Looking Beyond the Nuclear Bluster:
Recent Progress and Remaining Problems in PRC Security Policy

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At a July 14 press conference, Major General Zhu Chenghu of the PLA appeared to threaten nuclear first strikes on the United States in retaliation for intervention in the Taiwan Strait. He also expressed his opinions about the PRC’s willingness to accept the destruction of China from the Pacific Ocean inland to the ancient city of Xi’an. As one would predict, General Zhu’s statements received a tremendous amount of attention in Washington and elsewhere. They continued to do so two weeks later, when this article was drafted. Unfortunately, when many Americans consider recent trends in U.S.-China security relations they might think of the specter of nuclear exchanges and the destruction of many cities in both countries. Many Chinese, on the other hand, might think of the Pentagon’s report to Congress on Chinese military power, a report that sparked a harsh, and in my opinion, excessive reaction in Beijing. What I would like to emphasize below, however, is that, in general, China’s security-related diplomacy improved in late spring and early summer of 2005 especially when compared with the first few months of this year (see CLM 14 for a critical account of Chinese diplomacy toward Taiwan, Japan, and Korea in early 2005). This more basic trend should not be missed because of the shadow cast by General Zhu’s nuclear bluster or Beijing’s heated response to the Pentagon report, topics I will return to at the end of this article.

Of most direct importance to PRC foreign policy in general, and Sino-American relations in particular, in July North Korea agreed to return to the six-party talks regarding its nuclear weapons programs. Although it is always hard to be optimistic that negotiations with North Korea will produce constructive and verifiable agreements, there are reasons to be somewhat more hopeful going into this round of talks than in the past. The United States team, headed by Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, and the North Korean delegation appear relatively flexible both in the format in which they discuss key issues and in the topics covered. Although nobody expects the North Korean nuclear problem to be solved fully in one round of negotiations (and the meetings were just beginning at the time of this writing in late July), hopeful signs include a willingness to extend this round of talks beyond four days if necessary, and cautiously optimistic statements from foreign-policy elites in Beijing, Pyongyang, and Washington. It is clear
that the PRC has staked a good bit of its diplomatic reputation on success in the talks, something that Washington had hoped would happen. As discussed below, China almost certainly deserves some of the credit for this progress, however temporary and limited it may prove to be. Moreover, Washington seems willing to give China that credit. This can only have a salutary effect on Sino-American relations in the near term. That positive effect could not have come a moment too soon, as U.S. domestic forces seemed poised in summer 2005 to pressure the Bush administration for punitive measures against China.

Less welcome in Washington is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s call for a time limit on U.S. military deployments in Central Asia in support of efforts in Afghanistan. The initiative for this declaration at the organization’s July summit was sponsored by the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but the position adopted clearly fits China’s long-term strategic interests. This, of course, led to speculation about Beijing’s role behind the scenes. Beijing does not want the U.S. military to become too comfortable on China’s western frontier, even if the two countries share interests in defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Regarding two other issues discussed in CLM 14—Taiwan and Japan—the picture is more mixed for Beijing. Although the visits to the mainland by pro-accommodation, opposition-party elites from Taiwan in April and May did not markedly improve cross-Strait relations, neither did they lead to a ratcheting-up of tensions between the Chen administration in Taipei and President Hu Jintao’s government in Beijing. What is perhaps most important is that the negative fallout from the PRC’s passage of an antisecession law in March 2005 proved relatively short-lived. Moreover, the positive public reception in Taiwan granted the opposition leaders’ visits bolstered Beijing’s sense that cross-Strait relations are stable. These factors reinforced the optimism in Beijing following the victory of anti-independence candidates in Taiwan’s legislative elections of last year. As readers will recall from the earliest issues of CLM, I generally consider optimism in Beijing about long-term prospects for relations with Taiwan a major source of near-term stability in cross-Strait relations. On a much less promising note, China’s relations with Japan remain very cold and continue to be impacted by the history issue, sovereignty disputes, upgrades in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and issues relating to Taiwan. China’s celebrations of the 60th anniversary of VJ Day is an unlikely occasion for improvement in those relations, as Chinese nationalist historiographies underscore Japanese crimes in China in the 1930s and 1940s.

