

## “Ding, Dong, The Witch is Dead!” Foreign Policy and Military Intelligence Assessments after the Retirement of General Xiong Guangkai

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For more than a decade, General Xiong Guangkai used his position as the head of military intelligence to shape and influence Chinese leadership assessments of foreign and security policy, especially Sino-U.S. relations. News reports suggest that General Xiong has finally retired, after staying in his position well past the mandatory retirement age, which most outside observers attributed to his real or self-described indispensability. His reported replacement, General Zhang Qinsheng, is not a military intelligence officer by training, but has instead occupied a series of critical staff and command positions. This article analyzes General Zhang’s known biographical data, and examines his limited public comments for clues about his worldview and attitudes.

### Xiong’s Retirement: Not with a Bang, But a Whimper

Xiong Guangkai, born in March 1939, joined the PLA in July 1956.<sup>1</sup> He became assistant chief of the General Staff in November 1992, and assumed the position of deputy chief of the General Staff with the portfolio for intelligence in January 1996. General Xiong Guangkai was due to retire last year, according to the military’s established age-based retirement norms, which state that the retirement age for a deputy chief of the General Staff, who in terms of cadre rank is equivalent to the commander of a major military region, is 65 years of age. Hong Kong media in December reported that Xiong would retire at the end of December 2005, replaced by Major General Zhang Qinsheng (bio below).

Assuming that these reports are correct, what does the future hold for General Xiong? Even before his alleged retirement, Xiong was jointly listed as the president of one of Chinese military intelligence’s research organizations, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), and reportedly will continue in that role after leaving active duty. This position will give him significant opportunities to continue shaping and influencing leadership assessments of foreign and security policy, either through internal conferences and publications or through participation in Beijing’s increasingly vibrant public discourse. Outside observers will not be at all surprised to see the loquacious and opinionated Xiong appearing as a television commentator or keynote speaker at public meetings, or even traveling abroad for foreign conferences.

## Who Is Zhang Qinsheng?

Major General Zhang Qinsheng, born in May 1948, is a native of Xiaowen in Shanxi Province.<sup>2</sup> He has served successively as director of the Military Training Department of the Beijing Military Region,<sup>3</sup> deputy director of the Military Training Department of the General Staff Headquarters, director of the Campaign Teaching and Research Office under the National Defense University (NDU), dean of studies at the NDU, and director of the Operations (First) Department of the General Staff Department. At NDU, Zhang reportedly developed a reputation as an expert on “informationized warfare” and conducted research on network command systems.<sup>4</sup> In the early 1990s, Zhang was also reportedly the “guiding instructor” for Ge Zhenfeng, who is currently Deputy Chief of the General Staff with the key operations portfolio. Zhang Qinsheng was promoted from director of the Operation Department of the General Staff Headquarters to the position of assistant chief of the General Staff in December 2004. If he has replaced Xiong Guangkai, he would assume the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff with the portfolio for intelligence.

Zhang has frequently appeared in media reports. In September 2001, Zhang attended an international forum in Beijing entitled “China and the World in the 21st Century,” sponsored in part by *Wen wei po*. Major General Zhang Qinsheng accompanied Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai at the meeting. Zhang also accompanied Guo Boxiong on an inspection tour of Fujian and Guangdong units in April 2005.<sup>5</sup>

Zhang Qinsheng’s most important and highest profile media appearance was in his role as chief of staff for the Chinese side in the China-Russia joint military exercise directorate for “Peace 2005” in August 2005, supporting Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ge Zhenfeng.<sup>6</sup> Zhang led the Chinese side during the five pre-exercise consultations,<sup>7</sup> the last of which concluded in June 2005.<sup>8</sup> An August 12 article in *Wen wei po* revealed that Zhang, in addition to his responsibility for implementing the “commander’s intent,” would also have special responsibility for training and drilling of command organs during the exercise.<sup>9</sup> On August 22, Zhang led the Chinese side in proposing the joint campaign course of action for the military exercise.<sup>10</sup> Zhang briefed Chinese minister of defense Cao Gangchuan and Russian minister of defense Ivanov on August 24 on the progress during the exercises,<sup>11</sup> and briefed Chinese and foreign media throughout the eight-day exercise.<sup>12</sup> Among his public comments, Zhang described the background and purpose of the exercise as follows:

We are holding a joint exercise in order to demonstrate to each other the strategic capabilities of our countries. They should also reflect the level of relations between Russia and China.<sup>13</sup>

Further,

the Chinese and Russian armed forces had no contact for half a century, and yet the joint military exercise involved assessment of the international security environment and agreement on the interests of the two sides; it

involved Chinese and Russian military doctrine, operational theory, and customary practices in the organization and implementation of major military actions; it involved theories and concepts of future warfare and peacekeeping actions; it involved methods of organizing and conducting exercises, etc. Thus, if the joint military exercise was to succeed, it was first essential to achieve jointness in operational thinking, and engage in military cultural contact.”<sup>14</sup>

After Peace 2005, Zhang accompanied Guo Boxiong on an inspection tour of Nanjing Military Region in November 2005.<sup>15</sup> In December, Zhang began meeting with foreign military delegations, which had always been an important job for Xiong Guangkai. Zhang Qinsheng accompanied Cao Gangchuan, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and defense minister, in a meeting with Namoloh, the visiting defense minister of Namibia.<sup>16</sup> Later in the week, Zhang Qinsheng met with Lieutenant Colonel Croft, deputy commander of the Defense Force of Antigua and Barbuda, at the Bayi Building.<sup>17</sup> In the meeting with Croft, Zhang “briefed his guests on China’s domestic construction, and expounded the principled stand of the Chinese government on the Taiwan Issue.”<sup>18</sup>

## What Does Zhang Qinsheng Believe?

A limited selection of quotes in official media sources reveal some features of Zhang Qinsheng’s thinking.

