The Crucible of Tragedy: SARS, the Ming 361 Accident, and Chinese Party-Army Relations

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The recent loss of Ming-class submarine Number 361 with all hands aboard and the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) medical system in the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cover-up threaten to further strain a Chinese party-army dynamic that was already undermined by the incomplete leadership transition of the 16th Party Congress. Yet, the evidence also suggests that Hu Jintao, despite the potential opening offered by the governance crisis over SARS, appears unwilling or unable to directly challenge Jiang Zemin’s leadership at this point in time, portending more months of jockeying and ambiguity in the political arena and an unclear chain of command in the military realm.

Introduction

The last 12 months have proven to be highly turbulent for party-army relations. Previous submissions to China Leadership Monitor have detailed the incomplete leadership transition at the 16th Party Congress in late 2002 and the cryptic “two centers” debate at the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2003. Shortly after the close of the NPC, the world began to learn about the spread of the SARS epidemic in China, the full extent of which was finally exposed by a military doctor in Beijing. Just as the military became embroiled in the ensuing internal debate about government transparency, the leadership was confronted with the choice of whether to reveal the details of an accident involving a Ming-class submarine that resulted in the deaths of all 70 members of the crew. Mindful of the recent outcry over SARS and cognizant of the Russian government’s mistakes in handling the recent Kursk submarine accident, the PLA leadership made the unprecedented decision to release details of the tragedy to the public. Yet, reports from Beijing, official media statements, and VIP appearance patterns suggest that the SARS and Ming 361 episodes became a new policy battlefield on which Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and their respective allies continued the unfinished political struggle for control of the military apparatus. This article explores the implications of the SARS crisis and the Ming 361 tragedy for party-army relations, concluding that these incidents have further strained a Chinese party-army dynamic that was already undermined by the incomplete leadership transition of the 16th Party Congress. Yet, the evidence also suggests that Hu, despite the potential opening offered by the governance crisis over SARS, appears unwilling or unable to directly challenge Jiang’s leadership at this point in time, portending more months of jockeying and ambiguity in the political arena and an unclear chain of command in the military realm.
SARS

Severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, emerged in China in November 2002. The story of civilian obfuscation, cover-up, confession, and mobilization is well known, but the parallel events within the military, particularly in Beijing, require further exploration.

The PLA Cover-up in Beijing

According to a Western journalist, SARS in fact first appeared in Beijing in the elite PLA Number 301 Hospital, spreading quickly to the PLA Number 302 and Number 309 Hospitals, “though no one in the military reported these numbers to civilian authorities in the city.” Later, official Chinese media confirmed that the first non-local-resident SARS patient arrived at PLA Number 302 Hospital on March 7, 2003. An article by a Western journalist, quoting a direct participant in the meeting, asserted that Premier Wen Jiabao told the Chinese Center for Disease Control (CDC) on April 7 that the military was not reporting cases of SARS to the Beijing municipal government or to the central government. The chief of the CDC, Li Liming, reportedly told the premier: “If we had controlled the military hospitals at the beginning, we never would have had this epidemic in Beijing.” This lack of communication was facilitated and exacerbated by Chinese bureaucratic politics, which separates military and civilian organs into opaque stovepipes that can share information horizontally only at the highest levels. In similar ways, PLA hospitals also resisted intrusive inspections by the World Health Organization (WHO). According to a Western newspaper, doctors at PLA Number 309 on April 15 moved 40 SARS patients to the Zihuachun Hotel on the hospital’s grounds in order to prevent visiting WHO teams from finding them.

