

Promoting the Scientific Development Concept

Joseph Fewsmith

For the past nine months, Hu Jintao and other leaders have been promoting a new approach to development called the “scientific development concept.” This approach aims to correct the presumed overemphasis in recent years on the pursuit of increases in gross domestic product (GDP), which encourages the generation of false figures and dubious construction projects along with neglect for the social welfare of those left behind in the hinterland. Identified as a “people-centered” approach to development, the scientific development concept has been extended to leadership practices in general, including the recruitment of talent and the administration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although leaders associated with Jiang Zemin, such as Secretariat head Zeng Qinghong, have endorsed the scientific development concept, Zeng in particular has appeared to demur at some of its central notions. At a minimum, this divergence points to the difficulty of defining “social development” as opposed to “mere” economic development; at a maximum, it suggests continuing tensions within the leadership.

Genesis of a Guiding Concept

In Hu Jintao’s first year as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, he worked hard to establish himself as a man of the people—a leader concerned with the welfare of those left behind in China’s headlong rush toward economic development—and as a pragmatist who is more interested in institutions than ideology. Beginning with the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in fall 2003, Hu has begun to establish his own ideological thought, though he has been careful to depict it as built on the “three represents” of Jiang Zemin (as well as on Deng Xiaoping Theory and Mao Zedong Thought). The key notion in this emerging body of “Hu Jintao thought” is the “scientific development concept” (*kexue fazhanguan*), which is seen as a summation of the “comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development” that was touted by the Third Plenum.¹

The first use of the phrase “scientific development concept” appears to have come from Hu Jintao during his September 2003 inspection trip to Jiangxi Province, about a month before the Third Plenum. The context is interesting, and not only because Jiangxi is one of the lesser-developed, agricultural provinces that the scientific development concept is intended to address. As he has done before, Hu also made a point of visiting the old revolutionary sites in that province, where the CCP was based in the early 1930s, and praising the spirit of Mao Zedong and other first generation revolutionaries.² Furthermore, in December Hu Jintao would give an expansive talk on the 110th anniversary of Mao’s birth, lauding Mao extensively.³ In light of these actions and his well-known December 2002 trip to Xibaipo, the CCP’s last “capital” before it entered Beijing in 1949, a pattern emerges whereby Hu has repeatedly tried to identify himself

with the noblest aspect of China's revolutionary history.⁴ Notably, this impulse comes even as Hu has tried to move toward a distinctly postrevolutionary future, in which the market, the law, and institutions circumscribe the parameters of political life. In some ways, the scientific development concept tries to reconcile these seemingly divergent political impulses.

During his trip to Jiangxi, Hu gave a long and expansive explanation of his new idea:

It is necessary to solidly adopt the scientific development concept of coordinated development, all-round development, and sustainable development, [and to] actively explore a new development path that conforms to reality, further improves the socialist market economic structure, combines intensified efforts to readjust structure with the promotion of rural development, combines efforts to bring into play the role of science and technology with efforts to bring into play the advantages of human resources, combines the development of the economy with the protection of resources and the environment, combines opening up to the outside world with opening up to other parts of the country, and strives to take a civilized development path characterized by the development of production, a well-off life, and a good ecological environment.⁵

While such an expansive definition risks overfreighting his concept, it does point to concerns about rural development, regional gaps, science and technology, and ecology, all of which would soon show up in other discussions of the scientific development concept.

Hu again used the term “scientific development concept” on his early October 2003 trip to Hunan, another inland province that is identified with China's revolution and with being left behind in recent years. This time he said: “The broad masses of cadres and people in the central region must conscientiously enhance their sense of responsibility and urgency for accelerating development, firmly foster and resolutely implement the scientific development concept, actively explore ways of development that conform to reality, continuously inject new impetus for development through reform, and strive for faster and better economic and social development.”⁶ That these first two uses of the term occurred away from the capital and in the interior of China suggests two main things about the scientific development concept: it is intended as part of Hu Jintao's continuing effort to bolster his image as a leader concerned about the welfare of those left behind in the course of reform, and it aims to address the difficulties of the interior in particular.

