The Party Transition
Will It Bring a New Maturity in Chinese Security Policy?

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This essay will address three questions relating to the 16th Party Congress. First, what do the power transition and the new lineup of leaders mean for the prospect for future flexibility and new thinking in Beijing on key security issues important to U.S.-China relations: Taiwan, the war on terrorism, Iraq and the U.N. Security Council, weapons proliferation, North Korea, etc.? Second, what evidence exists of new thinking more broadly in the younger generations of Chinese foreign policy elites (35–60 years old) who are replacing the generation of Jiang Zemin, Qian Qichen, and retiring generals such as Chi Haotian and Zhang Wannian? Third, what role do these changes play, if any, in the marked recent warming trends in relations between Washington and Beijing?

ON THE FIRST QUESTION, I believe the messages are mixed and it is still too soon to tell. Many observers focus on the new leadership of General Secretary Hu Jintao and the relative lack of acrimony in the transition of power. But most still tend to believe that the complete transition will involve years of cautious consolidation for Hu’s new team, as it did for Jiang Zemin in the 1990s. An alternative interpretation would be that the real transformation at the 16th Party Congress was more immediate and dramatic and has less to do with Hu than with his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Many believe that Jiang emerged the clear victor from the 16th Party Congress, for he was able to stack the Politburo Standing Committee with his supporters, most notably his right-hand man, Zeng Qinghong. Perhaps Jiang finally will now have the confidence to push a consistently more moderate agenda on the international stage, since his protégés are firmly in place and rivals in his own generation, including Li Peng and Li Ruihuan, have successfully been squeezed out of politics. There are strong expectations that Jiang will stay on as head of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
for at least a few years, expectations fueled by Jiang himself in meet-
ings with foreign dignitaries. There also have been reports in regional
newspapers that Jiang will head a new National Security Council,
rumored to be under preparation for next year. Moreover, inside the
military, retiring generals who were promoted by Jiang have secured
promotions for their own protégés, perhaps extending Jiang’s influ-
ence in the uniformed military at the expense of Hu Jintao.

A third possibility, of course, is that both arguments are somewhat
ture. Hu is likely to be truly powerful, but his current power has lim-
its. He will seek to increase his power over time. Jiang has rid himself
of real or potential rivals among his generational peers, but he now has
Hu to contend with and, therefore, important party decisions will still
require consensus-building and caution on the part of individual lead-
ers, lest they overstep their bounds. Such a scenario could also lead to
dangerous fractures at times of policy crisis.

These are three very different scenarios with possibly quite differ-
ent implications for U.S.-China security relations. Without reliable
evidence accumulated over an extended period of time, it would be
difficult to test one hypothesis against another. Moreover, it is not
easy to discern the true foreign policy preferences of Hu Jintao, or of
Jiang loyalists on the Politburo Standing Committee such as Zeng
Qinghong, so it is not clear what the policy implications of their rel-
ative power might be. To date, both Hu and Jiang’s protégés have
been focused largely on domestic politics and party-building issues.
Even Jiang Zemin himself remains a bit of a mystery on foreign pol-
icy. In my interviews with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) scholars
and analysts since his famous eight points speech of January 1995,
Jiang has frequently been referred to as a moderate in international
affairs and sometimes even as a “pro-American” leader, whose rough
public edge derives from his need to protect himself against elite foes
who could criticize him for being too soft on Taiwan or the United
States. Whether this is an accurate analysis is hard to determine
given Jiang’s mixed record of moderate and immoderate
statements and actions in cross-Strait and trans-Pacific relations. My broader
point is that, given uncertainty about top leaders’ individual preferences, it is not entirely clear what the implications of one group’s
ascendance over another really are for People’s Republic of China
(PRC) foreign policy.

A key question might simply be whether the government is divided
between Jiang and Hu, as seems most plausible, or really united—
either under Hu as the legitimate general secretary or under Jiang as informal paramount party leader in the vein of his predecessor, Deng Xiaoping. A divided government, regardless of factional preferences, might be more conservative and less flexible on issues ranging from the preconditions for cross-Strait dialogue to the content of domestic political reform. If tensions across the Taiwan Strait increase, or if there is another unforeseen crisis like the EP-3 incident, each group might try to outcompete the other on nationalism, leading to a dangerous ratcheting up of posturing in the ways that Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder claim are endemic to the politics of immature democracies and certain cartelistic nondemocracies.8

On a more hopeful note, it is at least plausible that the factions within a divided government could vie to be seen as the most politically liberal at home and the most accommodating abroad, especially if all the competing groups have a liberal orientation.9 The problem with this scenario is that nationalist messages tend to be simpler to articulate and therefore easier to sell, especially outside the party, where the broader population has little access to a marketplace of ideas that would allow for mature discourse on international and domestic affairs.10 In a weakly institutionalized China with various societal groups that feel frustration with the government, the label of “compradore” or “traitor” (maiguozei) might be an easier one with which to brand one’s political opponents than would “conservative” or “hegemonist.”