Dr. Jiang Yanyong, Whistle-blower

But, the PLA cover-up was not to last, and the revelation of unknown PLA cases was one of the most important impetuses for the civilian leadership to admit its previous obfuscation and begin cooperating more fully with the World Health Organization. On April 4, Jiang Yanyong, age 72, former director of PLA Number 301 Hospital during the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen, revealed in an e-mail to China Central Television and Hong Kong–based Phoenix Television that the Number 309 Hospital had 60 cases of SARS, with six deaths. His revelation occurred on the same day on which Health Minister and former military doctor Zhang Wenkang told a news conference that Beijing had 12 cases and three deaths. Neither media outlet broadcast the content of Dr. Jiang’s e-mail, but the content was leaked to Time, which placed the information on its web site on April 9. Later, Jiang Yanyong told Time that three PLA hospitals in Beijing had at least 120 SARS patients, six of whom had died by April 9. This information contradicted the Health Ministry’s tally of 22 cases in Beijing with four dead.
Partially as a result of Dr. Jiang’s whistle-blowing, the Chinese leadership reversed course on April 18 and ordered officials to stop covering up the extent of the SARS outbreak. After a Politburo meeting that “demanded the accurate, timely, and honest reporting of the SARS situation,” Hu Jintao announced the mobilization of a nationwide anti-SARS campaign, “relying on science, effective prevention, and increased coordination.” On April 20, Vice Minister of Health Gao Qiang released a revised number of 346 SARS cases in Beijing, more than 10 times the number previously acknowledged by the ministry. On the same day, Health Minister Zhang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong were both sacked. Zhang’s removal was linked to his earlier false statements and to the desire of the leadership to improve the Chinese government’s credibility and international reputation, while Meng’s dismissal appears to reflect the purely political calculation of balancing the loss of an official from the Jiang camp (Zhang) with the loss of one from the Hu camp (Meng).

**PLA Contributions to the Fight against SARS**

Most SARS-related activity in the military was focused on propaganda, mobilization, and security. On the propaganda side, the media were filled with laudatory stories about the military’s scientific and medical role in combating SARS, as well as grandiose treatises on “national spirit” and advice on how to use the theory of the “three represents” to improve military sanitation work. Military researchers from the Microbe Epidemic Institute of the Military Medical Academy of Sciences “identified the pathogen and developed a technique for quickly testing” the disease. The researchers also cooperated with the Beijing Genomics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to complete genome sequencing of the coronavirus. Medical staff was sent to rural areas to augment limited rural medical infrastructure. The General Staff Department’s Chemical Defense Command and Engineering College in Beijing was honored for its contributions to the fight against SARS, specifically the college’s development of disinfectants and cooperation in sterilization campaigns in the city. Among the many identified “heroes” in the PLA was Jiang Suchun, an infectious-disease expert at PLA Number 302, a special hospital for people with infectious diseases. Jiang became infected soon after he began treating patients, and then used himself as a guinea pig by injecting blood serum from SARS patients who had recovered, getting well after 23 days.

In terms of mobilization, Guangzhou Military Region’s response to the new SARS policy was likely typical of those across the PLA’s regional commands. Guangzhou set up a SARS leading group at the military region level, “plus an epidemic monitoring and managing group, technical guidance group, and clinic treatment group.” Units at or above the regiment level formed their own leading groups for preventing and controlling the disease, as well as special groups for dealing with emergencies. All hospitals affiliated with the military region established special clinic teams for treating SARS patients. On the information side, military region political and health units cooperated to disseminate knowledge about preventing SARS—publishing and distributing pamphlets to the rank and file, organizing mobile exhibitions, and setting up
a 24-hour hotline. Finally, all personnel movements were “strictly controlled” under a policy called “closed management,” involving the rescission of all leave and relatively complete isolation from the general population and even from military members’ own dependents.22

The most important, or at least the most public, PLA contribution to the fight against SARS, however, involved the rapid construction and staffing of the new SARS hospital in Xiaotangshan, a suburb of Beijing. On the approval of the General Departments’ “Circular on Transferring Emergency Personnel in Support of the Beijing Municipality Dedicated Hospital for Atypical Pneumonia” by Central Military Commission (CMC) Chair Jiang Zemin on April 27, a total of 1,200 medical specialists (respiratory disease, contagious disease, and epidemic control) were transferred from major military units to Beijing’s designated SARS patient reception hospitals.23 By April 28, 333 military medical staff members from the Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan Military Regions, as well as personnel from the Number 175 and Number 180 Hospitals in Nanjing Military Region, from Changzheng Hospital under the Number 2 PLA Medical University, and from the Number 3 PLA Medical University, had arrived at the new SARS hospital, with the remainder expected to arrive by May 5.24 The hospital accepted its first patients on May 1, treating them with 90 million yuan worth of medical equipment.25

Continued Stonewalling and Opacity?