The idea behind the scientific development concept—but not the term itself—was endorsed by the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which convened in Beijing on October 11–14, 2003. The plenum decision did say that it was necessary to “take people as the main thing [*yiren weiben*], establish a concept of comprehensive,

coordinated, sustainable development, and promote comprehensive economic, social, and human development.”⁷ This sentence has since been invoked by Chinese media as the locus classicus of the idea of scientific development.

At least one provincial leader, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, explicitly used the phrase “scientific development concept” when he conveyed the “spirit” of the Third Plenum back in Guangzhou on October 17, indicating that the term was used in the course of leadership discussions in Beijing.⁸ More importantly, *People’s Daily* endorsed the concept in a commentator article on November 5,⁹ and the party theoretical journal, *Qiushi*, similarly endorsed the concept in a commentator article on November 16.¹⁰ Both these articles indicate that the new leadership wanted to signal a new approach to development, one that centers on human beings (*yiren weiben*) and their “comprehensive development,” a concept that was endorsed by the 16th Party Congress in fall 2002. As the *People’s Daily* article points out: “At first glance, growth seems equal to development, but in fact [it] is not.” It goes on to say that if the nation were to focus exclusively on quantitative economic growth—while “ignoring the balance between development of the economy, politics and culture, and ignoring the balance between people and the natural world”—development would be imbalanced and ultimately would slow. Similarly, the *Qiushi* article declares that the scientific development concept answers the question of *how* to develop. It goes on to say that “[i]t is particularly necessary to solve, through coordination, issues related to the big gaps between regions, between urban and rural areas, and between different social strata and social groups to promote coordinated development and common progress of the society as a whole.”

Suggesting a political dimension to this concept, the *Qiushi* article also said that the country should “build socialist political civilization, . . . actively and soundly push forward political restructuring, expand socialist democracy, [and] improve the socialist legal system.” It also invoked a concept used fairly frequently in the 1980s but rarely seen in the official media these days: “The founders of Marxism predicted that the future socialist or communist society is an association of free people, where the free development of each person is conditional on the free development of all people.”¹¹

Politburo Endorsement

The scientific development concept was subsequently endorsed by the Politburo meeting that was convened on November 24, 2003, in preparation for the National Economic Work Meeting (which was held November 27–29) and the National Meeting on Human Resources (which was held December 19–20).¹² It was only at this time that the term gained wider currency, as top leaders began to lace their remarks with it. For example, Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan used the term at a Beijing humanities forum on November 24,¹³ and Organization Department head He Guoqiang used it in discussing the three represents at a forum in mid-December.¹⁴ Perhaps most interesting was Politburo Standing Committee member Zeng Qinghong’s use of the term during an inspection tour of Sichuan in December. Zeng is in charge of party affairs and was in

Sichuan to affirm the party-building work that has been done at the local level in Sichuan in recent years. Zeng told people that they should “use the scientific development concept and an accurate concept of political achievement” to guide development, again suggesting that the scientific development concept has a political reform dimension.¹⁵

Human Resources

The conference on “human resources” (Xinhua English’s translation of *rencai*, which is frequently translated as “talented people” or “skilled personnel”), convened jointly by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, was billed as the first such meeting in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹⁶ According to the PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper *Ta kung pao*, this work conference set out to establish the principle of the “party administering qualified personnel,” a substantial broadening of the traditional concept of the “party administering cadres.” The article explained that this change came in response to the enlarged scope of qualified personnel, which has gone from the party cadres of the past to “creators of value” and “outstanding management personnel [and] professional and technical workers.”¹⁷ This change derives in part from pressures coming from the private and international sectors, which hire employees without regard for traditional cadre-management practices.¹⁸