On the second issue—generational change of elites overall—there is somewhat less ambiguity. Hu Jintao has surrounded himself with some moderate foreign policy advisers, suggesting the possibility of a new maturity and a softening of Chinese diplomacy. His advisers have included scholars such as Wang Jisi and Zheng Bijian, both of whom have worked at the relatively liberal Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and, more recently, as important faculty at the Central Party School. It would be significant if Jiang Zemin’s protégés were to share moderate attitudes about issues such as the need not to appear overly threatening to Taiwan and other PRC neighbors, the potential for multilateral cooperation on regional economic and security issues, and the
recognition that a strong U.S. presence in East Asia is not inimical to PRC interests.

While recognizing that there is arguably considerably less conservatism in the new generation of Chinese scholars and advisers than in the previous two generations, we should also realize that the Chinese political environment is far from homogeneous. There are both “New Left” voices regarding politics at home and nationalistic voices on policies abroad, especially toward Taiwan. There are also debates, discussed below, about the proper mindset (xinli or xintai) for China’s foreign affairs. Unless Hu and Jiang are activist true believers in political reform and foreign policy accommodation above all else (which seems extremely unlikely), the resolution of these debates among the next generation will likely have less to do with which particular leadership or group is ascendant, and more to do with perceived trends in the party’s relationship with Chinese society and in relations with Taiwan and the United States.

The next section of this essay will discuss evidence from China for a wave of more accommodating, patient, and confident voices among CCP scholars and commentators on international affairs on the one hand, particularly in the year since September 11, 2001, and continuing evidence within the CCP of more conservative, nationalistic, and zero-sum views of cross-Strait relations and U.S. activities in the world on the other. The following section will look at policy pronouncements and initiatives that appear consistent with the assessment of a major trend of moderation and maturation in Chinese foreign policy, including initiatives on confidence-building measures and arms control. In all these cases, there are reasons both to appreciate the new tone of Chinese foreign policy in the past two years and to avoid excessive enthusiasm and optimism, particularly about the longer term. The conclusion will discuss factors that might make Chinese analysts confident about their security environment for the next two years, but that might change as the decade progresses.

THE THEORY WARS: CHINA’S VICTIM MENTALITY OR VICTIM REALITY?

In recent years there has been a healthy blossoming of scholarly reconsideration of PRC foreign policy. One cannot do justice to the various strands of thinking in a brief essay such as this one, but there are certain themes that are worth reporting. The first, relating to Taiwan, is a
recognition among some Chinese analysts that bluster and threats are likely insufficient for or even counterproductive to Beijing’s goal of encouraging acceptance in Taipei of long-term unification. Even as they acknowledge the deterrent role of military threats, these analysts also argue that only greater transparency in economics and politics will reassure Taiwan citizens that unification is in their interests.\textsuperscript{11}

Additionally, since September 11, 2001, many Chinese scholars have recognized in interviews and writings the shared interests of the PRC and the United States in fighting terrorism, even in light of the increased U.S. military presence in China’s backyard in Central and South Asia.\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps most striking is a recent article by an editor of the CCP propaganda organ, \textit{People’s Daily (Renmin ribao)}. In it the author argues that Japan is not the Japan of the imperialist past and that one should not equate recent Japanese military strengthening with “militarization” of Japan.\textsuperscript{13} Such sentiments are particularly significant given the well-documented Chinese mistrust of Japan and, in particular, of Japanese military assertiveness.