Despite these public efforts, however, there is some evidence that the military continued to be less than candid about the extent of the outbreak among the armed forces. While describing its multifarious efforts to combat the disease, Guangzhou Military Region also reported as of April 28 that no SARS cases had been discovered among its personnel, an assertion which stretched credulity to say the least.26 In light of the deceptions among military hospitals in Beijing, the Health Ministry in late April issued a circular on SARS data, and General Logistics Department (GLD) Director Liao Xilong ordered all medical units to comply.27 Yet, the WHO in mid-May, according to a Washington Post article, criticized the military for continuing to limit information on SARS within its ranks.28 Soldiers accounted for an estimated 8 percent of cases in China, but the PLA had heretofore released only scant information.29 One member of the WHO expert team in Beijing, Keiji Fukuda, complained: “A lot of the key details about those cases . . . [are] not being shared with the civilian authorities. These numbers don’t tell us anything.” General Logistics Department Director Liao Xilong further obfuscated the situation by declaring on May 14 that the PLA was “safe” from SARS, arguing that there were no cases of SARS in the ranks.30 In perhaps the most counterproductive move of all, Hong Kong media reported that the PLA was censuring the “honest doctor,” Dr. Jiang Yanyong of PLA Number 301 Hospital—surveilling his movements and banning him from contact with foreign and domestic media without prior approval from the Number 301 Hospital Propaganda Department. An internal circular reportedly even criticized Jiang Yanyong for providing the original information about the additional Beijing cases to foreign media while serving as a military doctor.31 It was not until June, when Beijing
Weekly placed him on its cover, that any official media in China acknowledged his contribution.

**Jiang, Hu, and SARS**

The SARS crisis revealed continuing strains in both the party-army dynamic and the leadership struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. While they were guilty at a minimum of sins of omission—and perhaps also of sins of commission—at the beginning of the crisis, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took leading roles in pushing the transparency policy once the extent of the disease in PLA hospitals in Beijing had become known in mid-April, appearing constantly on state media. One Western journalist asserts that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao “used the crisis to challenge the authority of parts of China’s government, the military and the capital’s administration, ultimately challenging the authority of their predecessor, former President Jiang Zemin.”

For his part, Jiang Zemin, and his allies as well, remained silent on the epidemic until April 26, 2003, when Jiang told the visiting Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes at a meeting in Shanghai that China had “scored notable achievements in containing the disease.” His appearance in Shanghai reportedly left many Chinese with the impression that Jiang had fled the capital to escape the disease, and his statement, which directly contradicted the new openness and transparency of Hu’s and Wen’s public statements, seemed to be out of touch or naive. In the following weeks, Chinese sources cited in Western media reports strongly suggested that Jiang was opposed to Hu’s transparency policy and that he sought to use the military media apparatus to undermine Hu’s efforts. At the same time, Hu began to make aggressive plays for an independent power base in the military, chairing a Politburo meeting on military reorganization that reportedly was not attended by Jiang.

Public statements by senior civilian and military officials also hinted at the possible schism between Hu and Jiang. In a tour of the SARS hospital on April 28, General Logistics Department Director Liao Xilong tried to balance the situation, ordering the PLA to carry out the “instructions set forth by General Secretary Hu Jintao and CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin.” This equitable profession of loyalty was strikingly different than the language used by senior military leaders during and after the 16th Party Congress, when Jiang’s name was prominently mentioned at the expense of Hu’s. By contrast, CMC Vice Chair Guo Boxiong used the opportunity of a SARS inspection meeting to flatter Jiang Zemin, mentioning only Jiang by name and referring to “the party Central Committee” instead of mentioning Hu. Moreover, Guo found time to laud the “important thinking of the ‘Three Represents.’” Likewise, Liu Qi, the Beijing party secretary and Politburo member who escaped punishment for the obfuscation of SARS cases in Beijing because of his close ties to Jiang Zemin, gushed over the latter’s wisdom in deploying PLA personnel to aid in the battle against SARS.
By June, when the disease appeared to be coming under control, Jiang Zemin took a belatedly active role, perhaps concluding that his previous reticence and nonchalance on SARS had undermined his standing. On June 6, Hu and Jiang appeared together at a meeting with delegates to a military personnel training seminar, and Jiang used the event to praise the PLA for its achievements in fighting SARS. On June 22, Jiang signed a circular praising the PLA personnel who had served at the Xiaotangshan SARS hospital for “making great achievements in protecting people’s health and safety.” The circular closed with a Jiang-friendly mantra, calling upon the PLA to “follow the correct leadership of the party Central Committee and the CMC, hold high the banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, earnestly study the important thinking of the ‘Three Represents,’ implement the general requirements of the ‘five sentences,’ and work hard to promote the development of our army’s modernization by leaps and bounds.”

