited its "assortment" to 127 products, Gossnab worked with 169 product categories (see Table 2). The greater number of categories is explained both by the finer breakdowns of products (different types of steel) and by the absence of

31. Gossnab argued for what appears to be enormous reserves, such as a two-to-three-year reserve of nonferrous metals (p. 12).

some products from Gosplan's plans. Gosplan plans tended to be longer and contained the key "balances" of the economy—specialist calculations of product supplies (including imports) and industrial uses for these products. Gosplan prepared 55 balances, each signed by the appropriate department head, broken down by years of the five-year plan to show that balances could be achieved only if the (generally higher) Gosplan production figures were used.

In its drafts, Gosplan argued for more investment, more production, greater cost economies, more product assortment, and greater attention to quality. Gosplan pointed out to Stalin what it perceived to be a number of disproportions in the Gosplan draft: For example, it showed that under the Gosplan variants, there would not be enough steel production to meet the needs of machine building and capital investment.

### *The Ministry of Finance*

The Ministry of Finance's job was to make sure that the economy produced sufficient tax revenues to pay the government's bills without printing money. Insofar as the two major revenue sources were profits taxes and turnover taxes on consumer goods, the Ministry of Finance lobbied for more consumer goods, whose sale generated turnover taxes; higher labor productivity, which lowered costs of production; and more economical use of resources, which also lowered costs of production. Lower costs of production benefited the Ministry of Finance by raising enterprise profits and raising turnover tax revenues (which were the difference between retail prices and wholesale prices). Consider the finance ministry's criticisms of Gosplan's draft: "Gosplan did not consider all possibilities to increase national income, raise labor productivity, and lower production costs and, in connection with this, understated the volume of national income and national consumption." More specifically, the Ministry of Finance criticized Gosplan's projections for labor productivity growth as being too

low by historical standards, in spite of the fact that in the current plan are “broad measures for the industrialization of construction and the mechanization of construction work.” Moreover, the Ministry of Finance felt that costs could be lowered 22 percent versus Gosplan’s 15 percent figure. The Ministry of Finance also pointed out that Gosplan had underestimated the growth possibilities of cotton and linen, leather products, and silk—consumer goods that could be sold to generate sales tax revenues.

The Ministry of Finance’s criticisms are contained in only seven printed pages; Gosplan’s take about 100. Judging from his marginal notes, Stalin paid much closer attention to the finance ministry’s comments than to those of Gosplan.

### *Gosplan’s Defense*

Gosplan defended its calculations quite vigorously, primarily from the criticisms of its rival Gosplan.<sup>32</sup> In its 25-page single-spaced response, Gosplan rejected virtually all of Gosplan’s objections and recommendations, beginning with what it regarded as Gosplan’s most serious complaints: that is, in arguing against Gosplan’s proposal to significantly raise ferrous metals production, Gosplan pointed out that its lower target would not create the disproportions against which Gosplan warned, and suggested that Gosplan did not know what it was doing. According to Gosplan’s calculations, its rate of growth of ferrous metals was sufficient to meet the needs of construction because Gosplan was using the wrong construction figure, and to meet the needs of machine building, which Gosplan argued would be producing more precision instruments that require less steel. Moreover, if Gosplan’s proposal to increase ferrous metals production were accepted, capital investment for ferrous metals would have to be increased by 30 percent—a sum not available in the budget. Gos-

32. See, e.g., “O zakliuchenniakh Gosplana, Gostekhniki, Gosstroia i TsU po proekty direktiv k sostavleniiu piatiletnogo plana razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1951–1955 gody,” June 8, 1950 (592/1/14).

plan's defense of its plans was unrelenting: "Gossnab does not understand what it is doing; if we accept Gossnab's suggestions there have to be substantial increases in investment, etc." Gosplan also attacked Gossnab's demands for additional reserves: "The proposal of Gossnab to increase the production of bricks to 35 billion will result in the creation of unnecessary reserves of 5 billion bricks. In addition, one must consider that in order to meet Gossnab's proposal, it would be necessary to build an additional 595 concrete slab-block factories with a capacity of 6 million and 20 new brick factories every year, requiring an additional capital investment of more than one billion rubles." Gosplan also gave a strong defense of its own balances, such as the coal balance, saying that it had constructed them to yield balances of supplies and demands.

The remarkable feature of the Gosplan defense is that it rejected all Gossnab's proposals and stubbornly stuck with its own, even though Gossnab worked at a greater level of detail. If our interpretation of marginal marks is correct—that they were made by Stalin—Stalin reviewed Gosplan's defense of its own figures with care and made no corrections. It is noteworthy that Gosplan did not attack the Ministry of Finance's memos. Its "defensive critiques" were aimed at Gossnab.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet Union waited thirteen years for a new course to be set by Stalin's designated successors for the postwar era—though Stalin's designated successors were not entirely free to choose this course. Stalin, in spite of growing infirmity and loosening of control over his associates, remained the ultimate arbiter. The XIX Party Congress did indeed provide a venue for announcing the course of postwar Soviet policy. For those who expected something different, the XIX Party Congress was clearly a disappointment. Malenkov's keynote speech touched upon peaceful coexistence, greater party democracy, and criticism of economic



performance, but it offered no real solution to the economic deficiencies of the economic system that were already apparent in the early 1930s. There was no discussion of real economic reform, as there had been in the early 1930s (see chapter by Davies). The economy could now be criticized without blaming wreckers, but Malenkov and his associates did not propose alternatives to the problematic planning system that had been created some twenty years earlier.

The XIX Party Congress's major agenda item—approval of the Fifth Five-Year Plan—turned out to be a rather meaningless gesture. The Fifth Five-Year Plan had been formulated and basically completed before the party congress was even called. It was the product of technical debates among planning agencies. Nowhere in this debate was the issue of fundamental changes in priorities and procedures raised. The Fifth Five-Year Plan simply parroted the procedures of the fourth and earlier five-year plans. The archives provide no evidence of strong interest by Stalin, in contrast to his intense interest in five-year plans during the 1930s. He may have come to the conclusion that five-year plans were a hollow exercise.

The Hoover file on the XIX Party Congress, including the preparation of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, provides a behind-the-scenes glimpse of high-level decision making. It even supplies a detailed defense plan, which would have been regarded as a treasure trove by earlier Western researchers. The XIX Party Congress file reveals how five-year plans were constructed, who the participants were, and how outcomes were decided. One surprising feature is that the five-year plan was put together by the technical planning agencies, Gosplan, Gossnab, and the Ministry of Finance, with no official input from those who had to fulfill the plan; namely, the industrial ministries and regional authorities. Any process that lacks input from the eventual executors would be lacking in credibility. The new national supply agency, Gossnab, was not really a representative of industrial consumers; its sole concern was putting together a national supply plan that it

could claim was balanced between supplies and demands. From the documents, it appears that it constructed its balances mathematically through scientific norms, not through communications with producers.

The Soviet Union, therefore, entered the postwar era much as it ended in 1991, tied to an economic system that had serious problems, whose operations had become routine, each with few ideas as to how to fix it.