The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched a campaign to “maintain the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members.” Although it may seem anachronistic to carry out an old-style rectification campaign in the early 21st century, the campaign is just one part of a much broader effort to strengthen the “governing capacity” of the party—the primary theme of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in September 2004. Party members are rather cynical about campaigns such as the one just begun, but campaigns nevertheless can give the party center new information about lower-level party cadres and provide a basis for reshuffling careers.

In January 2005, the CCP launched a new campaign to “maintain the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members.” The campaign was kicked off with an authoritative editorial in People’s Daily on January 5. The editorial said that the new campaign—called “educational activities” (jiaoyu huodong)—would be conducted throughout the party in three phases extending over a year and a half. The campaign is to focus on putting the “three represents” into practice, on implementing the spirit of the 16th Party Congress and the Third and Fourth Plenums of the 16th Central Committee, and on strengthening the party’s ability to govern. The editorial makes clear—as did the resolution of the Fourth Plenum in September 2004—that the CCP feels it is at a critical juncture, at which the ongoing marketization of the economy, the pluralization of social interests, and the intensification of social contradictions have threatened the ruling status of the party. The threat also comes from abroad, in the form of “hostile forces” that continue to try to Westernize and divide (xihua fenhua) China.¹

A few days after the editorial, Xinhua News Agency released the “Opinions of the CCP Central Committee” on the campaign, which elaborated on the reasons for the campaign and explained what it was intended to accomplish. Citing the abuse of power and the “moral degeneration” of some party cadres, the weakness of many grassroots party organizations, and the inability of some leaders to deal effectively with complex social issues, the “Opinions” called for combating such problems by improving education, developing inner-party democracy, and enhancing the governing capacity of the party. The “Opinions” specified that educational activities would start with central and local party organs and proceed in the second and third phases to include urban grassroots organizations and rural areas. Although this outline of campaign activities fits the pattern from previous campaigns, the “Opinions” specify that there will not be a separate stage
for taking disciplinary actions, though disciplinary measures could be meted out along
the way in accordance with party regulations.2

This new campaign marks the third “rectification” campaign undertaken by the
CCP since the death of Mao (party people in Beijing referred to it as a “rectification”
campaign even though it is officially being called “educational activities”). In 1983, the
party launched a rectification movement to root out those who continued to support the
goals of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four. In 1998, the CCP launched the
“three stress” (sanjiang) campaign—stress study, stress politics, and stress righteousness
(jiang xuexi, jiang zhengzhi, jiang zhengqi). Not coincidentally, those two previous
campaigns were closely associated with the consolidation of the “lines” of Deng
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, respectively.

Although the new campaign stresses implementation of the three represents, a
concept touted by former general secretary Jiang Zemin, it is apparent that Hu Jintao is
building into this campaign his own interpretation of the three represents—particularly
his ideas about increasing the governing capacity of the CCP. At a January 14, 2005,
meeting called to discuss the new movement, Hu Jintao emphasized that it would not
only implement the three represents but also build on efforts to strengthen the governing
capacity of the party, implement the “scientific development concept,” and “establish the
party for the public and govern for the people” (lidang weigong, zhizheng weimin)—all
themes that Hu Jintao has promoted in recent months.3 Similarly, in his January 24 talk
to the Politburo collective study session on maintaining the party’s advanced nature, Hu
said:

The ultimate goal of strengthening the building of the party’s advanced
nature is to enable our party to always represent the demand for
developing advanced productive forces in China, to represent the
orientation of China’s advanced culture, and to represent the fundamental
interests of the greatest majority of the people, by continuously raising the
ability to govern, consolidating the position of the ruling party, and
fulfilling the mission of governance.