### *On 9/11*

“There is still some time, the reason has not been determined yet. No government should react in a rash manner and any government should, in its actions, comply with the mainstream of the development of mankind. We were shocked when we heard about the news that this could happen in an era of peace and development, this kind of terrorist act. On this point the United States and China hold common views.”

### *On Regional Wars and the Role of Maritime Conflict*

“For the first time, the breakout of a new world war and a large-scale China-Soviet Union conflict is unlikely, and the threat to peace in the future will come from a regional conflict on the sea.”<sup>19</sup>

### *On the Taiwan issue (circa 2001)*

“The bill recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives proclaims that the plan for strengthening U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, for which it calls, is for the purpose of

enhancing Taiwan's so-called defense capability and the 'joint combat capability' of the U.S. and Taiwan armed forces; this in fact means that they want to establish a U.S.-Taiwan paramilitary alliance, and to bring U.S.-Taiwan relations to develop toward a military alliance. Its essence is extremely serious. If this bill eventually becomes law, the consequences will be extremely dangerous. Not long ago the United States permitted Taiwan's so-called minister of national defense to formally visit the United States. These moves are undoubtedly aimed at boosting the morale of the 'Taiwan independence' forces and inflating their arrogance in 'rejecting reunification through armed force' and 'promoting independence through armed force,' thus blocking China's great cause of peaceful reunification.

"U.S. interference is the fundamental reason why the Taiwan problem has not been resolved in the past 50 years. Setting aside what happened in the distant past, during the 1990s, with the breakup of the bipolar pattern, certain Americans saw China as an obstacle to their exercise of world hegemony and continually used the Taiwan problem to pressure us, thus causing problems in Sino-U.S. relations and heightening Taiwan Strait tension.

"Taiwan's special military value and the requirements of U.S. global strategic interests, plus the fact that the United States does not want to see an increasingly stronger China emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, determine that the United States will not lightly abandon Taiwan and is bound to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation and enhance Taiwan's strategic status, so as to curb China's development and growth. Looking at history, U.S. policy on Taiwan and on China both have dual characteristics. During the Cold War, when the United States wanted to contain the Soviet Union, it developed exchanges with China; following the breakup of the bipolar system, when the United States wanted to plan and control [*jing lue*] the Asia-Pacific region, it used the 'Taiwan card' to contain China. On the Taiwan issue, on the one hand it aided and supported Taiwan, and on the other, it often partially sacrificed its Taiwan interests for the sake of U.S.-China relations. The fluctuating and pragmatic nature of such policies is completely driven by U.S. national interests; this point is proven by the U.S. actions in 'breaking ties' and 'withdrawing forces' from Taiwan in 1972.

"Not long ago the Taiwan authorities secretly plotted to change the name of their overseas offices and hang up a 'Taiwan' signboard, to 'demonstrate' the so-called fact of a sovereign independent state; on March 17, the 'World Taiwanese Congress,' an overseas 'Taiwan independence' organization, held a gathering in Taiwan with the public support of the Taiwan authorities, at which they loudly clamored that 'Taiwan must have its proper name and the state must have a constitution.' The 'Taiwan independence' elements are extremely rampant.

"The continual escalation of this 'incremental Taiwan independence' should arouse a high degree of vigilance on our part. 'Incremental Taiwan independence' has a hidden and confusing nature. The Taiwan authorities use the pretexts of 'nativization' [*ben tu hua*] and 'nature of the main body' and push these through by administrative measures, in a conspiracy to turn quantitative into qualitative change, gradually advance

from inside to outside in nibbling fashion, proceed from within the island to the international scene, and first create opinion and then take action, so that Taiwan will gradually complete its 'separation from China' and 'become a state.' This deceptive and fraudulent 'Taiwan independence' behavior is profoundly dangerous. 'Incremental Taiwan independence' challenges the one China principle and nibbles away at the basis for peaceful reunification; it is extremely dangerous. For the leaders of the Taiwan authorities and 'Taiwan independence' forces inside and outside the island to collude with each other and embrace foreigners to earn themselves dignity constitutes serious provocation in wrecking cross-Strait relations and is bound to further heighten tension in the Taiwan Strait and bring tremendous calamity on the Taiwan compatriots."<sup>20</sup>

*On the "new historical missions of the PLA"*<sup>21</sup>

"At the beginning of this new era, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has taken on a new historical mission.

- Peace and development are the main topics of the current era. Winning peace, striving for cooperation, and advancing development have become the irreversible tide of history. China is a large, responsible country; it is a sturdy force that maintains world peace and stability. The Chinese army will play positive roles in maintaining regional stability, in maintaining world peace, and in advancing the civilization and progress of the human race.
- As a sovereign nation, China cherishes the hard-won right to independent self-governance. A China that upholds the unity of the ethnic groups and achieves the unification of the homeland is the only China that can make an even greater contribution to the noble cause of peace and development for the world. Opposing invasion, maintaining unification, countering separatism, and protecting the totality of the territory constitute the fundamental mission of the Chinese army.
- The Chinese people constantly strive to become stronger, make changes and innovate, and surge forward with accomplishments. Their achievements in the socialist modernization have attracted the world's attention. Protecting the peaceful labor of the people, securing the fruits of reform and opening, actively joining and supporting socialist modernization, and advancing the sustained and stable development of the economy are the holy responsibilities of the Chinese army.
- As a member state of the United Nations, China highly values and actively participates in international security cooperation. The Chinese army actively participates in multilateral military foreign relations activities, and gives full play to its active role in dealing with international military affairs. In order to demonstrate to the world its role as an honorable and just force, China will continually increase its military exchange with other countries, and do its part in the world military arena."

