Chinese Views Regarding
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

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As indicated in earlier CLMs, China’s behavior and rhetoric toward Japan regarding a range of controversial events occurring in the East China Sea—from resource claims to naval transits and island territories—constitutes a major component of an arguably escalating pattern of assertiveness between Beijing and several of its maritime neighbors. Among these altercations, Beijing’s increasingly acrimonious confrontations with Tokyo over five small islands northeast of Taiwan (called the Diaoyu Islands by China and the Senkaku Islands by Japan and hereafter referred to as the S/D islands) are arguably the most dangerous.\(^1\)

Although tensions over these islands and their surrounding waters have existed since at least the 1970s, they have erupted into a series of sometimes sharp and dangerous interactions between Beijing and Tokyo only in the past two to three years, beginning with a crisis precipitated by the ramming of a Japanese coast guard ship by a Chinese fishing trawler in the vicinity of the S/D islands in September 2010.\(^2\)

The most recent—and thus far most intense—imbroglio between the two nations was largely precipitated by Tokyo’s purchase of three of the five main islands on September 10, 2012, a move apparently made to prevent an ultra-nationalist right-wing Japanese politician from acquiring them (see timeline below). This action resulted in large-scale, numerous, and sometimes violent, demonstrations in China (and to a lesser extent in Japan) in late 2012; an ongoing pattern of potentially dangerous interactions between Chinese and Japanese air and naval vessels jostling for position in or near the islands’ territorial air space and waters; and some particularly heated rhetoric, especially on the Chinese side.

This dispute is particularly significant among Beijing’s altercations with its maritime neighbors because of the uniquely volatile combination of elements involved. These include, most notably: a) China’s current efforts to challenge directly Japan’s long-standing administrative authority over the islands through a fairly regular pattern of incursions into nearby spaces by a variety of mainly civilian government aircraft and ships; b) the relatively high numbers—and in some cases, level of capability—of the government vessels participating on both sides; and c) the intensity of elite and public emotions involved, especially in China. These and other factors significantly increase the likelihood of a serious crisis occurring, and perhaps escalating out of control, as a result

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of either a miscalculation and subsequent escalatory reaction by either side or a deliberate attempt by one or both sides to gain a lasting advantage during the ongoing crisis. Even if one accepts that the current Sino-Japanese confrontation over the S/D islands began with Tokyo’s September 2012 purchase decision, it is evident that the current crisis is sustained primarily by Beijing’s ongoing attempts to create a new “status quo” with regard to administrative authority over the islands, and Tokyo’s resistance to such efforts.³

Hence, in order to assess the likely evolution of the crisis, and any path toward its possible future resolution, it is particularly important to understand Chinese views—both official and unofficial—toward the S/D islands dispute in general and the current imbroglio in particular.

This CLM seeks to contribute to this effort by examining unclassified and publicly available data in these areas. As with several past CLMs, three categories of leadership and elite sources are examined—authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative—to identify, compare, and assess both mainstream and non-mainstream views and possible leadership positions on a variety of relevant issues,⁴ from the background context and specific catalysts and drivers of the crisis, to assessments of Japanese responsibility and possible paths toward some sort of resolution or more stable modus vivendi, the role of the United States, and the larger importance of the issue to Chinese policies and strategies toward Japan, the United States and the Asia-Pacific region. The methodology employed includes both a quantitatively-based comparison of word usage across media and over time, as well as a qualitative assessment of articles and statements appearing in party, government, and military sources.⁵

The first section presents a brief overview of the use of certain relevant terms in the two major Chinese government-controlled newspapers (People’s Daily and Liberation Army Daily) during the past two years. This is followed by a description and assessment of the authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative Chinese statements regarding the above issues. A timeline of the major events in the current crisis is appended at the end.

In examining the above issues, we attempt to answer several questions, including first: Can one discern any critical differences between the Chinese leadership and outside Chinese elites regarding the understanding and handling of the dispute? Second: Can one identify differences between civilian and military views (both authoritative and non-authoritative) toward the overall dispute and the current crisis in particular? And third: Will the new Chinese party and state leadership under Xi Jinping likely adopt a new or different approach to the dispute?

Chinese Use of Terms

As one might expect, both People’s Daily and Liberation Army Daily have published a large number of articles on the S/D islands issue over the past two years. The vast majority of these articles appeared after Japan purchased three of the S/D islands on September 11, 2012.⁶ Among those articles, a relatively small number associated the S/D
islands issue to Japanese militarism (军国主义) or fascism (法西斯), or characterized it as a “farce” (闹剧). Slightly higher numbers in some way linked the issue to the behavior of Japanese “right-wing” elements (右翼).

Although only impressionistic, these findings suggest that the issue has not generally been discussed in inflammatory or bombastic ways as a proportion of all articles available on the S/D islands in these two important sources, despite the obvious existence of strong emotions on the subject among most Chinese citizens.

Claims and Origins

There are few if any differences between authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese views on the nature of China’s claims to the S/D islands and the origins of the dispute. For virtually all Chinese who have addressed the S/D islands tensions, the primary issue, at least as stated in the public realm, involves an incompatible, zero-sum dispute over territorial sovereignty. In this regard, authoritative Chinese sources have been uniformly clear regarding Beijing’s claim. As the Chinese white paper on the Diaoyu Dao stated:

Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China’s inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.

Moreover, according to the new Premier Li Keqiang, China has an “unshakeable determination” to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity in this matter. This view echoes almost identical remarks made by authoritative civilian and military sources at lower levels.

Presumably to reinforce such strong claims to sovereign authority over the S/D islands, an authoritative Chinese source has on at least one occasion linked them with the controversial concept of China’s “core interests.” Specifically, on April 26, 2013, in response to a media question, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated in a video recording made at the time that:

[the Diaoyu Islands are an issue of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it pertains to China’s core interests.]

However, the subsequent official Foreign Ministry transcript of the press conference revised the spokesperson’s answer to read as follows:

The white paper, China’s Peaceful Development, released by the Information Office of China’s State Council in September 2011 expressly stated that China would resolutely safeguard the country’s core interests, including national sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity.

The Diaoyu Islands issue involves China’s territorial sovereignty.
This revision perhaps reflects an attempt to make the Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s original depiction of the issue as a core interest less direct, but the implication remains, nonetheless. Indeed, the link is arguably stronger in this instance than it has been in authoritative Chinese statements regarding the South China Sea issue (see CLM 34 for a discussion of the latter).\textsuperscript{14} That said, it is doubtful that Beijing is making such fine distinctions between its South China and East China seas territorial claims. In both cases, Beijing has tried to have it both ways, by suggesting the claims are linked to Chinese core interests without employing language that clearly places them in the same category as Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang.

