Rethinking the Role of the CCP:  
Explicating Jiang Zemin’s Party Anniversary Speech

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After Jiang Zemin delivered his groundbreaking speech on the communist party’s anniversary last summer, there was much speculation about the strength of his political position and controversy over the meaning of the speech itself. Close examination of authoritative commentary, however, suggests that the speech has received strong support within the party and represents far more than the general secretary’s personal views. Moreover, articles by party theoreticians based at the Central Party School indicate that Jiang’s speech was intended to convey a program of wide-ranging political reform, albeit not one of democratization. This program of political reform is intended to meet the domestic and international challenges facing the party and to make the exercise of power in China better institutionalized and more stable.

Since Jiang Zemin delivered his controversial speech advocating that private entrepreneurs be allowed to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on July 1, there has been much speculation about the authority of the speech and about the strength of Jiang’s position as the party prepares for the Sixteenth Party Congress next fall. As discussed previously in the China Leadership Monitor, such speculation was fueled by a harsh attack on Jiang and his policies by conservative party leaders, led by the retired elder Deng Liqun. In addition, many people expected Jiang’s close associate Zeng Qinghong, head of the CCP Organization Department, to be promoted at the party’s Sixth Plenum in September last fall from alternate to full member of the party’s Politburo, so as to better position him to join the Politburo Standing Committee following the Sixteenth Party Congress. When he was not promoted, there was renewed speculation about Jiang’s political strength.

Careful inspection of authoritative commentary, however, suggests that Jiang’s political position remains strong, that his speech has been endorsed by the entire top leadership, and that the “expositions” (lunshu) of Jiang will form the basis of the political report at next year’s party congress. Moreover, commentary surrounding Jiang’s speech has shed much light on what party theoreticians believe to be its most important themes.

Endorsement by the Party Leadership

In the days following the publication of Jiang Zemin’s July 1 talk, every member of the Politburo endorsed the speech. Most significantly, given his conservative profile, NPC Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng was cited as endorsing the speech the very day it was given.1 Two days later, Li, speaking to the party group of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, declared that Jiang’s talk “is a Marxist programmatic document comprehensively promoting the construction of the socialist
enterprise with Chinese characteristics in the new century and comprehensively promoting the new great engineering project of party building.”

Further endorsement came when the Sixth Plenary session of the Fifteenth Central Committee met in Beijing September 24-26. The Communiqué issued at the end of the plenum stated:

The whole plenum highly appraised Jiang Zemin’s talk at the grand meeting celebrating the eightyth anniversary of the founding of the CCP. It unanimously believed that the talk … profoundly expounded the important thought and scientific meaning of the “Three Representatives”… and that it is a Marxist programmatic document that… has great and far-reaching significance.”

Not all plenum communiqués express unanimity about plenum deliberations, and so whatever private disagreements delegates might have had, the party nevertheless put itself on record as supporting Jiang’s speech in the most authoritative terms. Such an endorsement puts Jiang in a strong position in the run up to the Sixteenth Party Congress.

Zeng Qinghong

Many people-- including this author--expected Zeng Qinghong to be promoted from alternate to full membership of the Politburo at the Sixth Plenum. Zeng had been expected to be promoted not only because the death of Xie Fei in October 1999 left a vacancy on the Politburo, but because Zeng enjoys a very close personal relationship with Jiang Zemin. It has also been widely believed that Jiang wants Zeng Qinghong to be promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee at the Sixteenth Party Congress to assure Jiang’s continued political influence after he steps down from the position of general secretary. Many rumors swirled around Fifth Plenum in October 2000 concerning the same issue, and there does seem to be some reason to believe that Jiang discussed Zeng’s political future with Standing Committee colleagues at Beidaihe prior to that plenum. If there is any truth in the rumor mill, Jiang’s advocacy of Zeng met with strong, if artfully expressed, opposition. Because the Sixth Plenum was the last opportunity to promote Zeng to full membership before the upcoming party Congress, many believed that Jiang would make an all-out effort to promote his protégé.