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“As this new era is beginning, China’s armed forces should review history, face reality squarely, and explore new thinking for securing military construction and development into the future. Be prepared to win high-tech limited war; strive to raise the level of modernization of weapons and equipment. The whole reason for having a military force is to contain war, and to be victorious in war. At the beginning of the nineties, The Chinese army once again put the strategic directive of ‘active defense’ in place. The directive emphasizes that winning a modern-technology limited war, and, in particular, a limited war under high-tech conditions, be the starting point for all preparation for military conflict. The directive also emphasizes building our army into a military force that can meet all kinds of challenges and that has reached a fairly high level of modernization. To this end, we must focus on the goal of raising the high-tech combat ability of the army, and give an extremely prominent position to development of national defense technology and weapons and equipment construction. We must implement the principles of ‘put scientific research first, be demand-driven, accentuate the main points, and consider more than one system at a time.’ We must strive for breakthroughs in key technical areas, and use these breakthroughs to bring about weapons and equipment development and to improve the comprehensive combat ability of the army.

“Concentrate on the need to raise the army’s fighting strength, vigorously reform the staffing system. The staffing system of the army must adapt to the development of weapons and equipment and to the needs of preparation for military struggle in the new era. Keeping the principles of ‘streamlined troops, synthesis, and high efficiency’ in mind, and with structural adjustment as the center, increasing fighting strength as the goal, and reforming the leadership and command systems as the breakthrough point, we must attempt to solve problems in three areas. Number one is the integrated optimization of military strength, focusing on solving structural conflicts in the staffing system, on balancing the proportions of the branches of personnel, and on building new operations systems. Number two is improving the abilities in actual war of the troops, adapting to battlefield conditions of future high-tech warfare and to changes in the enemy and in combat methods, and developing new elements of operational strength. Number three is raising the command efficiency of combined operations, breaking down barriers between different departments, and decreasing levels of command, which will lead to efficient leadership systems and shrewd and capable combat organs.

“Adapt to changes of style in future war, continually innovate the theory of operations. Innovation of military theory is an indicator that an army has reached maturity. A lack of theory will result in crisis. We should highly value excellence in military scholarship, and innovation in military theory. Through researching the qualities and patterns of limited war under high-tech conditions, develop the ideology, strategy, and tactics of People’s War; through researching future threats of war and the styles of campaign that China faces, innovate theory in joint operations of the three forces, in border counterattack operations, in mobile operations, and in anti-aircraft operations; through researching wars and conflicts involving different threats, different opponents, and different strengths, propose appropriate operations guidance policies, movement styles, and methods of battle.

“In accord with military development at the turn of the century, work to cultivate high-quality, talented troops. If the 20th century is to be called a time in which ‘wealth sprung from material resources,’ then the 21st century will embark on a brand new time in which ‘wealth springs from human resources.’ To this end, the Chinese army has brought forth policies and measures for cultivating turn-of-the-century talent, in order to gain the initiative. Number one is optimizing the structures to achieve quality personnel, and to cultivate ‘multi-faceted talent who know both politics and military affairs, and who know both command management and specialized technology.’ Number two is raising the starting point for cultivating talent. Begin by raising cultural quality, and gradually achieve the goals of a high cultural and knowledge starting point, high-level educational content, and highly efficient education management methods. Number three is broadening the pathways of cultivation of talent. Uphold training through the ranks, combined training for command and technology, cross training, and exchange with foreign countries. Broaden our field of vision for knowledge, and raise organization and command capabilities.

“Reform and perfect the army’s policies and systems that are relevant to the development needs of the socialist market economy. The construction and development of China’s army are conducted within the larger environment of reform and opening up to foreign countries. The socialist market economy has a very strong influence on military construction. Set up policies for legal rectification of the army, comprehensively strengthen construction of the military legal system, establish a system of military law that has Chinese characteristics, and ensure that national defense and troops construction follows a course that is supported by the rule of law. As the whole nation’s reform continues to advance, we should actively move forward the reform of the military, with particular emphasis on reform of policy systems. We should inspire the enthusiasm of the officers and increase the attractiveness of the army, and increase its cohesiveness. Emphasize reform of the military service system, of the cadet system, of the personnel system, and of the salary and benefits system. Safeguard socialization and other systems and policies. Set forth on a path of modernized construction of the troops that requires relatively little investment and shows high returns.

“Strengthen military contacts with other countries, develop ourselves by studying the experience of others. On the one hand, China builds relations with foreign countries to advance understanding and trust among the militaries of the various nations of the world. The other reason is for China to study the advanced experience of other countries’ militaries through multi-level exchanges in many areas. For example, that kind of consciousness of always searching for new and better ways to do things that was spawned by industrial civilization; quickly incorporating new findings of science and technology research into the military, and the sensitivity for maintaining superiority in military technology; tracking changes in the status of wars, boldly positing new theories of operations so as to be on the leading front of warfare; taking in advanced management methods from socialized, large-scale production, approaches that raise the efficacy of military reform and management, etc.”

*On "Diverse Threats" in the 21st Century*

"We find ourselves in an age of development and changes, and we can envision that, for some time down the road, there will be some new changes in the international strategic situation in keeping with the readjustment of relations among the great powers. There will also be numerous uncertain factors in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, intervention in the Taiwan problem represents a serious challenge and threat to the development of our country.