Finally, there has been an abstract call for China to behave more maturely and confidently—in a way befitting its newfound economic and military power and its accession to major regional and global organizations. This “maturity,” perhaps, is already reflected in China’s calm reactions to perceived slights from Taipei of the sort that might previously have led to histrionics in Beijing or even military exercises. It has still been dangerous for authors to criticize recent Chinese foreign policies directly, particularly at a time when Jiang Zemin was busy solidifying power for himself and his protégés by claiming a record of massive success. But, some articles strongly imply that China has behaved immaturely and has revealed a general lack of confidence unbecoming for a respected, truly great power.\textsuperscript{14} Such implicit criticisms and explicit suggestions for improvement in Chinese foreign policy demonstrate not only new thinking among a younger generation of Chinese strategic analysts, but also a more open environment provided by their elders that affords this new thinking outlets in

\begin{center}
\textbf{Party elites must think about more than just international diplomacy; they must also concern themselves with the domestic legitimacy of the party.}
\end{center}
Chinese publications, all of which are ultimately subject to government censorship and sanction.

Even as we recognize these positive trends, we must also recognize the continuing intellectual and political currents flowing in the opposite direction. Many authors continue to raise the threat of war over propositions such as a Taiwan referendum law that would allow the Taiwanese population to determine the island’s future relationship with the mainland. Some authors explicitly assail the more liberal analysis mentioned above. One nationalistic commentator blasted the notion among Chinese liberals that China has a “victim mentality,” arguing instead that China simply has a victim’s history. Those people with the alleged “mentality” are, in this view, simply incisive observers of great-power treatment of China over the decades, and should not be criticized by new thinkers. Others have suggested in interviews and publications that China has not been sufficiently threatening toward Taiwan and the United States in the past and that this shortcoming has prevented China from achieving unification or even permanently stemming the tide of Taiwan independence. Similarly, some observers remain more concerned about long-term trends in U.S. power and foreign policy than they are comforted by the rapprochement on Taiwan in the second half of 2002, which they suggest is temporary.

It is difficult to know who will ultimately prevail in such debates and what effect these ideas have on the CCP leaders who consume such advice. Regardless of their inclinations, the party elites must think about more than just the international aspects of whatever policy they choose. They must also concern themselves with the domestic legitimacy of the party and the role that successful nationalism plays alongside economic performance in shoring up that legitimacy. Even as China continues to grow at a fast pace, social discontent is apparently also growing among the rural populations and urban poor, particularly in areas that were largely dependent on state-owned industries and are not able to compete amid increasing foreign involvement in the Chinese economy. As the effects of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) take hold, this problem might get worse before it gets better. Of course, nationalistic posturing against Taiwan and the United States poses a devil’s choice for Beijing, as the CCP would run the risk of further damage to the economy and further losses of jobs. However, as I have pointed out in earlier CLM essays, appearances of weakness in the face of perceived nationalist slights by Taiwan and the United States provide one of the few opportunities for
disparate opposition groups in society to link up with each other and find allies within the party. So, inaction is also potentially dangerous over the long run.

CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF AN INTELLECTUAL SHIFT: BEIJING’S ATTEMPTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION WITH JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, ASEAN

Fortunately, the new trends in Chinese foreign policy are not just theoretical. Concrete reasons for optimism about trends in Chinese foreign policy exist in recent policies and events. As has been reported in past editions of CLM, Beijing has cooperated with the United States on various aspects of the war on terrorism. While it reacted negatively to Chen Shui-bian’s August comments regarding “one country on each side of the Strait” (yibian yiguo), Beijing did not respond with the sort of vitriol that accompanied either Lee Teng-hui’s trip to Cornell in 1995 or the pronouncement of his “two state theory” in 1999. Also, in early November Jiang Zemin spoke in relatively conciliatory tones about the need for cross-Strait dialogue, especially in comparison to the confrontational stance of those other two periods.

Moreover, China has sought to build some degree of confidence in Washington and in regional capitals. In August Beijing apparently took steps toward addressing a perennial concern of Washington, one that grew by leaps and bounds on September 11, 2001: Chinese proliferation of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. In addition, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have adopted a code of conduct for regional militaries operating or exercising in the South China Sea, where territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands remain a potential source of tension in the region.

More recently, Beijing’s policies and proposals on two issues—North Korea and Taiwan—are notable for both the positive spirit of the initial gestures and the potentially limited effectiveness of those gestures in practice. Following North Korea’s announcement that it has been pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program and that it will no longer cooperate with the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency via the 1994 Agreed Framework, Beijing not only has promised to cooperate with the United States to prevent North Korean nuclear weapons development, but also has adopted an approach toward North Korea that is fully regional and multilateral, recognizing not only Chinese,
U.S., and South Korean interests in North Korean nuclear issues, but
Japanese interests as well. Those with a sense of 20th century diplo-
matic history will appreciate the novelty of Beijing elites consulting
openly with counterparts in both Seoul and Tokyo to discuss how to
restrain Beijing’s “lips and teeth” ally from the Korean War.