Given the importance of Jiang’s July 1 speech, however, it now appears that Jiang was more concerned with getting his ideological legacy approved by the party than with such a potentially divisive issue as the promotion of Zeng Qinghong. Although the CCP has in recent year’s exhibited a preference for “step-by-step” promotions, there is no prohibition -- formally or informally -- against skipping ranks. When Hu Jintao was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo in 1992, he was not a member of the Politburo -- full or alternate. When Zhu Rongji was promoted to vice premier in 1991, he was only an alternate member of the Central Committee. Other precedents could be cited. With the strong endorsement of his July 1 speech by the Sixth Plenum, Jiang appears to be in a strong position to shape the composition of the Standing
Committee, and it still seems quite likely that Zeng will be promoted to the Standing Committee next year.

Authority of Speech

Given the harsh invective that leftist elders used against Jiang Zemin personally and the content of his July 1 speech, including the accusation that it had not gone through the proper party procedures, it is significant that Hu Jintao, vice president of the PRC and heir apparent to Jiang Zemin, defended the procedures by which the speech was considered and drafted in a September 3 speech to the Central Party School. According to Hu, Jiang Zemin personally expended a great deal of energy and a long time thinking about the speech. It was based on extensive investigation into the domestic conditions and on careful analysis of the “historical lessons concerning the rise and fall, successes and failures of some political parties in the world”—an obvious reference to the collapse of the CPSU and the socialist parties of Eastern Europe. Views both inside the party and out were considered, and “finally meetings of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Politburo discussed, revised, and determined” the speech. Interviews suggest that the discussions that led into the speech took place over a period of perhaps two years and included officials throughout China, including provincial and sub-provincial officials.

Defending and Explicating Jiang’s Speech

In the period since Jiang’s speech, party journals—including the Central Party School’s newspaper Study Times (Xuexi shibao)—have discussed the meaning of Jiang’s speech extensively. These discussions give new insight into the way party theoreticians—particularly those at the Central Party School, who played a role in drafting the speech—have been interpreting the main themes of the speech. In their articles, they have discussed the historical importance of Jiang’s ideas, defended admitting private business owners and others into the party, tried to redefine the role of the party in contemporary Chinese life, and developed the idea of “inner-party democracy.” Taken together, the ideological innovations included in the speech suggest a program of political reform, albeit one stopping short of democratization.

Admitting New Social Sectors into the CCP

The most controversial part of Jiang’s July 1 speech was his call to admit people from new sectors of society into the party. Since this has been widely reported as a call to admit “capitalists” into the party, it is worth noting that Jiang never used the word “capitalists,” even if that was the intent of his remarks. Jiang lists six sectors that have developed in recent years, and then, in the next paragraph, calls for admitting outstanding representatives of these strata into the CCP. Aside from whatever sophistry may have shaped Jiang’s choice of words, it is clear that the call was sensitive, and party commentary has defended it in practical, theoretical, and historical terms.
In practical terms, party commentary has repeatedly emphasized the rapid growth of the private economy and the party’s poor representation in that segment of society. For instance, one article stated that as of the end of 2000, the non-public economy accounted for 50.88 percent of industrial output, but the vast majority of enterprises in the “new economy” do not have party organizations. The article cited the example of Shanghai, which at the end of 1998 had only 353 party organizations in private enterprises and seventy-four in foreign invested enterprises – representing just 0.43 percent and 3.35 percent of those sectors. Without representation in that dynamic segment of the economy, the CCP is bound to end up in the dustbin of history. As one commentary put it, “One lesson of political parties that have lost their ruling positions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is that they have lost the support of youthful entrepreneurs and young intellectuals.” One can either absorb such new economic actors into the party or push them into opposition.

Theoretically, party theoreticians have argued that, because intellectuals are members of the working class, the emergence of the “knowledge economy” means that the composition of the working class is changing – increasingly it is being improved by the addition of “mental workers.” Obviously the accusation that the CCP was no longer the “vanguard of the working class” was one that cut deeply, and the party responded by arguing that to be the vanguard of the proletariat, the party membership did not have to come from the working class. What matters is the consciousness of the party members. As Jiang Zemin put it in his July 1 speech, “The criterion for determining if a political party is advanced, whether it is the vanguard of the proletariat, is primarily whether or not its theory and program are Marxist, whether or not it represents the correct orientation of social development, and whether or not it represents the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people.” In short, what counts is not the class origins of the membership, but their ideology. To make this argument, party commentators have drawn heavily on the party’s past. As a revolutionary party based in the countryside, the CCP drew heavily on peasants rather than workers. For instance, in 1928 (following Chiang Kai-shek’s bloody purge of Communists) working class party members constituted only ten percent of party membership. In 1929, the figure fell to seven percent, and in 1930 it fell again to 5.5 percent. Even, indeed especially, at that time, there were ideological disputes over the composition of the party. In his 1928 essay, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains,” Mao Zedong argued that a “party made up almost entirely of peasants” would have to carry out the “ideological leadership of the proletariat.” A party resolution in 1933 criticized “leftists” who argued that “only real proletarians can enter the party.”