**North Korea**

As loyal readers of CLM will recall, earlier in the year I shared Washington’s disappointment with Beijing’s inability to coax Pyongyang back to the negotiating table after top Bush administration officials had made high-profile assurances that Washington accepted North Korean sovereignty and had no intention of invading North Korea (see CLM 14). It seemed Beijing not only was failing to help solve the North Korea problem, but more generally was missing a fine opportunity to create the foundation for serious multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia based on common security interests. Applying
that same critical yardstick for success and failure in Beijing’s foreign security policy, one has to give Beijing credit for helping bring Pyongyang back to the table in July. It is almost certainly no coincidence that the breakthrough was announced at a July 9 dinner hosted in Beijing by the Foreign Ministry. That meeting included North Korean officials and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill.iii The South Korean contribution to the restoration of talks in the form of a massive offer of energy assistance received a great deal of press attention in the United States, almost to the exclusion of other factors, but it is doubtlessly the case that China has also contributed to this positive outcome, however temporary it might prove to be. China’s likely role in softening Pyongyang’s attitudes toward negotiation was underscored by the dispatch of former foreign minister and current state councilor Tang Jiaxuan to Pyongyang in mid-July, immediately after Kim Jong Il’s government had agreed in principle to return to the talks. Beijing is tight-lipped about its diplomacy toward Pyongyang, so it is difficult to know what combination of sticks, carrots, threats, and assurances China brought to bear to help bring the DPRK back to the table.

What is most important for U.S.-PRC relations is that top Bush administration officials seem to recognize and appreciate China’s more proactive and effective role in the six-party process. On July 10 in Beijing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice singled out the Chinese contribution to the process of convincing Pyongyang to return to the table, stating, “I think the Chinese have played a very active role—to show the North Koreans what the path ahead might look like.”iv This was an important shift in the administration’s attitudes toward China’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue. Weeks earlier State Department officials seemed highly disappointed in China’s efforts and were urging a more proactive and constructive policy by Beijing. That prodding was couched in somewhat vague but apparently quite serious threats that this might be the last chance to avoid the total and permanent breakdown of the six-party talks.

In case of such a breakdown in the talks, the Bush administration appeared poised to adopt what has been referred to as “Plan B,” a set of sanctions and international legal measures taken by the United States and, perhaps, Japan.v The so-called Plan B might include actions taken against North Korean financial assets held abroad, intensified interdiction of North Korean smuggling operations via an upgraded Proliferation Security Initiative, and the raising of sanctions resolutions at the United Nations. If that latter policy were adopted, China would be placed in the uncomfortable position of having either to stand aside or veto the measure. It seems that the Chinese government was catalyzed to urge North Korea back to the table by two factors: the Bush administration’s apparent increased flexibility regarding negotiations and its publicly stated security assurances toward the North on the one hand, and Washington’s growing impatience with Pyongyang’s stonewalling and threat of a new round of punitive sanctions on the other.ivi

Sino-American cooperation on North Korea and the six-party talks could not have come at a better time for the bilateral relationship. A range of domestic political actors in the United States have had China in their crosshairs this spring and summer. For the first time since President Bush took office, large domestic constituencies are taking aim at the U.S. government’s China policy. There is a long tradition of this going back to the days
of Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with Chairman Mao, but George W. Bush has been unusually insulated from such criticisms for a combination of reasons: he is known as a foreign-policy hawk, he enjoys a friendly Republican majority in both houses, and he has been given additional leeway on foreign policy after September 11. More recently, however, China has been harshly criticized by congressional representatives and public-interest groups on both sides of the aisle. The administration no longer seems fully immune to these pressures related to China’s record on human rights (including China’s relationship with Sudan and Zimbabwe), trade and monetary policies that critics argue give Chinese products unfair advantages in the U.S. market, and a host of other considerations.\textsuperscript{vi} The debate about China’s nonfloating exchange rates and undervalued currency has led to the threat of sweeping trade sanctions designed to push China’s hand to revalue its currency.\textsuperscript{vii} China’s decision to remove the peg from the dollar and to link the Chinese yuan (RMB) to a basket of currencies may remove some of the pressure for the time being, but without significant revaluation of the yuan against the dollar, the domestic pressure on the administration will probably intensify. The bid by China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to purchase U.S.-owned energy company Unocal sparked additional controversy in the United States and has provided a sort of litmus test for those who see long-term Sino-American relations in either zero-sum or positive-sum terms.\textsuperscript{viii}