Unsurprisingly, both quasi- and non-authoritative Chinese sources convey similar viewpoints on the sovereignty status of the S/D islands, as well as its association with China’s core interests.\textsuperscript{15}

This implies that, for most if not all Chinese, the basic issue at stake in the current crisis (i.e., sovereignty) is not subject to much if any compromise. Of course, the same can no doubt be said for the Japanese position.\textsuperscript{16} At the same time, authoritative Chinese sources also emphasize China’s commitment to peaceful development and a preference for negotiation over territorial disputes, “in order to maintain regional peace and stability.”\textsuperscript{17}

In other words, no authoritative sources suggest that Beijing has discarded its long-standing two-pronged policy of limiting and controlling disputes through negotiation and cooperation with other claimants on one hand while on the other hand maintaining what it regards as a necessary and resolute defense against perceived attempts by others to undermine its diplomatic, legal, political, economic, and military position involving such disputes.\textsuperscript{18}

Whether this means that Beijing might eventually be willing to negotiate the issue of sovereignty remains unclear in the case of the S/D islands (despite current Chinese statements to the contrary), largely because China has compromised on sovereignty-related territorial issues many times in the past.\textsuperscript{19}

For Chinese observers, both authoritative and non-authoritative alike, China’s strong and apparently absolutist stance toward the S/D islands is based on both a particular interpretation of history and the behavior of the Japanese government. The most complete presentation of both aspects has generally appeared in authoritative sources.

As also suggested by the above quote from the Chinese white paper on the Diaoyu Dao, Beijing claims that the S/D islands “have been China’s inherent territory since ancient times, for which China has plentiful historical and jurisprudential evidence.”\textsuperscript{20} This evidence largely consists of imperial Ming dynasty references to the islands as part of a defense perimeter against Japanese pirates, incorporation into China as part of Taiwan during the Qing dynasty, and one 19\textsuperscript{th}-century Japanese government reference to the proprietary attitude of the Qing dynasty toward the islands.\textsuperscript{21}
In contrast, for Beijing, Japan’s claim to the islands is allegedly based on their seizure “through illegal means” during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, as well as Washington’s “illegal and invalid” placement of the islands under its trusteeship during the post-war occupation of Japan and its subsequent return to Tokyo of the power of administration over the islands in the early 1970s. As shown in further detail below, Washington is thus viewed by many Chinese as a key contributor to the S/D islands dispute.

From the Chinese perspective, as noted above, the current crisis was precipitated by Japan’s decision to purchase three of the main S/D islands in September 2012. Although presumably intended by Tokyo to prevent the purchase and subsequent provocative development of the islands by the ultra-nationalist governor of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara, to almost all Chinese observers, this act was completely unacceptable and highly provocative in itself, for several reasons.

First, it allegedly violated an “understanding” that had supposedly been reached between Beijing and Tokyo in the 1970s to shelve the sovereignty issue. From the viewpoint of the Chinese government, the Japanese purchase involved the exercise of “sovereign rights,” and not a mere transfer of “property rights” (as Tokyo insisted), thus constituting an adverse change in the status quo and hence a violation of the agreement to shelve the sovereignty issue.

Second, the decision to purchase the islands occurred one week before the 81st anniversary of the so-called Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, which marked the beginning of imperial Japan’s invasion of China. Many Chinese citizens are acutely aware of historical events associated with China’s past humiliation at the hands of foreigners, and no doubt believe that Tokyo was either irresponsibly unaware or deliberately provocative in choosing such a date for purchasing the islands.

Third, the purchase followed several other allegedly “provocative” Japanese actions taken regarding the islands. As former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun (until recently the leading MFA official involved in consultations with Japan over the S/D islands dispute) stated:

In recent years, there has been a serious backtracking in Japan’s position on the Diaoyu Dao issue. It has taken a series of unilateral moves to infringe upon China’s rights and provoke matters, for example, the “naming” of some of the islands, the conducting of “surveys”, the holding of a “fishing gathering” around the waters off Diaoyu Dao, “landing” on the main island and so on.

Fourth, as indicated above, the announcement of the purchase decision occurred almost exactly two years after a sharp Sino-Japanese confrontation over Tokyo’s arrest and detainment of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler who rammed his boat into pursuing Japanese patrol vessels while fishing near the S/D islands. As in the case of the island
purchase, Beijing viewed the detainment and possible trial of the captain as a violation of a prior understanding reached between the two countries.27

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the purchase decision was part of what many Chinese see as a larger, very worrisome trend in Japanese politics toward “right-wing” views and policies. Former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun was apparently the major public exponent of this viewpoint within the Chinese government. In an inflammatory set of responses to questions from the media, he stated:

Right-wing forces in Japan instigated the farce of the “island purchase.” The Japanese government did not act to stop this. Instead, it deliberately pandered to it and used it. . . . In the past, this kind of dangerous trend [in a rightward direction] had created enormous catastrophe for the rest of Asia. So if the current trend is not stopped—or worse, if it is used, pandered to and condoned out of domestic political needs—then the arrogance of these people will be further inflated and Japan will move further down the dangerous path. One day, it is not unlikely that the tragedies of history will be repeated.28

Zhang’s remarks also drew a clear connection between the S/D islands dispute (and other supposed reflections of a rightward trend in Japanese politics) and the aggressive, militaristic, and brutal actions of the Japanese government during WWII:

The broader context of this [i.e., the purchase of the islands—author] is the increasing tilt to the right in Japanese politics. You may take a look at what has been said and done in Japan in recent years: denial of the Nanjing Massacre, denial of the so-called “comfort women,” disavowal of the Murayama statement and the Kono statement [i.e., statements by a former Japanese prime minister and a former chief cabinet secretary, respectively, apologizing for Japan’s overall misdeeds and for the use of “comfort women” by the Japanese army during the Second World War—author], the visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni war shrine, advocacy of military buildup and preparation for war and abandonment of Japan’s pacifist constitution.29

Beijing’s linkage of the S/D islands issue with a larger perceived pattern of rightward movement within Japanese politics toward the militaristic policies of the past has the potential to cast the controversy in a highly emotional light, by connecting it to the entire historical experience of Japanese behavior during World War II. While the Japanese government today is arguably moving in a decidedly rightward direction, suggestions by senior Chinese officials that this trend involves the reemergence of the aggressive, militarist policies of the wartime era are reckless and irresponsible.

Similar inflammatory and at times patronizing Chinese views drawing linkages between Japanese behavior toward the S/D islands dispute and past Japanese militarism are also
evident in quasi- and non-authoritative sources. For example, Zhong Sheng has stated, in the context of the S/D islands dispute, that:

Japan has neither deeply reflected on its history of aggression nor seriously examined its wrong statements and actions on China-related issues, and it does not feel grateful at all [for China waiving war reparations and allegedly assisting Japan’s economy by sustaining its rapid economic development—author].