At the conference, Hu Jintao stressed that China should establish a “selection and appointment mechanism that is open, competitive, and selective,” and Wen Jiabao called for disregarding seniority and doing away with nepotism.¹⁹ On December 31, 2003, Xinhua publicized a joint Central Committee–State Council “Decision on Skilled Personnel,” which was presumably a central topic at the conference. The decision called for allocating human resources via market forces and for eliminating structural impediments, such as divisions between urban and rural areas and departmental and enterprise restrictions on personnel movement. Parts of the decision point to greater rationalization of personnel practices, such as better classification of job categories and better definition of occupational norms; other parts point to greater economic impact on personnel decisions, such as the evaluation of enterprise managers via market forces and investors’ decisions. Still other parts of the decision point to greater democratic participation, such as through “democratic nominations, democratic assessments, and democratic evaluations.” Although much of the decision appears to point China further in the direction of creating a merit-based personnel system, the principle of putting the party in charge of skilled personnel suggests a broader, if more rational (in the Weberian sense), role for the party—which indicates difficulties in balancing the role of party principles with the various other criteria outlined in the decision.²⁰ Moreover, in his remarks to the conference, Hu Jintao said that Chinese leaders “should develop and allocate human resources in close conjunction with the implementation of the country’s important development strategies,” suggesting that the planning mentality that has dominated much of China’s public life has not disappeared.²¹

Implications for Party Governance

Efforts to institutionalize procedures—and enhance the “governing ability” of the CCP—were extended to the party in February 2004 with the promulgation of the “Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Inner-Party Supervision (Trial)” and the “Communist Party of China Regulations on Disciplinary Measures.” The regulations try to institutionalize several procedures of inner-party life, including requiring voting (but not necessarily secret voting) for major decisions (Article 13) and requiring party standing committees and discipline inspection commissions at all levels to make annual reports on their activities to the relevant plenary sessions (Article 19).

The regulations were adopted, according to PRC media, first and foremost to address the issue of corruption, particularly by the “number one” leaders of party organs (*yibashou*), and to regularize procedures within the party by “balancing distribution of power within the party.”²² Thus, as Wu Guanzheng, head of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), put it, the regulations on inner-party supervision are focused on leading organs and cadres, “especially major officials in charge of leading bodies at all levels.”²³ Structurally, the regulations try to address the long-standing problem of local discipline inspection commissions being subordinate to local party committees by specifying that the former are “special organs” and hence not a “working department” of the party committee at the same level.²⁴ Nevertheless, the regulations specify that local discipline inspection commissions report to the party committee at the same level as well as to the discipline inspection commission at the next higher level, so it appears that their primary affiliation remains to the local party committee.²⁵

Wu Guanzheng also argues that the new regulations combine inner-party supervision with supervision from outside the party, but the provisions for doing so remain vague. Alongside the relevant discipline inspection commission, party members in general are authorized to report the “masses’ criticisms and demand” as well as their own criticisms or evidence of wrongdoing (Article 10); moreover, party members “have a right to know how their opinions and suggestions are handled” (Article 23). Nevertheless, those who “try to frame” others will be subject to investigation and discipline.²⁶ Although reasonable, this provision could be abused to retaliate against whistle-blowers. The party’s continued ambivalence toward external supervision is most clearly revealed by Articles 33 and 34 under Section VIII, “Supervision by Public Opinion.” According to the former article, “news media should bring into play the role of supervision by public opinion,” whereas according to the latter article, “news media should . . . observe media discipline . . . grasp the correct orientation in guiding public opinion, and pay close attention to the social benefit of supervision by public opinion.” The criterion of “social benefit” has often been used in the past to criticize writers and journalists who would expose the seamy side of Chinese politics.

Whether the regulations will curtail the continuing scourge of corruption remains to be seen. In 2003, in response to a vigorous anticorruption campaign, 13 provincial-level cadres were prosecuted for corruption.²⁷ Aside from the ambiguities pointed out above, other measures taken by the CCP suggest that it does not fully trust its own

institutionalizing measures, at least in the short run. In July 2003, the CDIC announced that it was establishing five central inspection teams, which were subsequently sent to various provinces.²⁸ In April 2004, *Duowei* news, an overseas-based organization of uncertain reliability, reported that the CDIC had been given “unprecedented power in personnel appointment”—it would directly appoint over 200 secretaries of provincial, municipal, and ministerial discipline inspection commissions.²⁹ If true, such a report would indicate a strong push to centralize rather than institutionalize power within the CCP.