There is little doubt that these domestic pressures are a headache for those in the Bush administration handling Asia policy. As is often the case in strategic situations, they also provide Washington with some leverage in dealing with China on issues like North Korea’s nuclear programs, where the basic interests of the two countries in denuclearization overlap. The Bush administration’s ability to fend off domestic critics will be greatly enhanced by China’s visible and effective cooperation with Washington on the North Korea nuclear issue, which is of supreme national security interest to the United States. Beijing knows that the administration has adopted consistent and moderate policies toward China, particularly on trade and in Washington’s public and steadfast opposition to unilateral Taiwanese assertions of sovereign independence. Beijing will have to calculate the indirect costs of weakening or alienating voices of moderation on China policy in the United States if it fails to convince North Korea not only to stay at the negotiating table but to negotiate in good faith its full denuclearization. All things being equal, such calculations in Beijing should assist the Bush administration in encouraging a proactive posture toward North Korea by the PRC.

Since this article was drafted in late July as the new round of six-party talks was just beginning in Beijing, we will need to revisit the six-party talks in the next issue of CLM. Just as success in achieving a new round of talks was important to Sino-American relations, failure of the talks would be quite detrimental to the relationship, particularly if it appeared in Washington that Beijing had not done everything possible to convince North Korea to denuclearize or if it appeared in Beijing that Washington’s negotiating posture was overly rigid. This is especially true given the existence of other challenges to stable U.S.-PRC bilateral relations. Mutual recriminations between China and the United States for not doing enough would be quite possible and have occurred in the recent past.\textsuperscript{x} Moreover, the Bush administration would have a harder time fending off domestic critics
of the administration’s China policy with the argument that Sino-American strategic cooperation was producing important results and was worth protecting.

**Shanghai Cooperative Organization**

On July 5, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization published a joint declaration at its Astana summit. That statement went beyond the normal platitudes about shared interests in peace, cooperation, antiterrorism, and noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. It also called for a deadline for the stationing of foreign troops in Central Asia. Implying that the war in Afghanistan is largely over, the member states posited that it was time for foreign military deployments in Central Asia to consider eventual withdrawal. No timetables for such withdrawal were set, and the overseas forces in question were not identified by name. Still, the message was clear.\(^{xi}\) At least two of the six member states, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, expressed an interest in limiting the duration of U.S. basing in those countries. These bases were created in the months after September 11 and have served as vital assets for the war in Afghanistan. The United States is reluctant to leave, partially because the war in Afghanistan is far from over from the American perspective, and partially because Washington would like to have bases in Central Asia as part of a global network of military assets. For its part, Beijing clearly went along with the smaller members of the organization, though it is not clear what, if any, role China had in initiating the measure. Still, given Beijing’s remnant realpolitik thinking and its expressed concerns about permanent U.S. basing in Central Asia, it is probably safe to assume that Beijing weighed in behind the scenes early to support this statement.

The U.S. reaction to the SCO’s proclamation was quite negative, as one would expect. Washington alternately expressed concern and indifference about the declaration. The concern took the form of speculation that the SCO’s reservations about the bases were prompted by Beijing and Moscow. One hypothesis was that the smaller members of the organization simply carried the water of their more powerful neighbors.\(^{xii}\) U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointed out publicly that the SCO lacks the authority to ask U.S. forces to leave any given sovereign country. The U.S. will, then, simply negotiate for basing rights bilaterally with the local government in question. Underscoring the importance of this point and the issue in general, on July 25 Rumsfeld flew to Kyrgyzstan to discuss U.S. basing rights there. It appears that since the election of Kyrgyz president-elect Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the likelihood of continued opposition to cooperation with U.S. forces has reduced. Relations with President Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan remain very poor, however, following the massacre there and negative U.S. government reaction to it.\(^{xiii}\) As for China, it would be an exaggeration to argue that China wants the United States to fail in its Afghanistan operations. That said, however, the fact that the United States feels a bit off-balance in Central Asia can be coded as a diplomatic success for China—especially since this outcome was achieved in part through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the brainchild of the PRC and an organization whose secretariat is in Shanghai.\(^{xiv}\)