An article appearing in the Global Times asserts, “If they [i.e., the Japanese] keep on doing what they have been doing, treating Japan’s national dignity as a special kind of dignity that is greater than China’s national dignity, they must accept the kind of humiliation that they will remember for several decades to come.”

More broadly, articles appearing in People’s Daily following Tokyo’s purchase of the islands in September 2012 referred to Japanese militarism more than 20 times. While at least some Chinese outside of Mainland China question making such a linkage, few if any Chinese observers in the PRC have done so.

Japanese Responsibility and the Path to a Resolution of the Crisis

From the Chinese perspective (and regardless of the type of source, authoritative or otherwise) the above factors confirm that Japan alone brought about the current crisis by destroying the existing status quo between Tokyo and Washington regarding the S/D islands, and must therefore “bear all consequences arising therefrom.” As this stance implies, for both authoritative and other Chinese observers, the resolution of the current crisis therefore requires that Japan “face up to the facts and correct its mistake through concrete actions. Only this will return the bilateral relationship to the normal track of development.” In other words, the full responsibility for defusing the crisis lies with Japan, although Chinese officials also acknowledge that “[b]efore thoroughly resolving the disputes, the parties concerned should avoid taking action that might expand or complicate the disputes so as to maintain stability in the region.”

Moreover, a few quasi-authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese observers suggest that there can be no return to the status quo that existed prior to the Japanese decision to purchase the islands. This stance is also suggested, although not explicitly stated, by an authoritative military source. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense stated in December 2012 with regard to the S/D islands dispute, that it is “justifiable” for the Chinese military to provide security in waters under China’s jurisdiction, and that other countries are “in no position” to make irresponsible remarks in this regard.

Some non-authoritative sources also insist that Beijing must more clearly demonstrate its administrative authority over the islands and thereby pressure Tokyo to negotiate over them. In fact, a few Chinese observers also convey a willingness to apply all types of confrontational pressures on Japan, even to the level of employing coercive force. While most of these articles depict the use of force as a response to a similar Japanese action, a few do not.
In contrast, some important Chinese observers, including military figures such as Liu Yuan, a PLA general and reputed personal associate of Xi Jinping, have cautioned against going to war with Japan over the S/D islands. Liu implies that such an event would play into the hands of Japan and the United States by distracting China from its “central task” of promoting rapid economic development.41 The former head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of Defense (Qian Lihua) conveys similar caution, arguing that “We should not talk about war and military actions in such a careless way when the two countries just have problems.” Qian reportedly added that China values its relations with Japan and has always focused on settling disputes peacefully through dialogue.42

The Role of the United States and the Link to Larger Strategic Issues

As indicated above, both authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources assert that the United States is clearly implicated in the current crisis over the S/D islands, both historically and as a result of recent actions. They uniformly insist that the United States “arbitrarily” included the islands under its trusteeship in the 1950s, as part of the post-WWII management of territories seized by imperial Japan before and during that conflict. Washington then allegedly “returned” the “power of administration” over the islands to Japan in the early 1970s, an act (resulting from a supposed “backroom deal” between the United States and Japan) that “has no legal basis and is totally invalid according to international law.”43 As a result, according to China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the United States “has unshirkable historical responsibility on the Diaoyu Islands issue.”44

With regard to more recent events, the spokesperson added that the announced U.S. policy of opposition to any efforts to unilaterally undermine Japan’s administrative authority over the S/D islands disregard[s] the facts and confuse[s] right and wrong. China expresses strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to that. We urge the US side to be responsible on the Diaoyu Islands issue, be discreet in word and deed and take concrete actions to safeguard regional peace and stability as well as overall interests of China-US relations so as to win trust from the Chinese people.45

On another occasion, in commenting on the stipulation in the 2013 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act that the S/D islands issue falls under the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson cautioned against using the treaty to “interfere in the territorial disputes between other countries.”46 Even more recently, Cui Tiankai, China’s new ambassador to the United States and a veteran diplomat involved in U.S.-China relations, told Washington not to “lift the rock off Japan only to let it drop on its own feet.”47

While blaming and cautioning Washington, such authoritative commentary is relatively mild in nature. By contrast, quasi- and non-authoritative Chinese sources express a
sharper level of opposition to the U.S. role. For example, Zhong Sheng states that America has taken a step in the wrong direction with its allegedly pro-Japan stance toward the S/D islands dispute, asserting that the United States is jeopardizing peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region and could damage the Sino-U.S. relationship. In addition, a commentary published by Xinhua contends that “Washington’s failure to rein in nationalist sentiments in Japan will cast doubts on its credibility as a responsible power in the region.” The author also remarked that the “unbalanced” U.S. policy of support for Japan in the islands dispute “has betrayed its declared intention to stay neutral on the issue.”

Some observers allege that U.S. support for Japan (and Japanese right-wing forces in particular) and Washington’s greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region have emboldened Tokyo to undertake the purchase of the S/D islands. In advocating that Beijing move forward to “strike Japanese arrogance,” a Global Times article asserts that any resulting large-scale war would result in a catastrophe “intentionally set by the U.S.” While some Chinese sources thus sharply blame the United States for this situation, others blame Japan for maneuvering Washington into providing stronger support for its position.

In contrast to these sources, the moderate observer noted above, Professor Ling Xingguang, argues that “Washington will never allow Japan to retrace the path of militarism or to possess nuclear weapons. Japan can only strengthen its military force with U.S. permission... if Japan does repeat its error, both China and the US are bound to jointly constrain it.” And at least one Chinese observer argues that China and the United States should work together to deal with a “right-leaning” Japan, the “real troublemaker.”

No authoritative Chinese sources assess the implications of the S/D islands dispute for China’s larger strategic situation. However, a quasi-authoritative Zhong Sheng article implies that the dispute is part of Japan’s attempt to “encircle” (!) China and achieve “so-called dominant power in Asia.” A non-authoritative source also links the event with Japanese strategic objectives, stating that the “nationalization” of the islands is part of Tokyo’s strategy of using the U.S.-Japan alliance to attain its (undefined) “strategic sea power objective.” Another analyst asserts that “the West” seeks to keep control of the S/D islands as a part of its overall effort to contain China and undermine its maritime interests.