That having been said, China’s own past proliferation policies—par-
ticularly toward Pakistan—likely contributed, albeit indirectly, to
North Korea’s ability to make progress on its uranium enrichment
technology, as I discussed in the previous edition of CLM. In the past,
Beijing apparently has failed to think through all the implications of its
proliferation policies. In December one U.S. newspaper reported that
U.S. intelligence had detected Chinese sales to North Korea of chemi-
cals useful in nuclear weapons production. This author is unable to
assess the validity of these claims, but the problem of loose control of
Chinese industries is recognized not only in Washington, but appar-
ently in Beijing as well, judging from the PRC’s efforts to create new
export laws in late summer and fall 2002.

Of even more interest to those steeped in the debates about the
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei triangle is the apparent arms control
proposal by Jiang Zemin at the Crawford summit (this proposal was
revealed after the compilation of the fourth edition of CLM). Jiang
apparently offered, as a quid pro quo for restraint in U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, to pull back some of the short-range ballistic missiles currently
deployed near Taiwan in the Nanjing Military Region. This offer was
apparently indeed made, as President Jiang reiterated the position to a
visiting entourage of former U.S. officials headed by former Secretary

There are several reasons why this gesture is not as significant as it
might seem on the surface. First, these missiles are mobile and can be
returned to the front line relatively quickly in a crisis. Second, and
related to the first point, China would need to do more than pull back
mobile missiles in any case, namely credibly commit to reducing the
production of such missiles and the technology that makes them more
accurate and, thereby, more militarily significant. There is no evidence
that Jiang was suggesting anything so expansive, and policing such an
agreement would be difficult at best in any case. Third, most of the
weapons systems Washington has recently offered and is considering
offering Taipei either have nothing to do with countering ballistic mis-
siles or are multifunctional, with only a partial emphasis on missile
defense. For example, many of the systems Washington offered Taipei

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in 2001 would help protect Taiwan against blockade (e.g., submarine-hunting planes such as the P-3 Orion and mine-clearing helicopters), at a time when China’s maritime blockade capabilities have grown with the purchase of Russian submarines, antiship cruise missiles, and wake-homing torpedoes. Fourth, there is a long lead time between U.S. agreements to sell certain equipment and the transfer of actual weapons to Taiwan, to say nothing of the time it takes to absorb and integrate these weapons into Taiwan’s actual defense planning. For example, the delivery of the 12 P-3 aircraft promised to Taiwan in April 2001 is being delayed by budgetary battles in the Legislative Yuan in Taipei. Even smooth legislative processes take a long time. Few realize that after the historic 1992 decision by President George H.W. Bush to sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan, the first batch of operational F-16s arrived only in 1997.

All these factors would help explain why the Bush administration apparently refused to pursue this issue further, and instead simply referred to the Taiwan Relations Act. Washington would clearly prefer to have Taipei and Beijing work out their own confidence-building regimes. After all, Washington does not force Taipei to purchase weapons; it offers them for sale. Amid tightening economic conditions and budgets in Taiwan, it follows logically that the best way for Beijing to limit U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan is to convince Taipei that it does not pose an increasing military threat.

With all that skepticism expressed, there may be more to Jiang’s offer than initially meets the eye. At the most abstract level, such an offer at least suggests that Beijing accepts the basic notion that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) threat to Taiwan is a major motivator of the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship. Second, if Beijing can be convinced to reduce its coercive threat to Taiwan unilaterally—and increasingly accurate short-range ballistic missiles are one major part of this threat—then this development could have a significant effect on the long-term political environment across the Taiwan Strait and across the Pacific. Many U.S. scholars (including this author at a meeting in Beijing in early 2000) have made the argument that the best way for
China to pursue a peaceful settlement of cross-Strait relations would be to reduce the immediate military threat to Taiwan unilaterally. This reduction, presumably, would lead to less apprehension in Taiwan about the prospects of direct links in trade and more political contacts. It would also, over time, likely reduce Taiwan requests for U.S. weaponry. Such a withdrawal of missiles from the front could potentially provide more warning time of a PLA attack, since the movement of mobile missiles could be tracked by U.S. and Taiwanese intelligence agencies, thus reducing the possibility of a bolt-out-of-the-blue assault on Taiwan that might present a fait accompli to the United States before Washington could respond effectively. This change in military conditions would be particularly important if the United States had a slower response time because of distractions in another theater of operations. Finally, while mobile missiles can be moved back in a hurry for some attack on Taiwan, according to two U.S. experts it would apparently require more time to move them into place and coordinate very accurate, complex, and concentrated attacks along the lines envisioned in contemporary PLA doctrinal writings.27