**Taiwan**
At the time of this writing, there is little dramatic to report regarding cross-Strait relations. From Beijing’s perspective, that is generally good news. As discussed briefly above, the CCP seems to have successfully ridden out the storm over its antisecession law, in part by inviting to China the leadership of the two major opposition parties on Taiwan—the KMT’s Lien Chan and the PFP’s (People’s First Party) James Soong. Such a strategy has not had big near-term payoffs for Beijing, but neither has it led to a ratcheting-up of tensions with Taiwan. Given the way that Beijing shot itself in the foot earlier in the year with the promulgation of the antisecession law, such stability can be viewed as quite positive from Beijing’s perspective.

The Lien and Soong visits have not produced many concrete breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations because opposition party members in Taiwan lack the authority to implement the agreements reached on the mainland, but no one outside of President Chen Shui-bian’s government in Taipei seems to think that these visits will have any significantly negative consequences either. Perhaps the biggest impact of the visits has been to reinforce the sense in Beijing that long-term trends in cross-Strait relations are positive from Beijing’s perspective (a significant reversal of the pessimism of most of 2004). Since pro-independence parties failed to gain a majority in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan elections of December 2004, analysts in Beijing have been more confident that supporters of Taiwan’s legal independence, including President Chen Shui-bian, will find it very difficult to achieve their goals, at least in the near term. The visits by Lien Chan and James Soong, and those visits’ generally positive public reception in Taiwan, bolster this optimistic view.

The Bush administration has encouraged Beijing to expand its contacts beyond the opposition parties, and to enter dialogue directly with the elected government in Taipei. Predictably, this has not produced results, as Beijing continues to deal officially only with those political actors in Taiwan who accept a version of the “one China principle” that is deemed acceptable to CCP leaders.

Japan

Diplomatic relations between Japan and China remain icy in summer 2005. Discussions over the past two years with knowledgeable Chinese suggest that President Hu Jintao is a moderate on Japan policy and very much wants to improve Sino-Japanese relations. He is often portrayed as a leader trapped between domestic and international political forces that prevent him from reaching out to Tokyo in an effective manner. For example, there have not been marked improvements in China-Japan relations following Deputy Premier Wu Yi’s snub of Prime Minister Koizumi in May. Wu canceled without warning a meeting with the prime minister because of Tokyo’s continuing stance on the appropriateness of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (see CLM 14). XV Koizumi insists on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on principle, rendering controversial in Beijing any effort at Chinese accommodation of Koizumi’s government. In addition, there are those inside and outside the Chinese Communist Party who demand a tough policy
toward Japan and who would criticize any accommodation. These international and domestic political forces in combination, it is argued, prevent President Hu from improving relations with Tokyo.\textsuperscript{xvi}

The PRC policymaking process is so opaque that it is difficult or impossible to tell just how domestically constrained the Hu-Wen leadership really is on issues like foreign policy toward Japan. Former president Jiang Zemin had a reputation for being tough on Japan, as was demonstrated by his undiplomatic finger-wagging during his 1998 state visit there. So, to the degree that former President Jiang still wields influence on the issue, President Hu may very well be constrained because of internal party politics. The argument that Hu requires time to consolidate his position before he can implement his preferred reformist domestic and foreign policies is wearing a bit thin, however. Hu has, after all, entered his third year of office and seems quite capable of promoting many of his protégés to important posts around the country (see Li Cheng’s recent contributions to \textit{CLM}). But even if Hu is more secure in his post than he was when he assumed the presidency in 2003, it is quite possible that domestic politics are still in command on Japan policy. The party as a corporate whole may feel the need to reject a softer line toward Japan for reasons of state legitimacy, particularly if Tokyo is not seen to be meeting Beijing halfway by adjusting its behavior noticeably on the history issue. Chinese interlocutors often emphasize that CCP elites are very concerned about the domestic implications of appearing weak on emotional nationalist issues such as Taiwan and Japan.\textsuperscript{xvii}