The first three goals listed are, of course, the three represents; the emphasis on
governance, however, marks Hu’s spin on the three represents.4

The current campaign, which is being conducted within the CCP, should not be
confused with a broader campaign to improve morals—those of children in general and
those of college students in particular—that was launched in March 2004 and
reemphasized in October.5

Background behind the Campaign

Although just launched in January, the campaign has been long planned. A Hong Kong
sources traces the campaign’s origins to a large-scale survey conducted in 2000 among
300,000 party members. The results of the survey allegedly “frightened” and “astonished” the central leadership. The survey found that in Sichuan Province, some 32 percent of cadres at or above the county level were focused primarily on the interests of their superiors, not on their service to the people. Since such a figure hardly seems surprising—indeed, it seems rather modest—one has to assume that the results of the survey were a good bit more startling than this account suggests. In any event, the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 made a decision—not publicized at the time—to launch the current campaign.

Shortly thereafter, on December 15, 2002, Hu Jintao gave an address to the Central Organization Department titled “Instructions on Several Questions Regarding the Educational Activities to Maintain the Advanced Nature of the CCP.” At the time, People’s Republic of China (PRC) media publicized a talk that Hu Jintao gave at that meeting, but it was apparently a different speech that only tangentially touched on the theme of the present campaign (Hu stated that the “core” to implementing the three represents lay in “upholding the party’s advanced nature”).

On December 31, 2002, Zeng Qinghong convened the first meeting of the Central Party-Building Leadership Small Group, which approved in principle the Central Organization Department’s plan for undertaking the movement in selected test sites. On January 9, 2003, Hu Jintao convened a Politburo Standing Committee meeting to discuss and approve a “Work Plan for Testing Educational Activities on Maintaining the Advanced Nature of CCP Members,” and on February 22, 2003, the leading group in charge of this movement convened a seminar.

This experimental work was conducted for half a year—from the latter part of February to September—in 12 provinces and municipalities and seven central party and government organs. Some 52,000 basic-level party organizations, including more than one million party members, were involved in this experimental work. In December 2003 at the national meeting of organization departments, Zeng Qinghong made party-building one of the new year’s primary tasks, and a Politburo meeting on October 21, 2004, formally decided that “Educational Activities to Uphold the Advanced Nature of CCP Members” would be launched throughout the party in 2005. The delay from late 2003, when preparations seemed complete, to late 2004, when a decision was finally made, has not been explained.

Cultivating Communist Party Members

The current campaign brings back as a central theme an issue that has not been seen in China in many years—Liu Shaoqi’s understanding of “cultivation” (xiuyang). Liu Shaoqi, the chief target of the Cultural Revolution, was rehabilitated many years ago and has resumed his place as one of the revolutionary elders (usually listed as including Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai as well as Liu), but he is not generally the focus of much ideological attention. Recently, however, Li Junru, vice president of the Central Party School, compiled a volume titled The Cultivation of Communist Party Members in
The resurrection of Liu Shaoqi’s essay as a central document in the current campaign thus not only brings the CCP full circle ideologically (though current practice and the historical period are quite different), but also continues an effort to resurrect certain traditional Chinese values and integrate them into CCP ideology. Under Jiang Zemin, the CCP conspicuously moved away from criticism of China’s “feudal” past to incorporate some of the “superior” elements of that past. This revision of CCP ideology not only marked a new turn in the continuing “Sinification” of Marxism-Leninism, but also fed the cultural nationalism that became such a prominent theme in the 1990s.

Of course, the notion of “cultivation,” whether in Liu Shaoqi’s understanding or in the current campaign, is intended not to remake China as a Confucian society but rather to draw selectively on traditional values to support the political system. In the Confucian understanding, cultivation is an individual undertaking, a constant reflection on the behavior and morality of the sages in an effort to hone one’s own moral perfection. Liu Shaoqi, however, makes it quite clear that the model communists should follow in their cultivation is not Confucius but Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Cultivation consists not in the perfection of individual morality but in commitment to revolutionary practice and the constant questioning of whether one has lived up to the demands of the CCP. Liu also makes it quite clear that cultivation is not a solitary enterprise but a collective one, involving the criticism and self-criticism of others. The object of cultivation is not individual moral perfection but organizational solidarity.