Party commentators have focused particular attention on the December 1935 Wayaobao resolution because, in that resolution, there are a large number of statements that support the party’s current position. For instance, it states, “It is impossible for the party to gain leadership by relying on the activities of the working class alone. (This is a key point.)” It goes on: “The CCP is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. All people who are willing to fight for the CCP’s positions, regardless of their class origins, may join the CCP.” Not only does the Wayaobao resolution support the party’s position on
drawing its membership from all segments of society, it also conveniently criticizes those “leftists” who would restrict membership more narrowly. The Wayaobao resolution is also useful because it was shaped by Mao Zedong and favored his insistence that ideology, not sociology, was important to the revolution.

**Class Nature of the CCP**

Ever since Jiang Zemin gave his initial talks on his “three represents” theory, there has been great speculation that the CCP would give up its “class nature” and try to become a “party of the whole people” (*quanmindang*). Theorists from the Central Party School have visited Germany and are said to have studied the approach of the German Social Democratic Party quite closely. Similarly, it is widely rumored that Central Party School theoreticians have carefully studied *The Third Way* by Anthony Giddens, the British political theorist. Such reports, especially combined with Jiang’s efforts to expand the class basis of the CCP in his July 1 speech, have led to speculation that the CCP will, sooner or later, drop its “communist” label in favor of the more internationally accepted “social democratic” tag.

Whatever consideration may have been given to such ideas in CCP circles, recent commentary has made clear that the party has no such intention; indeed, the emphatic rejection of such ideas appears to forestall their likelihood for some years to come. The outcome of inner-party discussions has instead favored retention of the “communist” label while reinterpreting it in ways that the party leadership apparently thinks will provide sufficient room for maneuver in the coming years. As Hu Jintao put it in his Central Party School speech, “The ancestors cannot be tossed aside (lao zuzong buneng diao).”

Zheng Bijian, the executive vice president of the Central Party School who has been active in helping to create the “three represents,” has firmly rejected the idea that the CCP should become a “party of the whole people” (*quanmindang*). According to Zheng, a party of the whole people would be a catch-all party that would include diverse and conflicting interests; only a party representing the interests of the most advanced class (the workers, redefined to include intellectuals and entrepreneurs) can reconcile divergent interests on the basis of the fundamental interest of the broad mass of the people. In addition, he adds, on a more practical note, that efforts to create a party of the whole people, such as those of Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, failed. It is necessary, Zheng states, for the CCP to maintain its clear-cut class nature, and not fall into the “foreign trap” of calling the diverse people who have become prosperous in recent years a “middle class.” As Zheng puts it, “We definitely cannot copy Western concepts and include all of the broad mass of contemporary Chinese intellectuals, including science and technology workers, cultural workers, and economic managers, in the category of the so-called ‘middle class.’ This denigrates, weakens, and even obliterates the working class.”

The class nature of the CCP is obviously a sensitive issue. In Jiang’s original talks on the “three represents,” he did not use the term “vanguard of the working class.”
However, he obviously had to take critics into consideration when drafting his July 1 speech, for that term is used eight times in the text. Nevertheless, the final time the term appears, Jiang modified it in an important way. He said, “our party can forever be the vanguard of the proletariat and at the same time be the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese race.” It is in such ways that Jiang and the theoreticians who wrote the speech have tried to stretch traditional understandings of the meaning of the “vanguard of the proletariat.”