Again, differences could also be seen in the speeches of other officials attending the event. Liu Qi continued his paean to Jiang, linking the victory over SARS to correct implementation of the three represents and mentioning only Jiang by name, while GLD Director Liao Xilong took the opposite tack, calling for the masses to “unite around the party Central Committee with comrade Hu Jintao as the general secretary” and advocating Hu’s signature policy of “building a well-off society [xiaokang shehui].” The disparities in these statements, so different from the uniformity of the pre-16th Party Congress environment and the ceaseless lauding of the leadership “with Jiang Zemin at the core,” highlight the continuing jockeying among the elites and the ongoing lack of clarity in the leadership.

**Ming 361 Accident**

*What Happened*

In late April or early May, the diesel-powered, Ming-class submarine Number 361 experienced a “mechanical malfunction” during an exercise in the waters of the Yellow Sea between Korea and Shandong Province, killing all 70 crew members. According to *Wen hui bao*, which is often used by Beijing as a channel for unofficial messages, the crippled, half-submerged boat was discovered by fishermen, who reported their findings to authorities. When the hatch was opened, all 70 personnel were found to have suffocated at their stations. The submarine was towed from the accident site, east of the Neichangshan Islands, to its homeport base at Qingdao. The *Wen hui bao* article offered three possible reasons for the accident, speculating that (1) “a steersman mistakenly opened a discharge valve instead of an air inlet valve,” (2) “sea water mixed with the submarine’s batteries to produce a toxic gas,” or (3) “a spark caused a big explosion” on board the boat. Western experts discount explanation number 1 because the compartmentation of the submarine could have prevented the outcome, and they argue that number 3 can be ruled out because the submarine did not sink. A later article in the same newspaper claimed that an intake valve had failed to open during snorkeling with the diesel engines, which consumed the oxygen within the boat and caused acute suffocation of the crew within two minutes. The lack of oxygen lowered the barometric pressure within the submarine, making it impossible to open the hatch covers from inside and preventing any escape by the crew.
Battling Condolences

The Ming 361 accident provides revealing insights into the current party-military leadership dynamic between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, discussed in more detail in my contribution to China Leadership Monitor 7 (summer 2003). Jiang appears from the outset to have sought to dominate the media coverage of the event and thereby project his authority as head of the CMC. The original Xinhua News Agency report of the accident specifically mentions that “Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission, sent condolence messages, dated 2 May, to the family members of the dead Navy officers and seamen,” with no mention of General Secretary Hu. Later sources revealed the text of the message: “The officers and sailors of 361 remembered their sacred duty entrusted to them by the Party and the People. They died on duty, sacrificed themselves for the country, and they are great losses to the People’s Navy.”

One Hong Kong newspaper with a reputation for neutrality on China issues, citing sources in Beijing, also portrayed Jiang as the most important leader in the crisis. On May 4, Dongfang ribao reported that Jiang had “personally made the final decision to quickly release the news” as well as ordered “senior officers in the military to go personally to the scene to direct rescue work and properly cope with the aftermath of the accident.”51 The newspaper opined that these moves were undertaken to “improve the international image” of China after the SARS debacle, were evidence of learning from the Russian Kursk experience, showed decisiveness on the part of Jiang, and highlighted an improved crisis management system, the latter of which was one of Jiang’s stated reasons for retaining his leadership position.

By contrast, Hu Jintao’s condolences to the families were not issued until May 3. In his message, Hu declared the accident a great loss to the navy of the People’s Liberation Army and extolled the patriotism and bravery of the sailors aboard. He also added that “people should turn their mourning into a source of strength by learning from the accident to advance the country’s national defense capacity and speed the PLA’s modernization drive.”52 This latter statement has been widely interpreted as Hu’s attempt to turn the accident into an opportunity for reform, much as he has used SARS to force transparency on the government side. Moreover, Hu, unlike Jiang, called for an investigation of the accident, arguing that it was important to learn the lessons of the accident. Articles through May and June continued to remind readers of Jiang’s and Hu’s condolences,53 with some explicitly citing the different dates, as if to emphasize the point that Jiang’s regrets were more important and more timely.54