Concerns about Japan on the security front appear if anything to be on the rise in China. Influential analysts, such as Professor Wu Xinbo of Shanghai’s Fudan University, have publicly expressed concerns about the upgrades in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the increasing assertiveness of Japan as part of that alliance. Those upgrades date back to the Clinton administration’s Nye Initiative in the mid-1990s but have accelerated after September 11. Professor Wu emphasizes that the upgrades could have implications for cross-Strait relations. In his opinion, Japanese elites seem increasingly willing to consider the prospect of Japan’s fighting “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Sino-Japanese maritime disputes remain very sensitive. In addition to the ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and conflicting claims to the resources in the seabed in the East China Sea, tensions remain over the Japanese-administered islet of Okinotori and the waters and seabed surrounding it. Beijing claims the islet is a rock while Japan claims that it is an island, a legal designation that would grant Japan exclusive economic rights to the resources in the surrounding waters and seabed according to some interpretations of the U.N. Law of the Sea. Japan went to some length in terms of engineering to keep the alleged island above water so as to bolster its claim.\textsuperscript{xix} Japan recently upped the ante in this dispute by granting a Japanese company, Teikoku Oil, rights to explore for resources in disputed waters. China protested diplomatically in the strongest possible terms.\textsuperscript{xx}
So far, these maritime disputes have not led to any military crises or clashes between the two Asian giants. But there has been increased Chinese naval activity in and around Japanese waters this decade. For example, in November 2004 a PLA Navy nuclear submarine apparently intruded into Japanese waters and was tracked by Japanese naval vessels and aircraft. It is clear from such incidents and the general political problems between Tokyo and Beijing that the threat of escalating tensions is quite real.\textsuperscript{xxi} Prime Minister Koizumi has adopted a consistently tough posture on Japan’s sovereignty claims and, as discussed above, President Hu Jintao’s government is either simply unwilling or is domestically unable to reach out to Tokyo in a spirit of accommodation that might reduce those tensions.

The most positive thing one can say about Beijing’s handling of security relations with Japan is that PRC diplomacy improved over the early part of this year when racist protests, bordering on riots, broke out in Beijing and Shanghai and Chinese officials seemed unwilling to adopt an apologetic tone regarding the events (see \textit{CLM 14}). So, by that extremely low standard, bilateral relations have stabilized somewhat, even if they have not improved markedly.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Unfortunately, what has been an eventful and relatively successful few months in China’s security relations with its neighbors and the United States could be overshadowed in the public eye by two events: the U.S. reaction to General Zhu’s nuclear threats and the Chinese reaction to the Pentagon’s report to Congress on PLA military strength.

General Zhu’s belligerent statements regarding the prospects for nuclear war between the United States and the PRC created an uproar in Washington and almost certainly assisted those in the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere who argue that China poses a dire threat to their security. At the time of his statements, the outspoken and frank General Zhu tried to make clear that he was presenting only his own opinions, not the policy line of China’s top leaders. As a major general and dean at the PLA National Defense University, however, his stated opinions predictably caused big waves abroad. On an intellectual level, his statements seemed to call into question China’s oft-stated commitment to a principle of No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{xxii} We know from internally circulated Chinese military literature available in the West that there has been an ongoing debate in Chinese military circles about the appropriateness of a Chinese NFU pledge, and General Zhu’s comments confirm the existence of such a debate for the first time in public discussion. But that hardly means that the critics of the NFU policy have won the debate. In fact, soon after General Zhu’s statements were reported in the press, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reaffirmed to foreign visitors the PRC’s NFU pledge.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Whether or not such a political pledge in peacetime would be a meaningful constraint in a wartime setting is an obvious question, but that question exists independently of General Zhu’s comments.
A second issue that drew much attention in recent weeks was the long-awaited release of the Department of Defense’s report to Congress on Chinese military power. The report had been hyped in advance in the U.S. media as an extremely tough and perhaps exaggerated account of Chinese military power and political intentions. In the view of this observer and many others, the report was actually quite moderate in its findings about the general military balance across the Pacific and the scope of China’s impressive but still limited military modernization program. Moreover, the report did not draw conclusions about Beijing’s political intentions from that military modernization, merely stating that China’s growing capabilities could pose a challenge to regional militaries in the future if Chinese leaders were to choose that political path. The report neither defined the current Chinese state as an imminent threat to the security interests of the United States or its allies, nor assumed that the PRC would necessarily become such a threat to regional stability after its power increased. After the PRC responded to the report negatively, the U.S. government went out of its way to state publicly that China is not currently viewed as a threat in Washington.