**CCP as Ruling Party**

Buried in the often arcane language of the lengthy speech is a theme that may emerge as critical in the months ahead, namely the transformation of the CCP from a “revolutionary party” (gemingdang) to a “ruling party” (zhizhengdang). This change is only implicit in the speech, which uses the term “ruling party” several times but does not contrast that concept with that of a “revolutionary party.” Nevertheless, commentary emanating from the Central Party School has highlighted this shift, pointing to several passages in Jiang’s speech that suggest its importance. In one passage Jiang says, “Our party has already changed from a party that leads the people in the struggle to seize national power to a long-term ruling party (zhizhengdang) that leads the people by holding national political power; [our party] has already changed from a party that leads national construction under the condition of external blockade to a party that leads national construction under the condition of comprehensive reform and opening up.” The Central Party School commentator declares that making clear these two transformations provides a “logical basis for improving many problems in our party’s construction.”

Similarly, the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School stated that it is “extremely important” to clarify that the CCP is a “ruling party.”

The notion that the CCP is a now “ruling party” suggests that its relationship with society and government must be changed to emphasize procedural regularity and institutionalization. This conclusion is underscored by another important passage in which Jiang speaks of the “laws (guilu) of a communist ruling party.” This is the first time a party document has used such a phrase. In a well known report on political reform, Pan Yue, deputy head of the State Council Office of Economic Structural Reform, argued that the CCP must strive for legitimacy by enhancing attention to formal procedures, and the incorporation of this reference to the “laws” governing ruling parties suggests that ideas such as Pan’s are influential within the party.

Liberal Shanghai theorist Zhu Xueqin has linked the evolution of the CCP from a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party” to the change in the economic system. He argues that whereas a mobilizational revolutionary party was appropriate to the era of a planned economy, an institutionalized ruling party is necessary for governing over a market economy. Zhu argues that the failure to carry out political reform simultaneously with economic reform has allowed “leftist” ideas to continue and even threaten the recurrence of a Cultural Revolution. He thus calls for carrying out political reform and establishing the concept that the CCP must operate within the bounds of the constitution.
Inner-Party Democracy

One of the most interesting aspects of Jiang’s speech and the surrounding commentary has been the emphasis on “inner-party democracy.” In part, this is an obvious parry of pressures stemming from economic globalization and Western models of democracy. As one article by the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School put it:24

[Another reason to improve the party’s leadership system is]… [t]o guard against the plots of Western hostile forces to “Westernize” and “divide” us. At present, peace and development remain the primary subject (zhuti) of the age, but threats from hegemonism and power politics as represented by the United States will exist continuously. In this severe and complicated struggle, we must have a clear recognition. We must fully recognize that whether or not we can improve the party’s leadership and governance (zhizheng) style is a major question related to the state’s long-term ability to govern and maintain stability.

In other words, there is clear recognition that the CCP exists in competition with other models of political organization, and so its proposals to increase inner-party democracy are presented as an alternative to Western-style democratization.

Another reason cited for increasing inner-party democracy is to try to promote cadres who are acceptable to their local constituency, thus reducing conflicts between party secretaries and government leaders and increasing the accountability of party leaders. One of the sources of tension between local cadres and the public has been over the monopoly of power that the former have enjoyed and the temptations to abuse that power; that tension apparently exists not just between cadres and citizens but also within party organizations. As the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School put it, “In some places the party monopolizes everything and power is overly concentrated. The governing and leadership style of the party in some places remains stuck in the old framework of the planned economy and the party running everything…. Overlapping functions, unclear responsibilities, and so forth are major reasons why party secretaries and government heads are not unified…. If these problems cannot be solved, they may threaten the ruling position of the CCP.”25

Thus, party reform focuses largely on the nomination and elections procedures within the CCP, and particularly reform of the party congress system. Party congresses are gatherings of party delegates who are supposed to convene every few years and elect leadership bodies at each level of the party. However, “there are a considerable portion of grassroots party organizations that are unable to convene party congresses or party representative meetings on schedule as required by party charter…. Those that are really able to re-elect grass-roots party committees every three or four years as required by party charter are few and far between; those that convene a party congress every eight or ten years are certainly not in the minority. Some units can’t even remember clearly in what year they last held a party congress.”26
Given these problems, party theorists have recommended a number of measures to open up and regularize the party congress system. These measures include the regular convening of party congresses, the bottom-up nomination of delegates to party congresses, the election of congress delegates in competitive (cha’e) elections (instead of being appointed by the party committee), allowing congresses to decide their own agenda, and establishing a party congress standing committee system, similar to that in the National People’s Congress. Suggested reforms would also include institutionalizing methods of democratic evaluation, democratic recommendation, and democratic election of leading cadres. Another proposal is to establish a hearing system that could consider different views when the party is contemplating major issues (such as revising the party charter).27

These reform suggestions build on a large number of experiments that have been held in recent years, mostly at the lower levels, but extending up to the provincial level to expand the number of people participating in the selection of party leaders.