Comrades Are Seeing It for Themselves

On the night of May 5, state-run television showed both Jiang and Hu, in their capacities as chairman and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, meeting with family members of the dead sailors at the Lushun Naval Base in Dalian, sending the message that both men were involved in the investigation.55 One Hong Kong newspaper
reported that this was the first time Jiang and Hu had appeared together since the SARS outbreak. The Xinhua News Agency again reported Jiang in the lead, relating how he expressed “profound grief on the deaths of the officers and men and kind sympathy and solicitude for their families.” His comments focused on emotional and ideological issues, referring to the dead as martyrs and calling on the party to take care of the men’s dependents. In Hu’s comments, by contrast, the emotional rhetoric was followed by discussions of both military and nonmilitary policy issues, as he once again exhorted mourners to “turn grief into strength,” called for “victory in the struggle to prevent and control” SARS and promotion of the “modernization of national defense and [the] armed forces,” and reiterated the current developmental line of “building a well-off society in an all-around way.” The broadcast also showed the two men inside the crippled vessel and standing alongside the boat. According to the Washington Post’s John Pomfret, these latter images were unusual, as “Chinese leaders rarely if ever have appeared publicly at the scenes of disasters, especially those involving the military.” Later reports asserted that the two leaders “entered each cabin, carefully examined each combat position, and inquired into relevant details.”

These accounts suggest that the civilian leadership structure did not play a large role in the investigation. Since the accident involved a military unit, the Central Military Commission was a natural choice to take the lead, though it was also a bureaucracy in which Hu Jintao is subordinate to Jiang Zemin. When Jiang and Hu visited Lushun Naval Base in Dalian, official media used their CMC titles and ranked them accordingly. Similarly, the memorial service on May 20 in Dalian was attended by the entire Central Military Commission, and the eulogy was given by General Guo Boxiong, vice chair of the CMC and its “chief warfighter.” Interestingly, in his brief comments Guo echoed Hu Jintao’s earlier statements, urging “mourners to turn their grief towards building a powerful navy, and further revolutionizing, modernizing, and regularizing the armed forces.”

**Somebody Will Pay for This!**

Multiple sources report that the sinking of Ming 361 also quickly led to calls for accountability, suggesting that Hu Jintao’s strategy had succeeded. One People’s Republic of China (PRC)-owned news outlet in Hong Kong reported that CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong led a 30-member CMC work team to uncover the lessons from the Ming 361 accident. By June, the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission had dismissed four senior navy leaders, including Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng, Political Commissar Yang Huaqing, North Sea Fleet Commander Ding Yiping, and North Sea Fleet Political Commissar Chen Xianfeng. The officers were criticized not only for fostering an environment in which such an accident could happen, but also for the failure of the navy to discover the accident in a timely manner. On June 13, Xinhua News Agency reported that eight other “relevant personnel” had been disciplined with either administrative dismissal or demotion. The forcible retirement of Shi Yunsheng for “improper command and action” was reminiscent of the removal of Health Minister Zhang Wenkang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong for their
mishandling of SARS and was likely meant to send a signal that military leaders would assume responsibility for mistakes on their watches, whether they were directly responsible or not. A June 14 article in the PRC-owned Hong Kong daily Ta kung pao, citing an unnamed “expert,” expounded on this theme at length:

[T]he Navy personnel reshuffle reflects the modern leadership mentality of the central leadership in running the army strictly and according to law, adding that the only way to win the hearts of servicemen and the people is to be strict and fair on matters of merits and demerits, right and wrong, responsibility, and rewards and punishments. . . . [T]he resolute measures taken by the central authorities reflect that the Chinese government has steadily increased its transparency [and] acted strictly in accordance with the system of taking responsibility for accidents. . . . This is in keeping with the international practice of offering to resign to show that one takes full blame, a practice that will win the support of people of all walks of life in the whole country.67

Moreover, it is significant that the official Xinhua announcement of the demotions began with the statement, “With the approval of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Central Military Commission recently issued an order . . . ,” possibly confirming Hu Jintao’s role in ensuring accountability and reform in the PLA. Perhaps realizing that Hu had stolen a march on him, Jiang in late June reportedly gave a speech on the Ming 361 accident in which he emphasized similar themes of reform and military development.68

Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale of Unreasonable Expectations