Despite the potential benefits of a unilateral withdrawal of missiles, the PRC offer of a quid pro quo is still a nonstarter. The United States and Taiwan should not dismiss it out of hand and should, instead, seek ways to convince Beijing that reducing the threat to Taiwan unilaterally would indeed be constructive. It should be noted that the normal CCP elite reaction to such proposals when they have been raised by U.S. scholars in the past has been something bordering on indignation.28 The fact that the PRC president is now suggesting some connection between the PLA military threat to Taiwan and Taiwan arms sales shows a real political, if not intellectual, shift in China. Reciprocity in Washington and Taipei would have to be diffuse, for all the reasons offered above, but that does not mean that Beijing can achieve nothing by unilateral military accommodation. And, it is difficult to see what Beijing would lose for the foreseeable future by adopting such concessions.

The fast-paced PLA buildup of military resources capable of coercing Taiwan and other regional actors continues to be a major problem for PRC diplomacy. The increasing defense budgets, the acquisition of expensive and deadly technologies from Russia, and the conducting of exercises apparently designed for Taiwan scenarios all seem to belie the confidence often expressed in Beijing that economic issues across the Strait and political conditions in Taiwan will lead Taiwan to accept Beijing’s terms for talks regarding peaceful unification.29 Beijing is hav-
ing trouble wrestling with the contradictory tasks of acquiring and training with such new military capabilities and increasing confidence in the region, especially in Taiwan. One recent moment called to mind the truly clumsy diplomacy of the past and did not hint at all at a new “maturity.” A Foreign Ministry spokesperson attempted to reassure Taiwan by stating that the military exercises recently completed in the South China Sea were aimed not at Taiwan but at settling claims to the Spratly Islands. When a nation reassures one maritime neighbor by stating that it is preparing for conflict against nearly all the others, not the neighbor in question, this response does not suggest a deeply seated sense of what is involved in confidence-building and reducing the security dilemma.

THE MILD 2002 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER AND RESTORED U.S.-PRC MIL-MIL RELATIONS

The most recent Defense White Paper, a biannual publication of the PRC Defense Ministry, is also notable for its accommodating tone, especially in comparison to the anti-American and rather vitriolic document that was produced in 2000 at the height of concerns over trends in the direction of Taiwan independence. There is no space in this issue of CLM to compare those two White Papers carefully. For our purposes here, it is worth noting this moderate tone as yet another data point suggesting a potential shift in PRC foreign policy and security policy toward a more cooperative and less confrontational approach. In particular, more confidence is demonstrated by the authors regarding the prevention of Taiwan independence, and the United States is not always singled out explicitly as the major source of difficulties in cross-Strait relations, as it has been in the past.

From the U.S. side, the apparent rejection of “strategic competition” has taken the form of renewed, high-level military ties. These contacts have taken three forms. In November U.S. Navy ships made port calls in Hong Kong and on the mainland. In December Beijing and Washington renewed the deputy defense-ministerial defense consultative talks for the first time since the April 2001 EP-3 incident. This colloquy was followed by a visit by Commander of the Pacific Command Admiral Thomas Fargo to several cities in China. During his visit, Admiral Fargo reiterated Washington’s nonsupport for Taiwan independence and its adherence to the U.S. “one China policy.” In the same vein, China’s Foreign Ministry responded in a rather restrained
fashion to President Bush’s mid-December announcement that the United States would be deploying preliminary national missile defenses in the near term.  