What links traditional notions of cultivation with Liu Shaoqi’s interpretation and the current campaign is the demand to avoid worldly temptation. Li Junru’s book, as well as other writings compiled for the current campaign, makes clear that the CCP is very aware of how the ongoing marketization of Chinese society presents a fundamental challenge to the organizational competence of the CCP. Most directly, the CCP (and, indeed, the whole political system) is threatened by corruption and “hedonism” (particularly the keeping of mistresses, which arises over and over in accounts of the corruption of communist cadres). More broadly, as the year 2000 survey apparently revealed to CCP leaders, the CCP is threatened by the loss of belief in Marxism-Leninism; the party survives because it provides a route to upward mobility and because alternative routes, at least political routes, are blocked.
Strengthening Governance

Although the campaign to maintain the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members is a traditional rectification campaign in that it will rely on study sessions, lectures, and criticism and self-criticism to persuade party members to raise their ethical standards and enhance their faith in Marxist ideology, the CCP is not simply relying on education. The party is well aware that its membership has been through such campaigns before (in some cases, many times), and that individual members have developed an ability to comply outwardly with the demands of such a campaign while continuing behaviors that are detrimental to party discipline and cadre-mass relations. Thus, the campaign is being conducted not in isolation but in conjunction with other activities to strengthen governance, curb corruption, and reform party procedures.

As materials on the new campaign have repeatedly stressed, it is to be carried out alongside the implementation of the spirit of the 16th Party Congress and the Third and Fourth Plenums of the 16th Central Committee. The 16th Party Congress highlighted Jiang Zemin’s three represents, and the campaign has underscored that Jiang’s thinking is to continue to be central. But the Third and Fourth Plenums have Hu Jintao’s distinct imprint. At the Third Plenum, Hu Jintao talked about deepening economic reform, particularly measures that would better balance urban and rural development, address China’s ecological needs, and coordinate domestic development with China’s involvement in the international economy. Such efforts are to be guided by Hu’s scientific development concept. The Fourth Plenum, held in September 2004, discussed strengthening the CCP’s ability to govern, which seems destined to be a major theme of Hu Jintao’s first term as general secretary of the party.

The Fourth Plenum, building on notions previously introduced by Jiang Zemin, stressed institution-building—the party must “institutionalize, standardize, and regularize” procedures, govern in accordance with law, and “serve the interests of the public and govern for the people.” Although development remains the primary task, it must be guided by a “people-centered scientific development concept of coordination and stability.” The decision to focus on governance, like the present campaign, reflected an unease with the party’s ruling status. As Zeng Qinghong put it in a long article elaborating on the plenum decision, “a party’s status as a party in power does not necessarily last as long as the party does, nor is it something that once achieved can never be lost.” The present campaign is thus part of a multipronged effort to strengthen the party and improve governance, so that the party can stay in power.

Corruption

The many admonitions to prevent corruption make it clear that curbing this trend is one of the chief goals of the new movement. The CCP has, of course, been trying to curb corruption since the “three-anti” and “five-anti” campaigns of the early 1950s, and more or less continuously since the mid-1980s. In January 1986, Hu Yaobang presided over an enormous rally of 8,000 cadres, calling for a crackdown on corruption and the strict
enforcement of the law—a call that led to the execution of three sons of high-level cadres and may have roused dissatisfaction among some leading cadres, thus contributing to Hu’s own fall from power a year later.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite repeated efforts to curtail corruption, the problem has persisted and become worse. Last year, Wen Shengtang of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate wrote in the annual edition of the \textit{Blue Book of Chinese Society} that the problem of corruption was continuing to worsen; in the first nine months of 2003, people’s procuratorates at various levels investigated 32,759 cases, of which 905 involved sums of over 1 million yuan.\textsuperscript{23} In the first eight months of 2004, according to Wen’s contribution to the 2005 edition of the \textit{Blue Book}, people’s procuratorates investigated 27,907 cases involving 32,099 people, of which 11,150 were classified as “big cases” (but with no criterion given for adjudging them “big”).\textsuperscript{24}