**The Impact of China’s New Leadership**

The recent transition of China’s party, government, and military leadership initiated at the 18th Party Congress of fall 2012 has taken place during the current prolonged imbroglio over the S/D islands. This naturally raises the question of the possible impact of that transition on Chinese policies and views toward the dispute, and Sino-Japanese relations more broadly.
As discussed in CLM 40, Beijing is placing a greater stress on the need to promote its maritime interests within its overall foreign policy approach. At the same time, little concrete and reliable evidence exists, at least on an unclassified level, that the new leadership has altered its basic strategy for managing its maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. As indicated above, Beijing’s authoritative policy stance toward the S/D islands dispute with Japan, while rhetorically inflammatory and bombastic at times, has not departed from its long-standing two-pronged policy of searching for a cooperative and peaceful approach to maritime sovereignty disputes while resolutely defending against perceived challenges to its interests.

That said, these two objectives obviously exist in some tension with one another, that is, the latter approach can often require, from Beijing’s perspective, actions that undermine the former approach. In fact, this has been particularly evident in recent Chinese statements and actions toward disputes with Manila and Tokyo over maritime territories in the South and East China sea, respectively.\(^58\)

As suggested above and in various examinations of China’s behavior, Beijing is clearly currently engaged in an effort to pressure Japan, through frequent incursions into the ocean and airspace surrounding the S/D islands and other means, to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the issue and to accept in some way China’s assertion of administrative authority over the islands.\(^59\)

This assertive, sometimes aggressive, approach might reflect the specific influence of Xi Jinping. While no open-source Chinese statements or policy documents support this notion, many observers, including the author, have been told that Xi has exerted a major influence on China’s handling of both the Scarborough Shoal and S/D islands incidents. [For a discussion of the former dispute, see CLM 35.] Since at least mid-2012, he apparently has served as the senior member of two relevant policy bodies, a leadership group formed to deal with maritime security issues in general and a smaller office specifically in charge of the S/D islands crisis. According to some analysts, Xi personally approved a step-by-step plan to intensify pressure on Japan, thereby rejecting a more moderate approach advocated by some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^60\)

Other observers point to Xi’s past experience with the PLA, his famous PLA wife (a well-known singer of patriotic songs), his espousal of the “China Dream” concept that allegedly envisions a strong nation with a strong military, and his high-profile visits to military facilities to support the notion that the new leadership will employ a far more muscular, military-oriented foreign policy, especially toward maritime and other sovereignty disputes. At present, however, this more general assessment is largely speculative, an interesting hypothesis that awaits conclusive evidence. Nonetheless, it is quite possible that Xi Jinping enjoys closer relations with the Chinese military than did his predecessor, which could place him in a stronger position in dealing with the S/D islands crisis and other similar military-related disputes.\(^61\)

Concerning his actual views, Xi Jinping has not made statements out of line with the general authoritative Chinese stance toward the S/D islands dispute presented above. For
example, before being promoted to his current top party and government posts, Vice President Xi also characterized the Japanese purchase of the islands as a “farce” and cautioned the United States to mind its words and actions, not get involved in the issue, and refrain from engaging in any escalatory actions.  

After becoming general secretary of the CCP in November 2012, however, Xi met with a special envoy of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, received a letter from Abe, and reportedly told the envoy that a high-level Sino-Japanese summit was possible under “the right atmosphere.”

Xi also stated:

> The Japanese side should face up to history as well as reality and make joint efforts with China through real action to seek effective methods for appropriately controlling and resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation. . . . Under the new circumstances, we should shoulder national and historical responsibilities as well as display political wisdom, just like the elder generations of leaders of the two countries, to overcome difficulties and advance China-Japan relations.

This relative moderation, especially when compared with many quasi- and non-authoritative statements, suggests that the new leadership under Xi has not moved significantly in a more hardline direction regarding the S/D islands dispute. That said, if Xi Jinping has indeed played a key role since at least late 2012 in pressing Japan through incursions and other means, as mentioned above, it is also unlikely that the new leadership has stepped back from that approach.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The above examination of various Chinese sources suggests that there is no discernable significant difference among authoritative sources, and between authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative sources, regarding the nature of China’s claim to the S/D islands, the allegedly invalid and “illegal” nature of Tokyo’s claim to the islands, and the origins of the current dispute with Japan. Virtually all statements constitute clear, strong, and consistent expressions of China’s sovereign claims to the islands and the historical bases of those claims, as well as a complete repudiation of Japan’s claims. There appears to be little if any room for China to compromise with Tokyo over these points, and also few if any indications of any differences among Chinese regarding them.

That said, authoritative sources also assert China’s long-standing commitment to a peaceful management and eventual resolution of the dispute through negotiation. In contrast, non-authoritative sources less frequently cite this aspect of Chinese policy, focusing instead on the need to place pressure on Japan or otherwise compel Tokyo to back down or undo what it has done in purchasing the islands. In this regard, Chinese sources seem unanimous in the view that the current dispute was caused solely by Japan, that Japan is responsible for any adverse consequences that result from the dispute, and
that Tokyo is therefore obligated to resolve the dispute through its own actions. This stance is rather typical of China’s black-and-white, moralistic approach to issues involving “principles” such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.64

Partly as a result of this approach, both authoritative and quasi- or non-authoritative Chinese sources sometimes employ inflammatory and patronizing language toward Japan, excoriating Tokyo and drawing connections between Japanese policy toward the S/D islands and the highly militaristic views and behavior of imperial Japan prior to and during WWII. This type of characterization of contemporary Japan is reprehensible and derives in part from Beijing’s own long-standing propaganda effort to keep the memory of Japan’s past misdeeds in the minds of China’s population while depicting present-day Japanese conservative groups as closet militarists plotting to resurrect that tragic wartime era.

As with many other foreign policy topics, one area where a notable difference exists between authoritative and non-authoritative statements concerns views toward the United States. While authoritative sources blame Washington for creating the controversy through its actions in the ’50s and ’70s and seek to caution it against intervention in the current crisis, quasi- and non-authoritative sources go much further in criticizing the United States for provoking, manipulating, or otherwise using the confrontation with Japan over the S/D islands to promote a range of larger political and strategic interests, from containing China to promoting instability in the region. As always, it is extremely difficult to determine whether and to what extent such perspectives are shared by the Chinese leadership.

In all of these areas, no major difference seems to exist between the views of civilian and military sources, whether authoritative or otherwise.

Finally, it is quite likely that Beijing’s assertive approach toward the S/D islands dispute is shared by China’s new leadership and Xi Jinping in particular. Indeed, it is quite possible that Xi has strongly influenced very forward-leaning Chinese policies and actions toward Japan throughout the ongoing crisis. At the same time, there is also some evidence to suggest that Xi is open to communication with Tokyo and is not promoting the use of increasingly escalatory measures. That said, there are few signs, at least based on open-source statements, that Beijing is prepared to return to the status quo ante.