CONCLUSION: THE DURABILITY OR FRAGILITY OF FACTORS BEHIND THE CURRENT OPTIMISM IN BEIJING

There is evidence of an increased sophistication and confidence in Chinese diplomacy. This development represents an important trend and should be welcomed in Washington and the region. Even if the PRC “does better” internationally with a more sophisticated approach, we should not worry, as relations with the PRC are far from a zero-sum game. Common interests are numerous, and Beijing’s worries about the future, however justified, are more likely than Chinese over-confidence to spark a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait, particularly if the United States and its allies maintain a robust deterrent presence in the region. In fact, the biggest concerns about the almost giddy nature of current CCP confidence are that it might come crashing down in the future, as it has in the past, and that it might do so at a time when China has developed more coercive options against Taiwan.

Some of the causes of CCP confidence seem potentially mercurial. One source of confidence in Beijing is surely the further consolidation of Taiwan politics into pan-blue (People First Party [PFP] and Kuomintang [KMT]) and pan-green (Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] and Taiwan Solidarity Union [TSU]) camps, combined with the strong showing of the pan-blue candidates in the mayoral elections in early December 2002. Not only did the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou win a landslide victory in Taipei, but a KMT candidate also nearly defeated the DPP party chief, Frank Hsieh, in the DPP stronghold southern city of Kaohsiung, renowned for its pro-DPP and pro-independence leanings. But, it would be dangerous for CCP analysts to assume that national presidential elections in 2004 will play out in a similar fashion to the municipal elections, because national identity issues may not play nearly as large a role in local elections. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the PFP and KMT will be able to agree on a unified candidate for the presidential race as easily as they did in the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral races. If the PFP and KMT cannot settle on a single, effective candidate, a victory by the very skillful Chen Shui-bian seems the most likely single scenario for 2004.
How Beijing would react to such an outcome is open to question, particularly since recent political trends and increasing economic integration seem to be creating high expectations in Beijing. Moreover, according to the director of the Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Jiang Zemin apparently reiterated at the 16th Party Congress a version of the provocative “third if” of the 2000 Taiwan White Paper, stating: “The Taiwan issue brooks no endless procrastination, and complete reunification of the motherland should be achieved as soon as possible.”

So, while Beijing’s current optimism may have contributed to patience, even in good times that patience is not entirely open-ended.

Another factor that is encouraging Beijing’s confidence in the near term is U.S. distraction in Iraq, North Korea, and various locations where Al Qaeda has a presence. The United States has certainly seemed more accommodating on Taiwan policy since August 2002 than it was in spring 2001. Top U.S. officials, including President Bush, have claimed publicly that Washington does not support Taiwan independence. Beijing’s spokespeople and media assert that in backroom discussions at Crawford, President Bush went further still, stating to President Jiang that Washington “opposes” Taiwan independence. Whether this assertion is correct or not, Beijing correctly perceives that Washington is not eager to see conflict over Taiwan in the near term and, therefore, has reacted coldly to President Chen Shui-bian’s recent statements regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Another related matter is the U.S. State Department’s labeling of the East Turkestan Independence Movement as a terrorist organization since Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage’s trip to Beijing in August. This stance may seem to have more to do with the war on terrorism than with Taiwan, but it is also relevant to the latter. Conspiracy theorists in China believe that U.S. support for Taiwan is part of a broader containment and breakup strategy aimed at a rising China. If Washington is lining up with Beijing against “splittists” in northwest China, this stance helps put the lie to the notion that Washington’s Taiwan policy is part of such a grand scheme.

Finally, following three summits in a relatively short period of time, the Bush administration demonstrated a high comfort level with outgoing President Jiang Zemin by reportedly congratulating Jiang for his reelection to the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. Such outreach might seem simply pro forma. However, if we rewind the film to spring 2001, it is hard to imagine such a gesture of celebra-
tion being offered by the White House to a CCP leader as he grasped on to the largely extraconstitutional reins of state power afforded the leader of a Leninist state. These moments are the hard test cases proving that observers who have noted a real warming in U.S.-PRC relations in past months are not wearing rose-colored glasses. The question, as before, is how long the warm spell will last.

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NOTES

1. The author would like to thank Michael Glosny for expert research assistance.
7. This has been a common refrain in my interviews with CCP scholars and analysts in Beijing, Shanghai, and the United States. In fact, a few interlocutors even make these points to criticize Jiang, not to praise him.
9. I am indebted to Iain Johnston for raising the interesting idea of such a scenario.
10. Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War.”
12. For example, recent statements by Professor Wang Jisi suggest a positive-sum rather than zero-sum view of U.S.-China relations; see Chang Liang, “Wang Jisi, Director of Institute of North America of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Prevent External Troubles from Becoming Internal Troubles” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Ming pao, November 22, 2002, sec. A, p. 22, FBIS CPP-2002-1122-000025. This theme was also raised by a few military and civilian interlocutors on a research trip to Beijing in January 2001. Also see Tang Shiping, “Jiang-Bush Summit Sets Tone for Constructive Partnership,” Straits Times, October 29, 2002.