The government has increasingly seen gambling both as a drain on fiscal resources (reportedly some 600 billion yuan [$72 billion], much of it public monies, is lost in foreign gambling arenas each year\textsuperscript{25}) and as a covert way to bribe officials (by deliberately losing large sums to the higher-up one wants to influence). Accordingly, in January 2005, Zhou Yongkang, state councillor and minister of public security, announced a campaign to ban gambling.\textsuperscript{26} Since then, PRC media have exposed several cases. For instance, one Cai Haowen, a low-level official in Yanbian (the Korean prefecture in Jilin Province that borders North Korea), reportedly lost 3 million yuan ($360,000) in a North Korean gambling establishment.\textsuperscript{27} Similarly, Deng Yaohua, mayor of Zhaoqing City in Guangdong Province, was removed from his post and expelled from the CCP for making repeated trips abroad for the purpose of gambling. The amount of money he spent has not been reported. Wu Haili, director of the Public Security Bureau in Huizhou, Guangdong, was similarly removed from office, as was Yu Changliang, an official in Jianan City in Shandong Province who lost some 5.6 million yuan ($674,700).\textsuperscript{28} The crackdown extends to online gambling as well—\textit{China Daily} reported that 597 people across China were being investigated in conjunction with online gambling cases involving over 500 million yuan ($60 million).\textsuperscript{29} Because of the crackdown, it is said, 84 casinos in foreign countries—primarily along the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam—have been forced to shut down.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Campaign and Cadre Regulations}

In recent years—and especially in the past year—the CCP has churned out a series of new or newly revised regulations governing management of the party. This is an ongoing effort that can be expected to continue, as widespread experiments on party reform are being conducted and summed up in various parts of the country.

- On February 17, 2004, the party issued the “CCP Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision (for Trial Implementation).” These regulations were intended to clarify and strengthen the role of the party’s discipline inspection commissions at various
levels, specifying that “the key targets of inner-party supervision are leading organs and leading cadres at all levels in the party.”

- On February 18, 2004, the party released the “Regulation on Disciplinary Punishment,” which specified in detail the penalties for violation of party regulations.

- In September 2004, the party released six documents in one batch:

  1. “Provisional Regulations on the Resignation of Party and Government Leading Cadres.” This regulation defines four types of resignation (work-required, voluntary, mea culpa, and ordered) and details the conditions under which each can and cannot take place.

  2. “Circular on the Rectification of Party and Government Leading Cadres Holding Positions in Enterprises.” This regulation tries to end the practice of leading party and government officials taking up simultaneous positions in enterprises (a leading cause of corruption), but allows exceptions for officials who are running enterprises to promote local economic development (as opposed to personal gain)—a significant loophole.

  3. “Provisional Regulations on Public Selection of Party and Government Leading Cadres.” Public selection does not mean voting, but rather the public disclosure of the position, the selection process, and the outcome. This disclosure can promote public participation by allowing a period for public comment.

  4. “Provisional Regulations on Contested Appointment in Party and Government Organs.” Contested appointment refers to opening up competition among candidates for promotion within party and government organs. In some cases this regulation has been accompanied by a voting procedure within the relevant organization.

  5. “Opinion on Issues Related to Party and Government Leading Cadres Resigning Their Public Posts to Engage in Business Activities.” This regulation addresses revolving-door profiteering by prohibiting any party or government leading cadre from holding a position in an enterprise, business, or social intermediary organization in the region under the jurisdiction of his or her former post within three years of resigning.

  6. “Method of Voting by the Plenary Session of a Local CCP Committee on Proposed Candidate and Recommended Candidate for the Position of Principal Leader of the Party or Government Leadership Team at a Lower Level.” This regulation specifies that a candidate nominated by a higher-level party organization for a leading post in a lower-level party or government position must be confirmed by a secret ballot of the lower-level party committee.