"From the perspective of the world situation the new century is facing, the threats to China's national security interests will be diverse, and they are also integrated. This is determined by China's distinctive national attributes. China is a major power which insists on taking the socialist path, is pursuing economic development, and bears responsibility for affairs in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Accordingly, political and cultural security centering around the 'infiltration and counter-infiltration' encountered in defense of the socialist system is extremely important; economic security centering around 'containment and counter-containment' triggered by participation in and construction of the new world economic order is extremely prominent; and national security centering around the 'hegemony and anti-hegemony' encountered in stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and having an impact on the international situation is also unavoidable.

"It must be noted that China's national security situation at the crossroads of the centuries is intricate and complex, with numerous uncertain and unknown factors. Among these, there are five factors that should attract our serious attention. The first is the impact of world hegemonism, power politics, and regional conflicts on China's security; second is the impact of economic globalization, the development of the information society, and information networking on China's security; third is the impact on China's security of local wars that may be triggered over the problem of unifying the motherland; fourth is the impact on China's security of the course of reforms and opening up and the risks that may be encountered; and fifth is the impact on China's security of the expansion of the forces of ethnic separatism and religious extremism."

*On "Informationized Warfare"*<sup>22</sup>

"The birth and growth of informationized warfare is the most significant mark of this military reform."

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"The change from mechanized weaponry to informationized weaponry inevitably leads to fundamental changes in modes of combat, military theories, and establishment of army units. Obviously, informationization is the most important factor driving the revolution of science and technology, and social changes; it is also the nature and substance of new military reforms."

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“In the history of war, the Gulf War has epoch-making significance. It was a war that occurred in the transition period from the industrial era to the information era, even though it was not an informationized war in the full sense. However, this war revealed the characteristics of informationized warfare, which became very obvious in the subsequent ‘Desert Fox’ operation, the Kosovo war and the Afghan war.”

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“An informationized weapons system is an integrated system based on information technology, with computer technology as its core. Its main components are informationized assault and defense weapons systems, digitized instruments for equipping foot soldiers, and C4ISR command and control systems. The outstanding feature of informationized weapons systems is precision strikes on battlefields. In the Gulf War, though only 7 percent of the bombs dropped by the multinational forces were precision-guided bombs, they destroyed about 80 percent of the major targets. Relevant data show that it took about 900 bombs to destroy a target in World War II; the number dropped to 300 in the Vietnam war. A war used to last a long period and consumed lots of ammunition. However, at present, it takes only one to two precision-guided bombs to destroy a target; a heavy precision-guided bomb can deliver the same destructive power as several thousands of bombs dropped by hundreds of bombers in World War II; an F-16 fighter plane has a destructive power equivalent to 30 B-17 bombers. Because of the high combat effectiveness of precision-guided missiles, the U.S. armed forces have made a great effort after the Gulf War to develop precision-guided weaponry. In the Afghan war, 60 percent of the bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Force were precision-guided bombs. The abundant use of long-range precision-guided weapons is the important factor leading to changes in the form of war.

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“The battlefield of an informationized warfare is multidimensional. The birth of airplanes and the advancement of aeronautical technology led to the first revolutionary change in the spatial quality of battlefields; two-dimensional battlefields of land and sea became three-dimensional battlefields of land, sea, and air. Since the 1980s, the application of aerospace technology, and especially the application of the information technology that is based on computers, has changed again the spatial quality of battlefields. A battlefield has not only extended in the three physical dimensions, from land, sea, and air to outer space, but it has also obtained a new combat space—cyberspace, which has quietly arrived in man’s world.

“For example, in the decisive battles of World War II such as the Vistula River-Oder River battle, the Battle of Berlin, and the Battle of Normandy, the size of a battlefield was not more than a few tens of thousands or a few hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. However, in the Gulf War, the size of the battlefield increased tremendously, from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west; from the Red Sea in the south to Turkey in the north; a total area of 14,000,000 square kilometers. In the Afghan war, the first war after man had entered the 21st century, although the main battlefield was limited to the 650,000 square kilometers within the

borders of Afghanistan, the relevant space of the war extended to the U.S. homeland and to the whole world. The U.S. launched B-52 and B-1 bombers from its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, which is 5000 kilometers away from Afghanistan, to carry out long-range bombing missions in Afghanistan. B-2 stealth bombers even flew all the way from the U.S. homeland to bomb Afghanistan. Various types of reconnaissance and early-warning planes were deployed in the air, giving round-the-clock and all-location surveillance to watch the enemy's every move. In outer space, a number of satellites form an outer-space surveillance network providing overall surveillance and searching for the movements and locations of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

“Other than having extremely huge physical space, information space is vast in other dimensions. Information space, as a brand new concept, includes spaces in electromagnetic fields, in cyberspace, and in psychology. The electromagnetic battlefield is known as the ‘fifth-dimension battlefield.’ after land, sea, air, and outer space, and is an important battlefield of informationized warfare. At present, a global Internet network already exists, and the computer networks of more than 170 countries in the world are interconnected as an integrated system. The birth of cyberspace has made the concept of geographical distances and border boundaries of nations lose their significance. Any target linked to the cyberspace can be subjected to attacks. In the Kosovo war, invisible hackers paralyzed the White House website service for several hours. After NATO’s air raid, the NATO headquarters was bombarded each day with tens of thousands of emails, causing serious jamming in its network. The psychology space, especially the thought space of decisionmakers, is an important battlefield of informationized war. In modern high-tech war, armies pay special attention to the contest in psychology space. The U.S. armed forces not only have formed special psychology units, but also have started research in specialized psychological weapons such as ‘noise emulators’ and ‘electronic howlers.’ The U.S. forces adopted a tactic that relied on both military assault and psychological assault in the recent three limited wars and succeeded in psychological warfare. Both sides of the U.S.-Iraq war are fighting a great psychological war.”