Downplaying Class Struggle

As the call to broaden the party base by admitting private enterprise owners and other social classes suggests, Jiang’s speech played down the theme of class struggle—to the point that the term does not appear in the text. Besides omission, however, the text also played down the historic Marxist theme by stressing to an unprecedented degree the distance between the present “primary stage of socialism” and the future “communist” society. In keeping with the party’s rejection of the notion of a “party of the whole people,” Jiang insisted that the party’s “maximum program” still lay in the realization of communism. However, Jiang also stressed the distance between the present and the future realization of communism. As Jiang pointed out, “the realization of communism will be an extremely protracted historical process. In the past, our understanding of this issue was quite superficial and simplistic.” Emphasizing the length of time prior to the realization of communism pari passu plays down the role of class struggle.

In addition, Jiang’s speech used the expression “comprehensive development of people” (ren de quanmian fazhan) seven times without reference to the class nature of humankind.28 This emphasis on human development is in strong contrast to earlier ideological documents that have stressed the class nature of human beings.29

Finally, this de-emphasis on class struggle has been extended to China’s relations with the rest of the world. In a recent article, Central Party School theoretician Li Zhongjie declared that human society “gradually moves from narrow national history toward broad world history,” thus bringing about a “dialectical unity” between China and other nations. This blurring of the difference between “socialism” and “capitalism,” both in China and internationally, is a striking and significant turn of events. It flies in the face of official denunciations of “peaceful evolution” that were routine only a few years ago and nationalist sentiment that has arisen in some quarters in recent years.
Conclusion

The themes laid out by party theoreticians and discussed above will have to be further elaborated in the political report and incorporated into the party constitution at the Sixteenth Party Congress next year if they are to be adopted as formal party doctrine. Indeed, formal adoption of such doctrinal changes, along with the personnel changes made at the congress, will be an important benchmark for judging the party’s willingness to change. Perhaps the most significant aspect of these ideological changes is the message that after two decades of effecting reform through the party, now the party itself has become the object of reform. This is, in effect, a program of incremental but significant political reform. These reforms are clearly intended to preserve the rule of the CCP and therefore stop well short of democratization. Nevertheless, such reforms, if they are implemented, are likely to promote a range of political changes--including institutionalization of state-society relations, more professional administration of justice, greater emphasis on law, and a proliferation of intermediary institutions–that will make the exercise of political power in China less arbitrary and more predictable. At a minimum, the endorsement of the themes outlined in Jiang’s speech will legitimize the push for political reform within the party, suggesting that the pace of reform in the next few years may be faster than in the past several.


2 “Li Peng qiangdiao: ‘yi “sange daibiaoz” zhongyao sixiang wei zhidao ba renda gongzuo tigao dao yige xin shuiping” [Li Peng emphasizes: Use the important thought of the “Three Represents” as guidance to raise the work of the People’s Congress to a new Level],

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5 There has been much speculation as to whether Jiang will retain his position as head of the Central Military Commission after the Sixteenth Party Congress. It is my assumption that he would like to retain this position, but that is obviously subject to negotiation, and so I remain agnostic as to whether he will do so.

6 Hu Jintao, “Shenru xuexi, zhengque linghui, quanmian guanqie Jiang Zemin tongzhi ‘qiyi’ zhongyao jianghua jingshen” [Deeply study, correctly apprehend, comprehensively implement the spirit of Comrade Jiang Zemin’s important “July 1” talk], Xuexi shibao, September 10, 2001 p. 1.

7 The six groups are: (1) entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by scientific and technical enterprises of the non-public sector; (2) managerial and technical staff employed by foreign-funded enterprises; (3) the self-employed; (4) private enterprise owners (i.e., “capitalists”); (5) employees in intermediary organizations; and (6) free-lance professionals.