Spring Developments

By early spring 2004, mobilization around the scientific development concept had reached a new level. In February, a weeklong special study course for leading provincial, central, and military cadres was held at the Central Party School in northwest Beijing. Zeng Qinghong emphasized that the scientific development concept would entrench the three represents and would, if successfully implemented, result in social stability and harmony.³⁰ Premier Wen Jiabao linked the concept not only to China’s economic and social development strategy but also to the project of raising both the “governing ability” (*zhizheng nengli*) of the CCP and the ability of the government to carry out its public management and public service functions.³¹

Wang Mengkui, head of the State Council Development Research Center, presented perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the concept in *Qiushi*, the party’s theoretical journal, in February. Wang depicted the scientific development concept as correcting the flaws that have stemmed from the continuing impact of the old planned economy on the one hand and from the “inherent contradictions and drawbacks” of the market economic system on the other. Wang argued that many “gaps” had appeared in China’s social development, “including those between urban and rural areas, between different areas, and between the income levels of different citizens.” The issues of fairness were clearly impinging on the government’s policymaking; as Wang put it: “The public’s reaction toward the expansion of the gap in income allocation is becoming stronger.”

Although Wang emphasized the importance of having an “overall plan” for harmonizing reform, development, and stability, he also emphasized that overall planning “absolutely does not require the government to intervene in the production and operation of enterprises.” Apparently, Wang has in mind greater government efficiency, better governmental supervision, the development of more-effective social security systems, and perhaps more-effective distribution of government resources (though he did not say this explicitly).³²

National People's Congress

Although the scientific development concept had been well established in the months since the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, it was at the National People's Congress in March 2004 that it really took center stage. Premier Wen Jiabao called adhering to the scientific development concept (as well as the related ideas of the “five balanced aspects” [*wuge tongchou*] and “putting people first”) one of the top priorities for 2004,³³ while General Secretary Hu Jintao underlined the concept in his meeting with the Hubei provincial delegation.³⁴ *China Youth News* declared that the new policy meant “making the welfare of the people the basic standard for measuring performance, [thus] altering our concept of development,”³⁵ while *People's Daily* declared that the people-centered initiative would lead to greater solidarity.³⁶

Between March 22 and March 28, *People's Daily* ran four front-page commentator articles on the scientific development concept.³⁷ Although these four commentaries added nothing new to the content of the scientific development concept, they made clear that the concept was now regarded as perhaps the defining thought of the new leadership.

Tension within the Leadership?

Although the steady unfolding of the campaign to make the scientific development concept a central ideological, economic, and institutional tenet would seem to indicate that the CCP has accepted this approach to governance, including its close association with Hu Jintao, there is some evidence to suggest that different approaches remain. As noted above, the thrust of the scientific development concept appears to be stressing the importance of the inland areas of China and institutionalizing governance. Yet coastal leaders have been just as willing as interior provincial leaders to embrace the scientific development concept and the apparent strengthening of the CDIC—even in ways that appear to undercut the institutionalizing effort of the “Regulations of the CCP on Inner-Party Supervision.” This discrepancy suggests that institutional procedures have not been universally accepted within China's top leadership.

More curious in this regard is the speech Zeng Qinghong gave to the Central Party School on March 1, 2004. Although he embraced the Central Committee and State Council's “Decision on Skilled Personnel,” Zeng declared that such objective criteria as academic credentials and professional titles were not sufficient to be considered true indicators of talent. He also said that experience was at least as important as knowledge and innovation. These comments appear to muddy the waters again about the sorts of people the CCP wants to recruit and the process through which they should be recruited. Zeng went on to seemingly undercut one of the chief tenets of the scientific development concept. PRC media have often talked about the importance of furthering social development as opposed to chasing GDP growth and discussed the waste involved in the “image” projects that local cadres put up to pad their lists of “political achievements.” However, Zeng said that after Deng Xiaoping introduced his “three-step” approach for

the modernization of China (building through different income levels), “we introduced GDP and per-capita GDP as important indexes of China’s development. This was a major historical step forward.” While noting the imperfections in GDP calculations, Zeng declared that “no alternative integrated statistical index, which is better and is generally recognized, has been found in today’s world.”³⁸ While such dissension should not be taken as indicating an open split in the leadership, it does suggest that there is a long way to go in defining a “scientific development concept” and perhaps in fully accepting Hu Jintao’s leadership.