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“Time is a key element of war. In informationized war, a combat is short and sharp. War in the past could last for months or years. Historical records exist that keep the numbers of wars that lasted for more than five years. About 40 percent of wars in the 17th century lasted more than five years, about 34 percent in the 18th century, about 25 percent in the 19th century, and about 15 percent in the 20th century. The duration of war has dropped sharply, especially in the several limited wars in recent years. For example, the U.S. air raid on Libya lasted only 12 minutes; the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor took only two minutes of actual combat; the ‘Desert Fox’ operation lasted only 52 hours; even the Gulf War and the Kosovo war, which are larger in scale, took 42 and 78 days respectively. The large difference between the duration of the two Afghan wars is particularly illustrative. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan was a mechanized war of the industrial era and it lasted 10 years. The U.S. war on Afghanistan started after September 11, and its main phase lasted only two months.”

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“Besides, out-of-sight and no-contact combat will become the basic forms of combat in informationized war; ‘zero-casualty’ war has become the target pursued by some countries. In the Kosovo war, NATO forces led by the United States fully utilized the advantages of high-tech weapons. From locations far away from the actual battlefield and enemy’s defense perimeter, from the U.S. homeland, from bases in allies’ countries, and from the sea, warplanes and guided missiles were launched to carry out precision attacks on strategic and tactical targets. For example, B-2A stealth strategic bombers were launched at a distance of 12,000 kilometers from Kosovo to carry out bombing missions, B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers were launched 2,000 kilometers away from Kosovo releasing cruise missiles at 800 kilometers from Kosovo, warships 1,000 kilometers away fired cruise missiles at Kosovo, and tactical warplanes carried out high-altitude bombing of Kosovo. It was really an out-of-sight war with no visual contact with the enemy. It realized the aim of one side being able to attack the enemy with effective firepower, without the enemy being able to counterattack. In the ongoing U.S.-Iraq war, within-sight land combat is unavoidable because the strategic target is to occupy Iraq, and the political aim puts a limit on military options.

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“It is correct to say that the U.S. armed forces are leading the world in the preparation for informationized warfare.”

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“The level of informationization of our army’s weaponry is incompatible with the demand to win a future informationized war. The mechanization of our army is not yet complete, but the need for informationization has arrived unexpectedly. The people are far from understanding the information era, the revolution of computer networking, and the digitized way of living. Our army has two serious and urgent tasks: completing mechanization and starting informationization. When we review the history of past eras, which are marked by advancement in technology: the steam engine era, the electrical power era, the wireless era, the atomic energy era, and the computer era, we notice that China lagged behind developed countries in every era by tens of years. When we read the recent Chinese history, we notice that the Chinese had too many failures and too much suffering because they had missed the opportunities to promote science and technology. Only in the present days, when man has entered the information era, does China not lag much behind the global trend. We may even say that China is in synchronization with the world. This is a once-in-a-thousand-year opportunity for China to catch up with the world. We should adapt to the general trend of modern global military development, face squarely new changes in the form of war, make radical changes in our thinking and guiding thoughts, make an effort to find the way to build an informationized army and to discover new ideas and new methods to win future informationized war.”

*On the “Two Basic Transformations”*<sup>23</sup>

“Challenges and opportunities have pushed our army modernization to a new phase. The sign of the new phase is precisely the genuine realization of the ‘two basic transformations,’ namely, converting, in the preparations for military struggles, from local war under ordinary conditions to winning local wars under the conditions of modern technology, especially high technology; and in army building, converting from the quantity-scale type to quality-efficiency type, and from the people-intensive type to the science and technology-intensive type.”

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“In the wake of the 14th CPC National Congress, the CMC, under the charge of Chairman Jiang Zemin, promptly set forth the army’s strategic principle for the new period based on the evolution of the international strategic pattern and changes in the forms of war, especially the situation wherein competition in high technology has grown increasingly intense with each passing day, and it stressed the need to place preparations for military struggles on the basis of winning local wars under conditions of modern technology, especially high technology, accelerate our army’s quality building, and work hard to improve emergency operational capabilities.”

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“The strategic principle for the new period proceeds from the high-tech condition of the information era; it guides the preparations for military struggles in the new period and the employment of military force in future wars, while guiding the building and development of military force. The former requires converting the foothold to winning high-tech local wars, while the latter requires proceeding from improving quality and efficiency, and increasing the content of science and technology. This is an extraordinary development. This principle is the general program that governs all work of the army in the new period.”

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“If information technology is the vanguard of the new technological revolution, then information warfare will be the core of the new military revolution.”

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“. . . war has begun to change from a contest between iron and steel to one of microchips, and our military thinking must gradually emerge from the time-zone of the industrial society; over-the-horizon and no-contact precision attack has forfeited the condition for exchanging space for time and time for strategic initiative in local war; the emergence of fifth-dimension warfare has made control over information the key to seizing the initiative on the battleground . . . All these new ideas seem to be far beyond us, but in actual fact, they have become very real issues that our army building must face.”