Despite the widely noted moderation of the report, Beijing reacted harshly to it in an almost rote fashion. Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi called Deputy Chief of Mission David Sedney to his office in Beijing for a standard dressing-down, while the PRC ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, similarly complained about the report as unfair and ungrounded in fact. It appears that Beijing would like to have its cake and eat it too on military modernization. It wants everyone to respect its military might along with its other trappings of power so that no one will take lightly Beijing’s security commitments, particularly on the issue of Taiwan independence. However, when foreign security analysts and defense ministries take note of PLA modernization and describe it as potentially challenging to their own nation’s forces, Beijing routinely objects in vehement terms, often referring to the analyses as “groundless” threat-mongering.

Despite these bumps in the road, if there is real progress on the North Korea nuclear issue, particularly if Washington continues to give a good share of the credit to Beijing for that progress, U.S.-China relations will likely remain quite good. If, however, the North Korea talks fail to make progress, and particularly if China is seen as insufficiently proactive in pushing Pyongyang for such progress, Beijing’s reputation as a constructive and influential regional leader will suffer. If this is the case, the Bush administration will have an increasingly hard time fending off domestic political forces that have the PRC in their crosshairs. The row over General Zhu’s comments and the harsh Chinese reaction to the Pentagon’s report will only add fuel to those domestic fires.

Notes


Christensen, China Leadership Monitor, No. 15


v On June 14, 1005, Christopher Hill testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “we believe China can and should do more” to get North Korea back to the negotiating table, at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/HillTestimony050614.pdf. On May 26 in testimony to the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, he emphasized during the question-and-answer period that China, as a close friend of North Korea, had special responsibilities to help encourage North Korea to denuclearize. The testimony can be viewed at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/aphear.htm; also see David E. Sanger, “North Korea Said to Offer to Rejoin Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, June 8, 2005; and Bonnie S. Glaser and Jane Skanderup, “U.S.-China Relations: Disharmony Signals End to Post-Sept. 11 Honeymoon,” Comparative Connections, CSIS, 2nd quarter, 2005.


viii For a discussion of bipartisan pressure on the Bush administration earlier in the year to urge Chinese revaluation of the yuan, see “U.S. Bill Aims to Shake China Off the Peg,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com, February 4, 2005. Also see the minutes of the July 21, 2005, U.S. Senate news conference with Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham.


xiv “Zhang Deguang Gaodu Pingjia Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Asitana Fenghui” (Zhang Deguang Offers a High-level Evaluation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Astana Summit), Xinhua, July 6, 2005. For an interesting article involving several Chinese foreign correspondents that suggests it may not be that...
easy to push the U.S. military out of its Central Asian bases, see “Zhongya Neng Ganzou Meijun ma?” (Can Central Asia Drive out the U.S. Military?), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), July 20, 2005.
xvii This was a common theme in my discussions in Shanghai and Beijing in January 2005 with Chinese experts.
xviii Wu Xinbo, “Taihai: Ri Xiang Tong Mei ‘Bingjian Zuozhan’ (The Taiwan Strait: Japan Thinks it Will Fight Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), June 20, 2005.
xxi I have heard more than one U.S. analyst in Washington express the view recently that, since cross-Strait relations stabilized following the Legislative Yuan elections in December of last year, the biggest threat of great power conflict in East Asia in the next few years is no longer a cross-Strait conflict, but rather a conflict between Japan and China over maritime resources.
xxii Experts have long wondered whether such a principle would be applied to Taiwan scenarios in any case, and whether or not Beijing would code nuclear threats by others against China or conventional strikes on China’s nuclear arsenals as equivalents of nuclear use. Finally, many wonder whether “No First Use” was ever a meaningful pledge for a nation in a potential life-and-death struggle for survival.
xxv These statements were noted in China, see “White House: China Not Considered a Threat,” China Daily, July 21, 2005.