China’s assertive, self-righteous, and absolutist stance toward the S/D islands dispute is by no means unique among nations confronting perceived threats to their sovereignty. However, Beijing’s tough-minded perspective on both the general dispute and the current crisis over the S/D islands, and the language it has employed toward Japan, have been especially onerous at times and certainly do not contribute to efforts to bring the crisis under control. Given the historical memories, nationalist fervor, and deep-rooted sense of resentment and anger toward Japan held by many Chinese, it is difficult to see the conditions under which Beijing would moderate its stance. And yet, as many observers have remarked in the past, strong Chinese rhetoric and statements, even regarding questions of principle such as sovereignty, do not always provide a reliable guide to
Beijing’s behavior. The latter can often involve a level of restraint, based on pragmatic considerations, that is not reflected in either authoritative or non-authoritative language. Indeed, some of the remarks cited above suggest such restraint. More importantly, in this instance, it is certainly the case that China’s strategic interests are not served by a deepening rift with Japan.65

It is thus quite possible that the Xi Jinping–led leadership, if given the right opportunity, will find a way to work with Tokyo to bring the current dispute under greater control, despite the often harsh Chinese views presented above.

APPENDIX

Table 1
Timeline of Recent Events in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>March to November 2012</td>
<td>47 Chinese ship incursions into or near the territorial waters of the S/D islands occur. From April to December, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambles fighters 160 times in response to Chinese aircraft in the same vicinity.66</td>
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<td>April 16, 2012</td>
<td>Ishihara indicates his plan to buy the S/D islands.67</td>
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<td>April 18, 2012</td>
<td>Prime Minister Noda and Diet members consider the nationalizing of the islands.68</td>
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<td>May 13, 2012</td>
<td>Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets Noda for talks in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where he asserts that the S/D islands are Chinese territory. Noda responds, saying: “China’s increasing maritime activity, including in areas near the Senkakus, offends the feelings of the Japanese people.”69</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 11, 2012</td>
<td>Japan and China meet at the vice-ministerial level near Lake Yamanakako in Yamanashi Prefecture. Zhang Zhijun, China’s vice foreign minister in charge of Sino-Japanese consultations states that “Japan should firmly block measures that damage the two countries’ political foundations.” However, Sasae, the Japanese vice foreign minister, hints at the islands’ possible purchase.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 7, 2012</td>
<td>Noda announces that the Japanese government would consider nationalizing the islands.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 11, 2012</td>
<td>Three Chinese state fisheries patrol vessels enter into territorial waters around the islands, prompting a sharp protest from Japan.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 13, 2012</td>
<td>Another Chinese surveillance ship is spotted near the same area.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 24, 2012</td>
<td>Prefecture-level Sansha City is created.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 19, 2012</td>
<td>Japanese nationalists land on the islands without permission.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late August 2012</td>
<td>Parliamentary Senior Vice Foreign Minister Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi visits China and delivers a letter from Noda to state councilor Dai Bingguo. The letter states: “It is extremely important to maintain close communications at the highest political</td>
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September 1, 2012  Japan’s ambassador to China, Niwa Uichiro, opens the Super Summer Festival in Beijing, marking the beginning of ceremonies to commemorate the 40th anniversary of normalization.

September 4, 2012  Japanese government reaches agreement with the Kurihara family on the purchase of the S/D islands.

September 5, 2012  Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou visits the Taiwan island closest to the S/D islands and asserts the Republic of China’s sovereignty over the islands.


September 11–12, 2012  Japanese government signs the purchase contract for three of the S/D islands. Chinese ocean surveillance ships head to the waters around these islands and declare Chinese sovereignty over them. Citizens in major Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong hold protests and demonstrations against Japan.

September 12, 2012  Anti-Japanese demonstrations spread across China in the following week through September 22.

September 18, 2012  81st anniversary of Mukden Incident is commemorated in China with protests.

September 19, 2012  Four Chinese patrol ships spotted near the S/D islands.


September 22, 2012  Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) and U.S. Marines engage in an exercise aimed at strengthening JGSDF capabilities to defend remote islands.

September 23, 2012  China informs Tokyo of the cancellation of the 40th anniversary celebrations of Sino-Japanese normalization, scheduled for September 27 in Beijing.

September 23, 2012  Xinhua reports the China Maritime Surveillance agency concluded a test of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft; State Oceanic Administration announces plans to have drones operational by 2015.

September 24, 2012  Japan-China Economic Association postpones visit to China. Taiwan fishing flotilla with about 60 boats departs for the S/D islands area.

September 25, 2012  China announces commissioning of the aircraft carrier Liaoning.

September 25, 2012  Ishigaki Municipal Assembly adopts a resolution calling on the national government to protect Japanese fishermen operating near the S/D islands.


September 26, 2012  Prime Minister Noda speaks at UN General Assembly and calls for peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in accordance with international law.

September 27, 2012  China Ministry of National Defense describes PLA Navy scheduled patrols and exercises in East China Sea as normal and legal activities aimed at protecting Chinese fishing and natural gas development activities.

September 29, 2012  Hokkaido Governor Takabashi Harumi postpones visit to China to attend the Shanghai Economic Forum, an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of normalization.

October 2, 2012  Four CMS ships enter Japan’s territorial waters in the S/D islands and depart later in the same day.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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</table>
| October 3, 2012 | Foreign Minister Gemba calls for a dialogue to stabilize the S/D islands situation, but underscores Japan’s nonnegotiable position regarding sovereignty over the islands.  
October 5, 2012 | Taiwan’s Interior Ministry announces plans to build a national maritime park in waters near the S/D islands.  
October 7, 2012 | Chinese ships enter Japan’s contiguous zone for seventh consecutive day.  
October 12, 2012 | At the World Bank-IMF meeting in Tokyo, IMF Deputy Managing Director Min Zhu expresses optimism over resolution of S/D islands dispute. China’s minister of finance and governor of the People’s Bank of China do not attend the meeting; Japanese see their nonattendance as reflecting China’s dissatisfaction with the islands purchase.  
October 15, 2012 | Foreign Minister Gemba meets U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns; he reiterates Japan’s position on the S/D islands that a territorial dispute does not exist.  
October 16, 2012 | Chinese media report the detention of five individuals for property destruction during anti-Japanese demonstrations in Guangdong Province.  
October 16, 2012 | Seven PLA warships return from exercises in the western Pacific, passing through Japan’s contiguous zone south-southeast of Yonaguni Island, becoming the first-ever PLA warships to transit through Japan’s contiguous zone.  
October 18, 2012 | Japanese ministers visit the Yasukuni Shrine.  
October 21, 2012 | Jiji Press reports that Japan and the United States cancelled plans for November military exercises aimed at recapturing uninhabited islands.  
October 24, 2012 | The Japanese and Chinese governments reportedly intensify back-channel efforts to mend bilateral ties.  
October 30, 2012 | China’s former ambassador to Japan Chen Jian calls on the United States to use its influence to move Japan to recognize existence of dispute and accept negotiations with China over the S/D islands.  
November 4, 2012 | Four CMS ships enter waters off the S/D islands and briefly enter Japanese territorial waters.  
November 8, 2012 | Japan’s Tourism Ministry postpones a trilateral Japan-China-ROK meeting scheduled for November 27, reporting that it had been informed by its Chinese counterpart that conditions were not right for China’s attendance.  
November 16, 2012 | A reception marking the close of the 40th anniversary commemorations scheduled for November 24 in Beijing is cancelled.  
November 18, 2012 | Japan Coast Guard reports the 30th consecutive day of Chinese activity in the contiguous zone of the S/D islands.  
November 20, 2012 | Japan, ROK, China trade ministers agree to begin formal negotiations on a trilateral free-trade agreement in early 2013.  
December 11, 2012 | Former Governor Ishihara attributes the present tension in Japan-China relations to the Noda government’s purchase of the S/D islands.  
December 13, 2012 | The 75th anniversary of the Imperial Army’s entry into Nanjing and the start of the Nanjing Massacre are commemorated.  
December 13, 2012 | A Chinese maritime patrol aircraft (Y-12) enters Japanese airspace over the islands in the East China Sea, the first such entrance by China since 1958, when
A newly commissioned Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command ship enters Japan’s territorial waters in the S/D islands, marking the 18th incursion since September 11.\footnote{111}