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“Although the world military revolution started its fermentation at the turn of the 1970s, its coming into distinct focus took place only in the wake of the Gulf War. Even when the

Americans ended the Gulf War, they did not promptly see the orientation of the military revolution. It was not until Clinton set forth the program for building the information superhighway and futurologists participated in summarizing the experiences of the Gulf War that the generals in the Pentagon gradually established the focus of the military revolution—information warfare. Toffler’s theory of ‘The Third Wave’ has intensified this view among American military leaders. In February 1995, they set out the new military strategy of ‘mobility and selective engagement.’ To adapt to the new military strategy, the U.S. Army set forth the major measures for building ‘the army of the 21st century,’ namely, digitization, improving combat effectiveness, and reconstructing the ground forces, in the belief that ‘the army of the 21st century’ must possess flexible operational theory, strategic motorized capability, a building-block-type, tailored setup, and joint operations capability.”

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“The CMC leadership has recently indicated that building in various aspects and all work of the whole army, including military training, political work, logistics support, and scientific research in national defense, must come under the guidance and overall consideration of the military strategic principle for the new period, must proceed from winning a local war under the condition of modern technology, especially high technology, and planning and overall arrangements must be made meticulously and carried out in depth.”

*On the Coordinated Development of National Defense and the Economy*<sup>24</sup>

“At the 16th National Party Congress, upholding the coordinated development of national defense and the economy was established as the party’s basic principle for its leadership over the building of national defense and the army for the first time. This marks a profound revealing and an accurate grasp by the party of the internal laws governing the development of national defense and the economy.”

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“The building of national defense and the development of the economy contradict each other, and the focal point is the input of military expenditure. . . . The results of comparative research on the military expenditures of various countries in the world show that it is appropriate that the proportion of a country’s military expenditure accounts for 2.5 percent to 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in peacetime and that the country is usually in a state of war or special circumstances if the military expenditure is more than 5 percent of its GDP. Military experts in our country and Western strategists have a common understanding in this regard.”

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“From the 1950s to the 1970s when the country’s economic strength was not strong enough, considerable funds were invested in the building of national defense. From 1950 to the 1979, the average expenditure on national defense accounted for approximately 17 percent of the country’s total fiscal spending.”

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“Army building has gone through more than 10 years with patience and by making way for economic construction. So the army has made a great contribution to national economic construction.”

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“After analyzing the international and domestic situation after the 1990s and summing up the historical experiences gained in the new period of 20 years for the building of national defense, Comrade Jiang Zemin clearly put forward the idea that the modernization of national defense should be based on economic construction, that the building of national defense and the development of the economy should be developed in a coordinated way, and that we should open up a road to the development of national defense with Chinese characteristics. In view of the realistic threat of war, he re-established the military strategic principle of ‘active defense.’ He stressed that the preparations made for military struggle should be centered on fighting to win a local war under the conditions of modern technology, especially high technology. He also stressed that our army should be built into a military force up to a higher modernization standard and capable of meeting various challenges, thus opening a new chapter on strengthening the army through science and technology, improving its qualities, and running it according to law. In this period, there occurred the Gulf War, the Kosovo war, and the Taiwan Strait crisis. The central authorities took major moves to strengthen the building of national defense. So the expenditure on national defense has tended to rise; in 2000 and 2002 in particular, the military expenditure accounted for 1.6 percent of the GDP, and its absolute value also notably increased.”

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“National defense is a big system which consists of many subsystems at different levels. Those playing a decisive role in this big system are mainly the army, science and technology for national defense, defense industry, and the war mobilization system. The army is the force which will be directly engaged in war, the science and technology for national defense and defense industry support the army, and the war mobilization system is the link between the country and national defense whose main functions are to release the internal military potentialities of the country and to turn them into direct war strength as soon as possible.”

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“Now the major problems in the modernization of national defense and the army are: The strength of the army is not strong enough, and its fighting capacity has yet to meet the requirements for winning a future high-tech war; the science and technology for national defense and the defense industry are not solid enough, which have yet to meet the requirements of the modernization of the army; and the war mobilization system has yet to be improved, and it still cannot meet the requirements of rapid mobilization for coping with a high-tech, local war. In view of this, we should act according to the objective of ‘having means to check war and the capability to win battles’ and build a strong, modern defense force.”

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“1. We should base ourselves on winning a local war under high-tech conditions and strive to raise the modernization level of the army. The whole significance of the existence of the army lies in checking and winning war. We should implement the military strategic principle of active defense and proceed from the objective of winning a local war under high-tech conditions to build our army into a military force with a relatively high level of modernization which is capable of coping with various challenges. We should vigorously push forward various reforms going on in the army and make efforts to solve structural problems in army building; we should optimize the establishment and systems of the army and adjust and improve policies and systems in order to make it possible for building the army in various aspects and to make it better adapt itself to the requirements of future war and the change of the developing socialist market economy. We should make innovations in military theories, education and training; the development of equipment; and the training of qualified personnel; we should strive to accomplish the double historic task of mechanizing and informationalizing our army so as to bring about leapfrog development in the modernization of our army.

2. We should make vigorous efforts to develop science and technology for national defense and the defense industry and strive to raise the modernization level of our army's weapons and equipment. The building of defense capability under modern conditions relies more than any time in the past on the economy, science, technology, and modern industry. Centering on the objective of increasing the army's fighting capability under high-tech conditions, we should give priority to the manufacturing of weapons and equipment and pay attention to the development of the defense industry and science and technology for national defense; we should implement the principles of 'scientific research starting off first, being drawn by the needs, laying stress on the key points, and giving consideration to systems' and make breakthroughs in key technological fields with which to bring along the development of weapons and equipment and the improvement of the level of the army's fighting capacity.