Notes

¹ The Third Plenum is discussed in *China Leadership Monitor* 9 (winter 2004).

² “Wai bao: Hu Jintao zuofang hongse tudi fanying minxin, fuhe minyuan” (External report: Hu Jintao’s inspection of the red areas reflects the people’s heart and meets their hopes), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2071684.html>.

³ Xinhua News Agency, December 26, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1226-000127.

⁴ As this article goes to print, there is a renewed emphasis in the Chinese press on the “spirit of Xibaipo” that confirms this emphasis on China’s revolutionary heritage.

⁵ Xinhua News Agency, September 2, 2003.

⁶ Xinhua News Agency, October 4, 2003.

⁷ “Zhongguo gongchandang dishiliujie zhongyang weiyuanhui disanci quanti huiyi gongbao” (Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), Xinhua News Agency, October 14, 2003, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2133923.html>.

⁸ Yue Yong, “Zhang Relays Spirit of the Third Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee to Province-level Old Comrades, Stresses Need to Give Priority to Doing Well Seven Tasks Right Now,” *Nanfang ribao*, October 18, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1020-000070.

⁹ “Build Up and Implement Scientific Concept of Development,” *Renmin ribao* (commentator article), November 5, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1107-000119.

¹⁰ “Firmly Establishing a Scientific Concept of Development,” *Qiushi*, 2003, no. 22 (November 16), FBIS CPP-2003-1126-000089.

¹¹ Interestingly, Dong Yunhu, vice president and secretary-general of the China Human Rights Research Society, invoked the same idea when he wrote, “Marx and Engels had wanted to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie in Western developed capitalist societies and establish an association of free people with highly developed productive forces that was free of classes and class differences and that did not need the mandatory force of the state and law or the adjustment of the rules of ‘rights’—namely, a communist society.” See “Inclusion of ‘Human Rights’ in the Constitution: An Important Milestone in the Development of Human Rights in China,” Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0314-000081.

¹² *Jiangji ribao*, November 25, 2003, 1.

¹³ *Zhongguo xinwenshe*, November 25, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1206-000088.

¹⁴ Li Shufeng, “He Guoqiang Addresses Summing-up and Experience-Exchange Conference on Study of ‘Three Represents,’” Xinhua News Agency, December 16, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1216-000164.

¹⁵ “Zeng Qinghong qiangdiao yi kexue de fazhanguan zhidao fazhan, yong zhashi de dangjian gongzuo tuidong fazhan” (Zeng Qinghong emphasizes using the scientific development concept to guide development and down-to-earth party-building work to promote development), Xinhua News Agency, December 16, 2003, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2249264.html>.

¹⁶ Chi Hsiang, “Central Authorities Have Worked Out Policy of Party Administering Qualified Personnel,” *Ta kung pao*, November 26, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1126-000049, and “China Strives to Bolster Human Resources Management,” Xinhua News Agency (English), December 20, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1220-000094.

¹⁷ Chi Hsiang, “Central Authorities Have Worked Out Policy.”

¹⁸ “China Strives to Break Barriers to Talents Flow,” Xinhua News Agency (English), December 22, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1222-000123.

¹⁹ “Hu Jintao: Shishi rencai qiangguo zhanlue, jianchi dang guan rencai yuanze” (Hu Jintao: Implement the strategy of human resources and a strong country, firmly uphold the principle of the party managing human resources), Xinhua News Agency, December 20, 2003, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2256582.html>.