- On October 24, 2004, the party released the “Regulations on the Protection of the Rights of Party Members,” which tried to balance the rights of party members (to attend party meetings, read inner-party documents, participate in discussions on party policy, criticize malfeasance without fear of retribution, etc.) with organizational discipline.
Conclusion

The combination of new regulations governing cadre behavior and opposing corruption, the emphasis on strengthening the party’s governing capacity (of which the regulations are a part), and the rectification campaign (“maintaining the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members”) suggests a rather comprehensive and well-thought-out effort to preserve and even strengthen party control in the face of economic marketization and societal pluralism. The expansion of market forces, the emergence of a better-educated and informed society, and the diversification of societal interests are forcing the party to rethink how it governs and to adopt rationalizing measures. But the party’s developmental trajectory appears more clearly aimed at the Singapore model, in which an authoritarian party coopts new ideas and social forces, than at a liberal democratic model. In adopting this developmental path, the CCP has created an interesting tension between “rationalizing” measures—the issuance of laws and regulations intended to guide the governance of both party and government—and traditional Leninist measures. Thus, the series of regulations enumerated above suggests a movement away from Leninism, while the implementation of a rectification campaign suggests a felt need to continue the Leninist practices of the past, no matter how attenuated they might be by China’s current stage of social development. This is a tension that can continue to last a considerable period of time.

Although it may strike the foreign observer as anachronistic and perhaps futile to launch a rectification campaign at the beginning of the 21st century, such a campaign can still give higher-ups in the party a great deal of information about party cadres at various levels and thus influence the career paths of many cadres. This heightened control over career advancement suggests that the campaign can play a role in consolidating the authority of the fourth generation of leadership and in binding aspiring young cadres to the party leadership.  

Notes


9 Ibid., 24.


11 Baochi gongchandang yuan, 24.

12 Ibid., 25.

13 Ibid., 25.

14 “CPC Initiates Education Campaign.”

15 A check through FBIS in recent years suggests that Liu Shaoqi’s name comes up most often in a listing of revolutionary elders of the past with no further attention to Liu as an individual or communist ideologue. Books about Liu continue to come out, though curiously his nianpu (chronological account) stopped after only one volume.

16 Li Junru, ed., The Cultivation of Communist Party Members in the New Period (Lun xinshiqi gongchandangyuan de xiuyang) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004). More general information on the new campaign can be found in Baochi gongchandangyuan xianjinxing jiaoyu: Xuexi huida (Education on maintaining the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2004); Baochi gongchandangyuan xianjinxing jiaoyu, yaodian ershi jiang (Education on maintaining the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members, 20 talks on the main points) (Beijing: Zhongguo fangzheng chubanshe, 2004); Shen Zhendong et al., eds., Deng de xianjinxing lishi nianpu (The historical origins of the party’s advanced nature and practical demands) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2004); and Zhang Rongchen, ed., Nongcun gongchandangyuan xianjinxing jiaoyu duben (Educational reader on the advanced nature of Communist Party members in rural areas) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2004).


20 Guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe ruogan zhongyao wenti jiedu (Understanding several important questions related to the strengthening and building of the party’s governing capacity) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2004).


22 Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 177.


24 Wen Shengtang, “Fan fubai: Tigao zhizheng nengli de zhanlue zhonggren” (Opposing corruption: The strategic responsibility of increasing governing capacity), in 2005 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Analysis of China’s society and forecasts: 2005), ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 106. The number of cases filed in 2003 averages 3,640 per month, while the number filed in 2004 averages 3,488 per month. If these are comparable figures, they imply a decrease of 4 percent, though Wen goes on to talk about new forms of corruption, including the proliferation of gambling with public funds, and is quite frank that the problem remains serious and is perhaps worsening.


34 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (CCP Central Organization Department), Dangzheng lingdao ganbu gongkai xuanba he jingzheng shanggang kaoshi dagang (Examination outline for public selection and contested appointment in party and government organs) (Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 2004).