3. We should improve various laws and regulations concerning national defense and increase our ability to make rapid mobilization for future war. We should strengthen education in national defense among the people, enhance their sense of urgency, and inspire their national spirit; we should improve the defense mobilization system and its operating mechanism and increase our rapid-mobilization ability to 'meet an emergency in peacetime and meeting an invading enemy in wartime'; we should strengthen the building of the reserves and lay a solid foundation for People's War; and we should accumulate tremendous war potentialities on the basis of economic and social development.”

*On the “Three Major Tasks in the New Century”*<sup>25</sup>

“The international situation is ‘unstable and changeable.’”

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“To bring a peaceful yet developing, prosperous yet stable world into the new century is the common desire of the Chinese people and of all the people of the world.”

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“In the 20th century, human beings have discovered a series of ‘global problems’ whose scope is alarming. There is unbridled population growth, natural resources are being exploited, the ecological balance is severely compromised, and economic systems are in chaos. Ethnic groups are divided, religious forces have expanded, and regional conflicts and even limited wars are occurring. People have suddenly become aware that the entire human race is crowded onto a narrow spaceship on which we depend on each other for survival, and that saving the planet on which we all rely for life itself is our own responsibility.”

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“Right now, Western politicians are smug and self-satisfied about the prosperity of capitalism. They are concluding, ‘The death of communism will come with the end of the 20th century.’ The imperialist countries that emerged after the war are using their inflated economic strength to lord it over the whole world, plotting how they are going to purchase every continent. At this very same time the Chinese leaders are raising high the flag of the times—‘peace and development.’ They are proclaiming to the whole world: ‘Though the new-born socialist system may have twists and turns in its path of development, history has already proven and shall continue to prove that the socialist system has enormous historical vitality and ability to survive and flourish. To see only a few whirlpools and counter-currents, and not see the surge of the great river of history simply illustrates the political shortsightedness of the observer. The replacement of capitalism by socialism is the true trend of history. The transition is a decisive period in which a nation moves from a realm of necessity to a realm of freedom.’”

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“In today’s world, opportunity and challenge, cooperation and competition, opposition and dialog, and stability and turbulence coexist. Our field of vision for examining the future must not be limited to one country or to one region; rather, we should have a strong global consciousness. In order to claim resources and maintain their scientific and technical advantage, developed nations are extending their feelers to the depths of the oceans, to the ice caps and to outer space.”

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“Even though we are not at the same stage as the developed nations, though many difficulties are right in front of us, we know that China’s modernization is not a transitory concept, but a world concept. The reference point for modernization can be sought on the

coordinate system of the whole world. To merge into the world and to transcend self and other is the imperative choice on China's path to development.”

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“China should achieve the great revitalization of the Chinese nation in the middle of the new century. This will deeply affect the advance of historical progress of China's socialist construction, the change in the world structure, and the progress of human civilization.”

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“In the process of realizing great achievements, however, China's survival and development are going to face challenges and even crises. From the perspective of the world situation, China receives multiple threats. This is decided by the unique category of state that China is. China is a large nation that upholds the socialist path, pursues economic development, and takes responsibility for the Asia Pacific region and for world affairs. For these reasons, it is of primary importance to protect the political and cultural security of the socialist system that faces “infiltration and counter-infiltration.” Participating in and building the “containment and counter-containment” economic security that was brought about by the new world economic order is also foremost. Stabilizing the Asia Pacific region, and advancing the ‘supremacy and counter-supremacy’ national security that multi-polar development has encountered cannot be neglected. Specifically, the main factors that influence China's national security are: struggles for world supremacy, power politics, and regional conflicts; the influence of economic globalization, of the transition to the information society, and of information networking; limited wars concerning the unification of the homeland; conflicts that have been brought about by disputes over marine resources and by contested territory; the risks that may be incurred during the course of reform and opening; and ethnic separatism and the growth of religious extremism.”

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“In the new century, China's security interests are brought together and expressed as the ‘three major tasks.’ The goal of the national security strategy in the new century should therefore be: work hard to create the three fundamental conditions of sustained economic growth, secure domestic unity, and a fine external living environment, guaranteeing the realization of the strategic goal of the ‘three major tasks.’

1. Building the external environment. We must properly manage the relationship between hiding our capacities and making a mark; we must properly manage the relationship between independent self-governance and international alliance. We must adjust the foreign relations structure, and utilize diplomacy skills to create a lasting and peaceful international environment.

2. Energetically develop the economy. Utilizing thorough reform, we must speed up the maturation and perfection of the socialist market economy, be aligned with the trend of economic globalization, strengthen international economic cooperation, optimize the

strategic layout of China's economy, achieve the strategic goal of opening up the West, and participate in the establishment of the new world economic order.

3. Build up national defense strength. We must uphold the policy of coordinated development and comprehensive advancement, and strive to raise the level of modernization of the armed forces. We must reform the leadership and command system, cultivate a new class of military talent, and innovate in military theory. We must also vigorously develop national defense science and technology, laying a solid foundation for the national defense industry.

4. Advance the unification of the homeland. Solving the Taiwan problem, and achieving the final unification of the homeland is in China's highest interest. We should make the resolution of the Taiwan problem an important topic that brings together the strength of all of the ethnic groups and that enlivens China's development, thus speeding up the progress of the unification of the homeland.

5. Maintain social stability. We should positively and reliably advance the reform of the nation's political system, and concentrate on properly managing the distribution of interests in reform. We should strengthen education for socialist ideals, prevent ethnic separatism and halt the spread of religious extremism."