²⁰ “Decision of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Further Strengthening Work Concerning Skilled Personnel,” Xinhua News Agency, December 31, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-1231-000104.

²¹ “Hu Jintao: Shishi rencai qiangguo zhanlue.”

²² *China Daily*, February 24, 2004.

²³ Xinhua News Agency, March 1, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0301-000091.

²⁴ Zong He, “Supervision Regulations: One Feature, Four Breakthroughs,” *Xuexi shibao*, February 23, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0304-000234.

²⁵ See Article 8, Clause 4 of the “Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Inner-Party Supervision (Trial),” Xinhua News Agency, February 17, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0221-000073.

²⁶ “Xia Zanzhong, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Answers a Xinhua Reporter’s Questions on the ‘CPC Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision (Trial),’” Xinhua News Agency, February 18, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0218-000107.

²⁷ The 13 officials were: Liu Fangren, former party secretary of Guizhou; Li Jiating, former governor of Yunnan; Cheng Weigao, former party secretary of Hebei; Tian Fengshan, former minister of land and resources; Liu Changgui, former vice governor of Guizhou; Pan Guangtian, former deputy chair of the Shandong Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Tian Fengqi, former president of the Liaoning Higher People’s Court; Cong Fukui, former vice governor of Hebei; Wang Zhonglu, former vice governor of Zhejiang; Liu Ketian, former vice governor of Liaoning; Wang Xuebing, former president of the China Construction Bank; Mai Chongkai, former president of the Guangdong Higher People’s Court; and Wang Huaizhong, former vice governor of Anhui. See Wang Haizhou and Zhang Pei, “Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision: Containing Power with System—Interviewing Professor Gao Xinmin, an Expert on Party Building from the CPC Central Party School,” *Zhongguo qingnian bao* (Internet version), February 18, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0218-000039.

²⁸ “The Party Should Run Affairs of the Party and Strictly Administer the Party; Three Measures Will Enhance Inner-Party Supervision,” *Renmin wang*, April 13, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0413-000065.

²⁹ Xia Fei, “The Central Discipline Inspection Commission Possesses the Power of Appointing over 200 Officials at the Ministerial Level,” *Duowei xinwen*, April 19, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0420-000202.

³⁰ Xinhua News Agency, February 16, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0216-000081.

³¹ “Wen Jiabao: Laogu shuli he renzhen luoshi kexue fazhangan” (Wen Jiabao: Firmly establish and seriously implement the scientific development concept), Xinhua News Agency, February 21, 2004, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2352034.html>.

³² Wang Mengkui, “Study and Practice the New Concept of Development,” *Qiushi*, 2004, no. 3 (February 1), FBIS CPP-2004-0204-000086.

³³ Wen Jiabao, “Government Work Report,” Xinhua News Agency (English), March 16, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0316-000088.

³⁴ *Hubei ribao*, March 10, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0311-000054. See also “Hu Jintao: Building Up Scientific Concept of Development,” *Ta kung pao*, March 10, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0310-000056.

³⁵ *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, March 15, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0315-000121.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao* (Internet version), March 12, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0312-000049.

³⁷ See “Chongfen renshi kexue fazhangan de zhidao yiyi” (Fully recognize the guiding importance of the scientific development concept), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2402518.html>; “Renmin ribao: Shenke lijie kexue fazhangan de jingshen shizhi” (People’s Daily: Deeply understand the spiritual essence of the scientific development concept), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2408934.html>; “Renmin ribao: Zhuque bawo kexue fazhangan de jiben yaoqiu” (People’s Daily: Accurately grasp the fundamental demands of the scientific development concept), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2411748.html>; and “Nuli tigao guanche luoshi kexue fazhangan de lingdao shuiping” (Energetically raise the leadership standards for

implementing the scientific concept of development),
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2414264.html>.

³⁸ Zeng Qinghong, "Deeply Understand and Comprehensively Implement the Strategy of Making the Country Strong through Development," *Xuexi shibao*, March 8, 2004, 1-2, FBIS CPP-2004-0312-000251.