

the United States and the European Union through the United Nations and ideally Latin American countries as well. If no progress is made in peace negotiations, military action would be directed at the holdout party. This approach would give the supreme commanders in each insurgent group an incentive to apply their own pressures to clean their own ranks of uncooperative elements in order to seek political office by winning elections.

Finally, U.S.-backed policy must address the social causes of the Colombian conflict as well as the drug-related sources feeding the insurgency. Colombia may prove to be a lost cause, but it needn't be. An integrated program will require serious, committed, honest, and objective calculated international support on all levels, not just the criticism and procrastination that have been common up to now. It will also require the support of frustrated Colombians. Failure will make inevitable the continuing deterioration of the social fabric and state legitimacy in Colombia and the spread of such decay to much of the rest of the hemisphere.

NOTES

1. See La Ley de las FARC, *Semana*, Bogotá, 11 October 1999, pp. 13–16; also see U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts with the Government of Colombia: Hearing before the Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, 106th Congress, 24 March 2000.
2. Peter Waldmann and Fernando Reinares, *Sociedades en Guerra Civil: Conflictos Violentos en Europa y América Latina* (Barcelona: Paidós, 1999).
3. Refer to Camilo Echandía, “Grado de Concentración de la Guerrilla Colombiana” (Degree of concentration of the Colombian guerrilla), Working Paper on Public Peace, Universidad de los Andes, 1998.
4. An article in the most widely read Colombian weekly gives precise accounts of these events. See “Exodo,” editorial, *Semana*, 28 June 1999.
5. Echandía has found a clear relationship between regional income inequal-

ity and civil unrest driven by guerrilla activities in different Colombian regions. See Echandía, "Grado de Concentración," pp. 25–27.

6. See Echandía, "Grado de Concentración."
7. See Edgardo Buscaglia, "The Links between the Growth in Drug-Related Organized Crime and Guerrilla Movements," Working Paper Series, International Law and Economic Development Center, University of Virginia, forthcoming.
8. See Timothy C. Brown, "The Children of Sandino: A View from the Radical Middle," in Brown, ed., *When the AK-47s Fall Silent* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), pp. 273–79.
9. Paul Collie and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice Seeking and Loot Seeking in Civil War," unpublished mimeo, World Bank, 2000.
10. Camilo Echandía, "Expansión Territorial de las Guerrillas Colombianas," unpublished paper, Universidad de los Andes, 1999.
11. Ibid., pp. 12–24, and Buscaglia, "The Links."
12. General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, "Realidad de la Zona de Despeje," *El Tiempo*, Bogotá, 20 October 2000; Buscaglia, "The Links."
13. See "La Prueba Reina," *Semana*, 2 April 2001.
14. Margarita Martínez, "Rebel Leader Faces Drug Arrest," *Washington Post* on-line, 10 April 2001.
15. Buscaglia, "The Links."
16. On the enormous variety in Colombia, see Camilo Echandía Castilla, *El Conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones de Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia* (Bogotá: Presidencia de la República y Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 1999).
17. Belisario Betancur, "Prologue," in Eduardo Posada-Carbó, *Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998), p. xvi.
18. It is estimated that the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) per capita in Colombia is three times greater than the region's average. Yet these NGOs are simply interest groups.
19. Mercedes Ortiz Cañón et al., *Descentralización y Participación Ciudadana* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1997), p. xii.
20. Humberto de la Calle Lombana and Jorge Mario Eastman Robledo, *En*

Defensa de la Descentralización y de la Autonomía Territorial (Bogotá: Colombia, 1996), p. 129.

21. Andrés de Zubiría Samper, *Constitución y Descentralización Territorial* (Bogotá: Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, 1994), pp. 8, 21.
22. See World Bank, *Local Government Capacity in Colombia* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995), p. ix, and Gustavo Bell Lemus, "The Decentralised State: An Administrative or Political Challenge?" in Posada-Carbó, *Colombia*, p. 104.
23. See "La Ley de las FARC," *Semana*, 11 October 1999.
24. Alvaro Tirado Mejia, "Violence and the State in Colombia," in Posada-Carbó, *Colombia*, p. 114.
25. Survey of 1,500 individuals stratified by gender, wealth, and education among the local populations in Putumayo, Caqueta, and the northern departments of Bolivar and Norte de Santander conducted as part of the ongoing study by Edgardo Buscaglia. "Study of Informal Institutions in Colombia's War Zones," April 2000 to February 2001, unpublished paper.
26. Andrés Pastrana, "Despite the Media, the Drug War May Have a Happy Ending," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 April 2001.
27. See Ricardo Gómez Perdin, *Las Zonas de Cultivo* (Caracas: Editorial Andina, 1998).
28. Petter Langseth, *Anti-Corruption Tool Kit: Global Programme against Corruption* (New York: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 2000).
29. Adding to previously approved U.S. assistance to Colombia of over \$330 million, the legislation provides \$818 million as an emergency supplemental for fiscal year 2000 and \$256 million in additional funding for fiscal year 2001. Refer to Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 19 July 2000. U.S. State Department.
30. See Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department, 19 July 1999.
31. See State Department Fact Sheet. It is noteworthy that the role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USIAD), traditionally the U.S. government agency channeling this type of aid, has been put into doubt. An increasing majority of U.S. officials and international sponsors have requested that American NGOs have a more active role in deciding how funds should be allocated.

32. Scott Lindlaw, "Bush Names Walters as Drug Director," Associated Press, 10 May 2001; Mike Allen, "Bush Suggests Shift in Drug Strategy," *Washington Post*, 11 May 2001; Christopher Marquis, "New Drug Plan Shifts Focus in Latin America," *New York Times*, 17 May 2001; "Worrisome Signals on Drugs," editorial, *New York Times*, 9 May 2001.
33. Myles Frechette, "Colombia: The War That Will Not End," in Brown, ed., *When the AK-47s Fall Silent*, pp. 234–36.
34. See *Huellas de Paz: Los Desmovilizados y Su Participación en los Escenarios de Elección Popular* (Bogotá: Dirección General para la Reinserción, 2000).
35. See Gómez Perdin, "Las Zonas de Cultivo."
36. Government of Colombia, National Alternative Development Plan (PLANTE), unpublished report, 2000.
37. Enchandia, "Grado de Concentracion."
38. See "La Prueba Reina," *Semana*, 2 April 2001. For the U.S. State Department case, see Fact Sheet, "United States Support for Colombia," 17 January 2001.
39. See comments by Thomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, Special Briefing Washington, D.C., November 27, 2000; "Looking Beyond Plan Colombia," editorial, *New York Times*, May 18, 2001.
40. *Financial Times*, 5 March 2001.
41. See U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts with the Government of Colombia: Hearing before the Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, 106th Congress, 24 March 2000.
42. Colombia National Police Internal Document A-4523. Government of Colombia, December 2000.
43. Refer to "La Ley de las FARC," *Semana* (weekly magazine), 11 October 1999, pp. 12–16