8 Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei dangxiao ketizu, “Xin jingji zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de xianzhuang yu qianzhan” [Present circumstances and prospects for party building work in organizations of the new economy], Dangjian yanjiu neican (June 2001): 11.
9 Li Junru, “Zhengque lijie he jianchi dangde jiejixing” [Correctly understand and uphold the party’s class nature], Lilun dongtai, July 20, 2001, p. 3.

10 Li Junru, ibid., p. 10. The quote is taken from p. 9 of the Chinese text of Jiang’s speech. It can be found, with a slightly different translation, on p. 20 of the English translation.

11 Zheng Bijian, “Xinshiji Zhongguo gongchandang qianmian jiaqiang zishen jianshe de Makesi zhuyi xin juexin” [A Marxist new consciousness for comprehensively strengthening the CCP’s own construction in the new century], Xuexi shibao, September 17, p. 3.


16 Zheng Bijian, “‘Sange daibiao’ yu dangxiao xuefeng” [The “three represents” and the style of study at the party school], Xuexi shibao, March 26, 2001, p. 2.

17 Ibid. See also, Zheng Bijian, “Xinshiji Zhongguo gongchandang qianmian jiaqiang zishen jianshe de Makesi zhuyi xin juexin,” Xuexi shibao, pp. 1, 3. The centrality and sensitivity of discussions surrounding the notion of a “middle class” is well illustrated by the publication of Lu Xueyi, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jiezeng yanjiu baogao (Research report on Social Structure in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), which not only discusses the growth of the middle class in contemporary China but focuses on it as the key to social and political stability. Despite the favor it reportedly found in the corridors of power, the book was subsequently banned because of its depiction of the working class as declining in social status.

18 This phrase occurs at the bottom of p. 11 of the Chinese text and p. 25 of the English translation.

19 This passage may be found on p. 8 of the Chinese text and p. 17 of the English translation. I have revised the English translation to more closely match the Chinese. The importance of this passage is highlighted in Li Zhongjie, “Jiang Zemin ‘qiyi’ jianghua shi lilun chuangxin de zhongda chengguo” [Jiang Zemin’s “July 1” speech is an important fruit of theoretical renewal], Neibu canyue, 31 (August 10, 2001): 6.

20 “Wei shenma yao ba shehui gefangmian de youxiu fenzi xishou dao dangnei lai” [Why do we want to absorb outstanding elements from all social sectors into the party?], Lilun dongtai, 1535 (August 10, 2001): 3.

21 The phrase occurs at the top of p. 9 of the Chinese text and on p. 19 of the English translation. On its importance, see Li Zhongjie, “Jiang Zemin ‘qiyi’ jianghua shi lilun chuangxin de zhongda chengguo,” p. 7. Pan’s proposals are discussed in China Leadership Monitor, no. 1. For those with long historical memories, the idea that policies must follow “laws” was a notion that was popular in the early reform period. At that time, particular attention was focused on economic policies and the importance of economic laws. This recognition began to break down the CCP’s privileged claim on truth, allowing professional economists to debate the existence and implementation of economic laws. See Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp.
For a brief discussion of Pan Yue’s political reform proposal, see my contribution to the first issue of *Chinese Leadership Monitor*.

Zhu Xueqin, “Shixian gemingdang xiang zhizhengdang de guannian zhuanbian” [Realize the conceptual transformation from a revolutionary party to a ruling party], *Neibu canyue*, 30 (August 3, 2001): 12-18. It is interesting and significant that Zhu Xueqin, well known as a liberal theoretician, has access to the pages of *Neibu canyue* in this period.


Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Sang Yucheng, “Yizhang zhidang shi zhizhengdang jianshe de zhongda wenti” [Governing the party according to the charter is an important problem in constructing a ruling party], *Neibu canyue*, 20 (May 25, 2001): 3.

Liu Yifei, “Shilun dangyuan zhuti canyu dangnei shiwu de zhiduchuangxin” [Preliminary discussion on institutional innovation to allow the main body of party members participating in inner-party affairs], *Lilun dongtai*, 1530 (June 20, 2001): 1-9.

Li Zhongjie, “Jiang Zemin ‘qiyi’ jianghua shi lilun chuangxin de zhongda chengguo,” p. 12.