14. One of the best examples of a general call for PRC calmness and confidence is Ye Zicheng and Li Bin, “Zhongguo suo bixu goujian de daguo waijiao xintai” (The great power foreign policy psychology that China must construct), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), July 20, 2001, 4. Ye Zicheng is a young foreign policy analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Li Bin is a young arms control expert, professor, and adviser to the CCP. The article calls for China to be more steady, show more confidence, be more optimistic, and have a greater sense of responsibility and initiative on the international scene.

15. Zhu Xianlong, “Taiwan ‘gongtou’ jiu shi xuan zhan” (Taiwan’s “referendum” would mean a declaration of war), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), August 8, 2002, 1–2.

16. In a chapter of an edited volume, PRC scholar Wang Xiaodong blasted one of his more liberal colleagues, Shi Yinhong, for suggesting that China suffered from a victim’s mentality (shoukun xinli), Wang argues that this is not a mentality but an objective analysis of China’s strategic history. See Wang Xiaodong, “Yi ge ren yao zouguo duoshao lu” (How many roads must a man walk down), in Quanqiuhua yinying xia de Zhongguo zhi lu (China’s road under the shadow of globalization), ed. Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, and Qiao Liang (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1999).

17. Interviews in Beijing in June 2000, January 2001, and January 2002. For a published version of these arguments, see “Jiejue Taiwan wenti bushi shili wenti: Er shi juexin wenti” (Solving the Taiwan question is not a question of material strength, but a question of resolve), interview with Professor and Senior Colonel Zhu Chenghu, National Defense University, by editors of online journal of People’s University School of International Studies, http://sis.ruc.edu.cn/daokan/200101/fangtan.html. In the interview, Colonel Zhu opines that Taiwan lacks resolve, that Japan can be separated from the United States in a fight over Taiwan, and that Chinese military power can limit the scope and effectiveness of U.S. intervention.

internal party circulation for elite party members and, therefore, likely carries more weight than most commentaries. For a more cynical take on increased Japanese activities during the war on terrorism, see Wang Zhijian, “Riben jiyu banyan ‘junshi daguo’ jiaose” (Japan eagerly seeks to play the role of military great power), PLA Daily, January 28, 2002, http://pladaily.com.cn.


25. From the author’s communications with members of that entourage, it appears that the initial public reports were accurate.


28. I witnessed such a reaction personally on two occasions with two different U.S. scholars raising the concept of PRC threat reduction as a potential confidence-building measure.

29. That economic-based theory just received a new boost in late December as economic statistics out of Taiwan suggest that Taiwan’s investment on the mainland increased a whopping 35 percent over the last year despite an overall drop in Taiwan’s overseas investment. Victor Lai, “Taiwan’s Investment in Mainland China Up 35% in First 11 Months,” Taipei Central News Agency, December 20, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1220-000143.


32. For a very positive Chinese account of these talks, see “Liu Jianchao Says China and the United States Will Maintain the Important Communication


38. Moreover, certain statements out of Taiwan suggest that Taipei views itself as the moderating force in cross-Strait relations and sees no reason for a change in strategy toward the mainland in the near term. For a September 2002 review of 107 examples of “patience and goodwill” on the part of Taiwan in policy toward the mainland over the past two years, see the Mainland Affairs Council web site at http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/MacPolicy/891012e.htm.

39. On this issue, see Hei Tai, “From Not Supporting to Opposing Taiwan Independence: The United States’ Stance on Taiwan Issue” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Wen wei po (Internet version), November 30 and December 4, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1204-000027.

40. For an analysis along these lines, see Tang Shiping, “Jiang-Bush Summit Sets Tone.”

41. “Bush Greets Jiang on Reelection as Chairman of CPC Central Military Commission,” Xinhuanet, December 12, 2002. Strangely, the English-language Chinese publication claimed that President Bush “cherishes” working with President Jiang. This is most likely a mistranslation back from the Chinese, but it adds a bizarre twist to what appears to this observer an odd story. The author is grateful to Alan Romberg for calling this article to his attention.