December 17, 2012

Japan Coast Guard confirms the seventh consecutive day of Chinese activity in the contiguous zone of the S/D islands.\footnote{114}

December 22, 2012

Aircraft from China’s CMS approaches within 100 kilometers of the S/D islands; Air Self-Defense Force jets are scrambled.\footnote{115}

December 27, 2012

Japan Coast Guard confirms the fourth consecutive day of Chinese ships’ activity in Japan’s contiguous zone of the S/D islands.\footnote{116}

January 10, 2013

Japan scrambles fighter jets to head off a number of Chinese military planes near the S/D islands.\footnote{117}

January 11, 2013

Chinese Ministry of Defense states that a Shaanxi Y-8 transport aircraft was conducting a routine patrol over oil and gas fields east of Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, and confirmed it had dispatched two J-10s after two Japanese ASDF F-15s closed in on the transport plane.\footnote{118}

January 17, 2013

Chinese Navy’s East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, carries out exercises with missiles in the East China Sea.\footnote{119}

January 19, 2013

Chinese frigate directs fire-control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) helicopter in flight over the waters.\footnote{120}

January 21, 2013

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warns that the United States opposes any action that would undermine Japanese administration of the islands.

January 25, 2013

China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, offers Japan a conciliatory tone during a meeting with a senior Japanese politician in what appeared to be an effort to reduce the escalating tensions between the countries.\footnote{121}

January 29, 2013

In another exercise, three warships of the North Sea Fleet based in Qingdao, Shandong Province, began conducting live-fire war games in the western Pacific on January 29.\footnote{122}

January 30, 2013

Chinese frigate directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer on the high seas near the S/D islands, but, according to recent comments by senior Chinese military officials, the act was not planned.\footnote{123}

February 9, 2013

Two fleets of Chinese marine surveillance ship carry out regular patrol missions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea respectively during the Spring Festival, according to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). One of the fleets (Haijian 50, Haijian 51, Haijian 66, and Haijian 137) patrols in the territorial waters surrounding the S/D islands in the East China Sea.\footnote{124}

March 10, 2013

China’s outgoing foreign minister warns Japan to return to the negotiating table to settle its territorial dispute or risk seeing tensions between the two countries spiral out of control.\footnote{125}

March 22, 2013

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decides to send Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso to China to meet with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang sometime in the following month, according to a report by the Sankei Shimbun.\footnote{126}

March 30, 2013

Taiwan unveils two new ships to patrol disputed East China Sea islands.\footnote{127}

April 1, 2013

Liu Cigui, director of the SOA, states that “China will maintain regular patrols in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.”\footnote{128}

April 8, 2013

Yasuo Fukuda, former Japanese prime minister, meets Xi Jinping in Boao. No
Chinese state media reported the encounter.129

April 10, 2013
Japan agrees to give Taiwan fishing boats unconditional use of 4,530 more square kilometers of contested ocean in the East China Sea.130

April 23, 2013
At least 168 lawmakers visit Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine. The pilgrimage came after Abe made an offering and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and two other ministers visited Yasukuni.131

April 23, 2013
Chinese military planes, mostly fighter jets, make more than 40 flights close to disputed airspace. The flights took place when eight Chinese marine surveillance ships entered the 12-nautical-mile territorial zone off the S/D islands, making this the largest sail into the disputed waters in a single day since Tokyo nationalized the island in September.132

April 26, 2013
Japanese and Chinese defense officials meet to discuss ways to smooth communications between the two countries.133

April 26, 2013
In response to a question about remarks by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey after his meetings with senior Chinese military officials, a Chinese MFA spokesperson confirms a linkage between the S/D islands and the concept of Chinese “core interests.” (See above for a detailed discussion of this statement.)

April 27, 2013
Beijing cancels an annual financial meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials set for the following week. The cancellation highlights China’s unwillingness to hold high- or ministerial-level dialogue with Japan.134

May 5, 2013
Three Chinese government ships enter the 12-nautical-mile zone off the S/D islands.135

May 6, 2013
Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso says that Japan and China have never had a smooth relationship at any time during their 1,500-year history.136

Notes
1 The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands consist of five islands (Uotsuri-shima/Diaoyu Dao, Kuba-shima/Huangwei Yu, Taisho-to/Chiwei Yu, Minami-Kojima/Nan Xiaodao, and Kita-Kojima/Bei Xiaoao) and three rocks (Okino Kita/Wei Da Bei Xiaoao, Okino Minami-iwa/Da Nan Xiaoao, and Tobise/Fei Jiao Yan). They are located approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles southeast of the Chinese mainland and 200 nautical miles southwest of the Japanese island of Okinawa.


Nonetheless, the vast majority of the search results occurring after September 11, 2012, referred to the phrase “September 11, 2012.” The large number of search results may be explained in part by the commonality of phrases “militarism,” “fascism,” “militaristic,” and “fascist” in Chinese; furthermore, it is impossible to identify how each article used the phrase “farce” in context, only that the returned articles contained this phrase along with “钓鱼岛” (Diaoyu Dao). Nonetheless, the vast majority of the search results occurring after September 11, 2012, referred...
specifically to Japan’s purchase or its current behavior as a “farce” (闹剧) as indicated by the presence of the phrase “island purchase” (购岛) in those articles.