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"To plan China's security strategy for the beginning of the new century, we need to utilize a high level of political and strategic intelligence, and to take care of the key conflicts. For example: properly managing the relationship between innovation of systems and national security, and answering the question of the spirit of socialist national security; properly managing the relationship between economic development and national security, and answering the questions regarding the destinies of developing nations; properly managing the relationship between national defense strength and national security, and solving the question of fundamentally assuring the national security of sovereign nations; properly managing the relationship between international systems and national security, and answering the question of the power of influence of large countries in international affairs."

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Yang Fan, "Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai Will Soon Retire," *Wen wei po*, December 20, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Yang Fan, "Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai Will Soon Retire," *Wen wei po*, December 20, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Gu Beijing and Su Ruozhou, "Beijing MR Military Training Department Achieves Automated Training Management—Utilizes Computer Technology, Improves Operating Efficiency," *Jiefangjun bao*, June 12, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Chin Chien-li, "Profile of Communist China's First Deputy Chief of General Staff Ge Zhenfeng—Key Person in Fighting against Taiwan," *Chien Shao*, May 1, 2005, No. 171, pp 50–53.

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<sup>5</sup> Ding Haiming, “Guo Boxiong Inspects Fujian-, Guangdong-Based PLA Units to Find Out, Study Situations; Guo Calls for Down-to-Earth Efforts Aimed at Making Success of Training of CPC Member Servicemen on Advanced Character of CPC Members, Constant Efforts in Heightening Overall Standard of PLA Forces Building,” *Jiefangjun bao*, April 14, 2005, p.1.

<sup>6</sup> Jiang Wanliu and Liu Xing’an, “Chinese and Russian Officers and Soldiers Part Reluctantly,” *Jiefangjun bao*, August 29, 2005, p.1.

<sup>7</sup> Li Bingyan, “Acting Together to Fulfill the Responsibility to Build a Developing, Harmonious World,” *Jiefangjun bao*, August 26, 2005, p.3.

<sup>8</sup> “Russia, China Finalizing Plan of First Ever Joint Military Exercise,” *Agentstvo Voyenmykh Novostey*, June 6, 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Chang Hsin, “Identity of Chinese Chief Commander of Sino-Russian Military Exercise Comes to Light,” *Wen wei po*, August 12, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Jiang Wanliu, Ding Haiming, and Liu Xing’an, “Devising Strategies in the Command Tent, Cooperating Well: Sidelights on How the Decision on a Campaign Course of Action Was Made in the China-Russia Joint Military Exercise,” *Jiefangjun bao*, August 22, 2005, p.1.

<sup>11</sup> Cao Zhi, Wang Jingguo, Zhao Jialin, “Cao Gangchuan Meets With Russian Defense Minister Ivanov,” *Xinhua*, August 24, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Sun Shangwu, “China-Russia Drills Entering Third Stage,” *China Daily*, August 22, 2005; Cao Zhi, Xu Zhuangzhi and Li Xuanliang, “Second Phase of China-Russia Joint Military Exercises ‘Peace Mission 2005’ Begins,” *Xinhua*, August 20, 2005;

<sup>13</sup> “Russia’s Far East Command, Chinese Army Officials Discuss Joint Exercise,” *Novosti*, translated by Caversham BBC Monitoring in Russian, June 6, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Li Bingyan, “Acting Together to Fulfill the Responsibility to Build a Developing, Harmonious World,” *Jiefangjun bao*, August 26, 2005, p.3.

<sup>15</sup> Du Xianzhou, “Guo Boxiong Stresses During His Investigation and Survey Tour of Nanjing Theater: Focus Attention on Carrying Out Our Army’s Historical Missions in New Phase of New Century, Further Strengthen All-Round Army Building,” *Jiefangjun bao*, November 20, 2005, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> Hong Wenjun, “Cao Gangchuan Holds Talks With Namibian Defense Minister,” *Jiefangjun bao*, December 23, 2005, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> Hong Wenjun, “Zhang Qinsheng Meets Antigua and Barbuda Guests,” *Jiefangjun bao*, December 23, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Zhang Qinsheng, “Regional War: A Major Threat to Today and the Future,” September 26, 1986, publication unknown, summarized in “Chinese Military Forces and Taiwan Strait Issues Under Maritime Rights Scholars,” *Kanwa Defense Review*, July 1, 2005, pp. 7–8.

<sup>20</sup> Sun Jilian and Wei Wei, “Escalating U.S.-Taiwan Military Cooperation Damages Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability—National Defense University Experts and Scholars Discuss Danger of Strengthened U.S.-Taiwan Military Cooperation,” *Jiefangjun bao*, May 20, 2002, p.9.

<sup>21</sup> Zhang Qinsheng, “Be Clear about the Environment in which We Are Situated; Be Clear about the Tasks that Are Before Us; Be Clear about Our Plan for Development—Strategic Thinking as We Face the New Century,” *Jiefangjun bao*, January 30, 2001, p.3.

<sup>22</sup> Sun Jilian and Wei Wei, “Informationized Warfare, a Leap to a New Era,” *Jiefangjun bao*, April 7, 2003, p.9.

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<sup>24</sup> Zhang Qinsheng, “Upholding the Coordinated Development of National Defense and the Economy—the Basic Principle for the Building of National Defense in the New Stage,” *Liaowang*, December 9, 2002, No.49, pp.6–8.

<sup>25</sup> Zhang Qinsheng, “Be Clear about the Environment in which We Are Situated; Be Clear about the Tasks that Are Before Us; Be Clear about Our Plan for Development—Strategic Thinking as We Face the New Century,” *Jiefangjun bao*, January 30, 2001, p.3.