By the end of June, Hu Jintao’s successful capturing of political momentum in the SARS and Ming 361 crises had led some outside observers to conclude that he was solidifying his power more rapidly than expected.69 For example, Hu in May assumed leadership of three of the key “leading groups,” dealing with foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the economy. The key issue, however, was whether he could translate this momentum into real power and ultimately push for further political reforms over Jiang Zemin’s increasingly weak resistance. Certainly there were signs of reform in the wind. One article in the main party theoretical journal, Qiushi, declared that political change was the only “practical choice” for the Chinese Communist Party,70 and Hu reportedly formed a working group to study constitutional changes. As a result, there were great expectations for his July 1 speech at the Central Party School on the 82d anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, with some pundits predicting dramatic announcements of far-reaching political reforms. Instead, as a final cautionary note to those who had prematurely declared victory, Hu’s speech was surprisingly orthodox, focusing almost exclusively on Jiang’s theory of the three represents and containing no new policy shifts.71 If anything, the speech reaffirms that Hu, despite the potential opening offered by the governance crisis over SARS, is unwilling or unable to directly challenge Jiang’s leadership at this point in time, portending more months of jockeying and ambiguity in the political arena and an unclear chain of command in the military realm.
Notes

6 Pomfret, “China’s Crisis.”
7 Ibid.
12 Pomfret, “China’s Crisis.”
13 The most egregious example of the latter, which could only have been written by a committee, is Yang Chunchang, Wang Xinseng, and He Gengxing, “Carrying Forward the National Spirit and Conquering the Disaster of Atypical Pneumonia,” Jiefangjun bao, May 14, 2003, 7.
18 “Efforts of PLA Medical Specialist to Combat Atypical Pneumonia,” Jiefangjun bao, April 25, 2003, 1.
21 Ibid.
26 Li Shiyuan and Li Jian, “Guangzhou Military Region Takes Measures.”
33 Pomfret, “China’s Crisis.”
34 Ibid.
36 Pomfret, “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening.”
38 Jiang Wanliu, “Liao Xilong Notes People’s Army.”
40 Cao Zhi, “Guo Boxiong Inspects Army’s Anti-‘Atypical Pneumonia’ Work, Stresses Work on Anti-‘Atypical Pneumonia’ and on Army-Building to Ensure Completion of All Tasks,” Xinhua News Agency, May 11, 2003.
41 Huang Wei, “Liu Qi on 30 April Inspects Construction Site of Xiaotangshan Hospital, Expresses Gratitude to Medics from People’s Army,” Xinhua News Agency, April 30, 2003.
45 Xu Zhuangzhi, “The People in the Capital Hold a Commendation and Farewell Meeting to Thank the People’s Own Army for Triumphing over SARS,” Xinhua News Agency, June 22, 2003.
48 Observers quickly noted that the Ming class has a standard complement of 55–59 sailors. Speculation centered on the question as to whether the additional personnel were related to the accident, signifying that the boat either was engaged in more risky experimental training or was overmanned. A possibly authorized leak in Wen wei po on May 7 specifically addressed this issue, asserting that the complement of 70 on the Ming 361, including a professor from the Qingdao Submarine Academy, was “within its carrying capacity” for a “routine training mission.” See Han Hsiao, “The Submarine That Had the Fatal Accident Was Not Overmanned and Overloaded,” Wen wei po, May 7, 2003. An article in the same newspaper the next day provided further elaboration, revealing that 13 cadets from the Qingdao Submarine Academy had been aboard. See “Cause of Submarine Accident Has Been Found,” Wen wei po, May 8, 2003, sec. A, p. 12.
49 “70 Sailors Killed.”
50 “Cause of Submarine Accident Has Been Found.”
51 “Jiang Makes Final Decision to Announce Submarine Accident—Indicates Ability to Deal with Crises Has Improved Sharply and Responses from All Sides Are Favorable,” Dongfang ribao, May 4, 2003, sec. A, p. 12.
53 For example, see “Two Senior PLA Navy Commanders Demoted after Submarine Accident,” Xinhua News Agency, June 13, 2003.
54 For example, see “CMC Attends Funeral Service Held for Submarine Accident Victims,” Xinhua News Agency, May 20, 2003.


Wang Wenjie and Chen Wanjun, “Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Other CMC Leaders.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

“CMC Attends Funeral Service.”


Ibid.


For example, see Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifies Power.”