8 Articles that referred to Japanese “right-wing” elements in the context of the S/D islands were searched using the phrases “Japan” (日本) and “right wing” (右翼) along with any appearances of the phrase “Diaoyu Dao” (钓鱼岛). This search query generated 59 relevant sources in Liberation Army Daily, of which roughly 76 percent appeared after September 11, 2012, and 128 relevant sources in People’s Daily, of which roughly 60 percent appeared after September 11, 2012.


10 See “Full Text of PRC Premier Li Keqiang’s Live News Conference 17 Mar 13,” CCTV-1, transcribed and translated by the Open Source Center (hereafter OSC), March 17, 2013, OSC CPP20130317045002.


12 For the video of MFA spokesperson Hua Chunying’s statement in the April 26, 2013, press conference, see NHK World video clip, “China says Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea as its ‘core interest,’” posted by ViralNewsOnLive, April 26, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxzYG1xAhE. The spokesperson’s remark was made in response to a question about comments U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey had made in an interview, wherein he reportedly claimed that Chinese military officials had used the phrase core interests “several times” in connection with the S/D islands in his recent meetings with them on April 25. (See the NHK World video clip.)


As former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun stated, “In the negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations in 1972 and the negotiations to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship in 1978, the older generation of Chinese and Japanese leaders recognized that the two sides have a dispute over the Diaoyu Dao as they had very different positions on this issue. In order not to affect the bigger interests of normalization of relations and conclusion of the treaty due to the Diaoyu Dao issue, the two sides agreed not to touch the issue for the time being, and reached the understanding and consensus of ‘putting aside the sovereignty disputes and has offered concessions 25 times in 17 of those disputes. See M. Taylor Fravel, “The PLA and Policy towards Territorial Disputes,” talking points prepared for a workshop on civil-military relations in China, “The Role of the PLA in National Security Policymaking: Is Change Underway?” April 7, 2011 (unpublished manuscript); and M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).


23 As former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun stated, “In the negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations in 1972 and the negotiations to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship in 1978, the older generation of Chinese and Japanese leaders recognized that the two sides have a dispute over the Diaoyu Dao as they had very different positions on this issue. In order not to affect the bigger interests of normalization of relations and conclusion of the treaty due to the Diaoyu Dao issue, the two sides agreed not to touch the issue for the time being, and reached the understanding and consensus of ‘putting aside the Diaoyu Dao issue to be resolved later.’ This created favorable conditions for the subsequent reestablishment and development of China-Japan relations.” See “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists.” For the original Chinese version, see “外交部副部长张志军就钓鱼岛问题举行中外媒体吹风会答问实录,” 中华人民共和国外交部, October 26, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t982822.shtml.

24 See Bonnie Glaser, “China’s perspectives on and strategy for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute” (full citation in endnote 3, above).


28 “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists.”

29 Ibid. In these same remarks, Zhang also characterized the Japanese purchase of the islands as likely to have the destructive impact of an “atom bomb” on Sino-Japanese relations, a particularly infelicitous and provocative remark, given the Japanese experience with atomic bombs in WWII.

30 Zhong Sheng, “Abe Must Correct His Wrong Statements and Actions (International Forum),” People’s Daily Online, translated by OSC, February 23, 2013, OSC CPP20130223718003. This article lists several of Prime Minister Abe’s supposed “petty calculations” behind his stance on the S/D islands dispute, including efforts: to rally public opinion in order to influence the upcoming July House of Councilors election by appealing “right-wing forces” and playing up the “China threat”; to court the United States, tighten the alliance with Washington, and enlist support of conservative forces in the United States in order to deal with China; to impede China’s development process by attacking and discrediting Beijing; and “to rid [Japan] of its status as being defeated in the war and to realize the dream of becoming a so-called major political power” by using the dispute to “push for a constitutional amendment to exercise the right of collective self-defense and revising the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.” Also see Zhong Sheng, “You Cannot Join the Class by Prettifying the History of Aggression!” People’s Daily Online, translated by OSC, February 26, 2013, OSC CPP20130226787009.

31 See “China’s Surveying and Mapping Team Will Measure Out What Constitutes the Bottom Line of Diaoyu Islands Crisis,” Global Times, editorial, translated by OSC, March 14, 2013, OSC CPP20130314671001. Also see “Japan blamed for Diaoyu islands tension.”


33 For a primary example, see Ling Xingguang, “Right turn in Japanese politics doesn’t necessarily mean militarist revival,” Global Times, February 17, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/761977.shtml. Professor Ling is director of the Institute of Japan-China Relations and Japan-China Science, Technology and Culture Center, Japan. While agreeing that Japanese politics is witnessing a rightward turn, Ling argues that “political right deviation is not equivalent to prewar militarization.”


35 “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists.” Zhang added: “I think the most basic that Japan can do is to return the territories it has illegally grabbed in its wars of aggression and expansion to their original owners. Japan should not incur any new debt without paying the old debt in the first place. It is high time that Japan did some soul-searching and truly reflected on its own past.” For non-authoritative voices making similar arguments, see “Japan blamed for Diaoyu islands tension.” Other non-authoritative civilian and military sources warn Japan against “playing with fire” (玩火). See Gao Hong, “Diaoyu will remain China’s,” China Daily, September 11, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/11/content_15748819.htm; and Yang Xiyu, “日本政府不要玩火” (Yang Xiyu, “The Japanese Government Must Not Play With Fire”), Liberation Army Daily, September 11, 2012, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/pinglun/content/2012-09/11/content_5021778.htm.

36 Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, “Stay Committed to Peaceful Development” (full citation for this and following source are in endnote 11, above). See also remarks of Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
in “Xinhua Insight: China more active in int’l affairs.” Yang stated, “The Japanese side needs to face up to the reality, take real steps to correct its mistakes and work with China to properly handle and resolve the relevant issues through dialogue and consultations to prevent the situation from further escalating or even getting out of control.” And see Zhong Sheng, “Abe Must Correct His Wrong Statements.”


38 Wang Yuanyuan, “Chinese military on guard against Japanese jet activity near Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua, December 27, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/27/c_132067267.htm. Wang also stated: “We will decisively fulfill our tasks and missions while coordinating with relevant departments such as maritime supervision organs, so as to safeguard China’s maritime law enforcement activities and protect the country’s territorial integrity and maritime rights.”

39 An article appearing in the Global Times states: “China’s new goal should be to force the Abe administration to the negotiating table on the Diaoyu Islands issue. This would be China’s strategic victory.” See “China’s Surveying and Mapping Team Will Measure.” Another article appearing in the same newspaper states: “What we should do is to give Japan a dose of its own medicine. If Japan doesn’t get its policy back on the rails, China need not exercise restraint on countermeasures such as dispatching officials to land on the islands, patrolling within 12 nautical miles of the islands, renting the islands to individuals or moving registered permanent residences to the Diaoyu Islands.” See Xing Guangmei, “New Measures over Diaoyu Just Start,” September 13, 2012, Global Times Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/732896.shtml. Major General Luo Yuan, a frequent commentator in the Chinese media with a reputation for holding hard-line foreign policy views, has reportedly proposed that Beijing be “less tolerant” and “abandon its so-called principle of ‘contending with the rivals without breaking the relationship.’” See quotations from Luo Yuan in “Summary: PRC Military Expert Says China Should Be Less ‘Tolerant’ Toward Japan,” 亞洲週刊 (Asia Weekly) no. 18, pp. 18–19, summary by OSC, May 12, 2013, OSC CPP20130507790024.


41 See “Liu Yuan: Ensure the Strategic Period of Opportunities; War Is the Last Option,” abridged by Yang Tingting from PLA General Logistics Department Director Liu Yuan’s report on studying the spirit of the 18th Party Congress, Global Times, translated by OSC, February 4, 2013, OSC CPP20130205722003. For speculation on Liu Yuan’s relationship with Xi Jinping, see James Mulvenon and Leigh Ann Ragland, “Liu
Yuan: Archetype of a “Xi Jinping Man” in the PLA?” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 36 (winter 2012),
42 “Former Defense Official Dampens China-Japan War Speculation,” ed. Yang Yi, Xinhua, March 3,
43 The fullest authoritative presentation of this argument is contained in “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory
of China” (for full citation, see endnote 9, above). For non-authoritative sources, see “Japan Must Give
Back Islands,” *South China Morning Post*, April 2, 2013,
01/21/content_16146476.htm; and “Commentary: U.S. sends wrong signal over Diaoyu Islands issue,”
44 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the US’ Recent Comments on the Diaoyu
Islands” (for full citation, see endnote 34, above). For a non-authoritative source that repeats this phrase,
see “Commentary: U.S. sends wrong signal over Diaoyu Islands issue.”
45 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the US’ Recent Comments on the Diaoyu
Islands.”
46 See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the China-Related Content of the
2013 National Defense Authorization Act Approved by the US Congress,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China, December 23, 2012,
48 See Zhong Sheng, “The United States Should Not Take on New Burdens,” *People’s Daily Online*,
translated by OSC, January 21, 2013, OSC CPP20130121705007. This Zhong Sheng article says that
the United States needs to understand the Chinese perspective and to be very clear that there is no room for
debate in the Diaoyu situation. It insists that the United States cannot continue to secretly back Japan
without hurting the U.S.-China relationship. Also see “Japan blamed for Diaoyu islands tension”; Gao
Hong, “Diaoyu will remain China’s,” *China Daily*, September 11, 2012,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/11/content_15748819.htm; and Nozomu Hayashi, “Chinese
think tank: conflict inevitable between Japan, China over Senkakus,” *Asahi Shimbun*, December 31, 2012,
“U.S. position on Japan island dispute a ‘betrayal’: China,” *Daily Star*, January 19, 2013,
a-betrayal-china.ashx#axzz2Shr1gZdq.
50 On Chinese views of the U.S. “pivot” toward Asia, see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and
Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 38 (summer 2012),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/124546. Lu Yaodong, a researcher at
the CASS Japan Studies Institute, states that “Japan cannot rely enough on its own military power and
offensive strategic guidelines to achieve its strategic objectives, and still needs the effective support and aid
of its chief ally, the United States. In fact, the Japan-US alliance is precisely the strategic foundation of its
so-called ‘nationalization’ of Diaoyu and the driving force for Japan in seeking its strategic sea power
objective.” See Lu Yaodong, “The Hegemonism of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” *People’s Daily*, translated by
OSC, January 21, 2013, OSC CPP20130121705009. Also see Zhang Lei, interview with Hu Jiping,
director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
*Online*, translated by OSC, October 17, 2012, OSC CPP20121017787015; and Jane Perlez and Keith
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/world/asia/in-speech-organized-by-beijing-ex-diplomat-calls-islands-
dispute-with-japan-a-time-bomb.html?_r=1&. This *New York Times* article cites retired Chinese diplomat
and former ambassador to Japan) Chen Jian as stating that some view the S/D islands dispute as “a time
bomb planted by the U.S. between China and Japan.” Chen also reportedly stated: “The U.S. is urging
Japan to play a greater role in the region in security terms, not just in economic terms.” That “suits the
purpose of the right wing in Japan more than perfectly—their long-held dream is now possible to be realized.”


52 “China’s Surveying and Mapping Team Will Measure.” The editorial states: “Japan is still taking a tough approach and has rejected any negotiations related to the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan. It is trying to gain U.S. support to be used as leverage to pressure China to back down, but it is also racked by a guilty conscience.” Also see Zhong Sheng, “Abe Must Correct His Wrong Statements” (for full citation, see endnote 30, above).


57 Gao Hong, “Diaoyu will remain China’s,” China Daily, September 11, 2012, http://usa.chinanews.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/11/content_15748819.htm. Gao states: “The Diaoyu Islands are the first islands marked out by the West to contain China. Washington will not allow Beijing to regain control of the Diaoyu Islands without a struggle. It is determined not to allow Beijing to challenge its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, even though Beijing has no plans to do so.”


61 See the “Leadership Transition” section (specifically, endnote 217) of “Chapter 2: China,” in Michael D. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/net_assessment_full.pdf. Xi’s principal governing experience is as a party executive in several southern provinces, including Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. This experience in the coastal region has led Xi to value market liberalization and global economic integration. Xi also has some military experience, having served as an officer in active service and as a secretary in the General Office of the Central Military Commission, possibly as a personal assistant to former PRC defense minister Geng Biao, from 1979 to 1982. His experience as a party operative in Fujian and Zhejiang also familiarized him with the military regional command system, and he has served on a series of National Defense Mobilization Committees. Also, Xi’s wife is a senior PLA nonranking civilian (wenzhi ganbu) and head of the PLA song and dance troupe, which would likely have exposed him to senior PLA leaders. And of course, he currently serves as a vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, after having served as vice chairman for two years prior to the 18th Party Congress. See James Mulvenon, “Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission: Bridesmaid or Bride?” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34

24
For a discussion of China’s strategic situation regarding Japan, see Swaine et al., China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030, especially chapter two.


Ibid.

Ibid.


“Inside Look: Japan tried but failed to avert disaster,” Asahi Shimbun.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

“Inside Look: Japan tried but failed to avert disaster,” Asahi Shimbun.

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
113 James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: 40th Anniversary: ‘Fuggetaboutit!’”
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
119 Okudera and Minemura, “Insight: China increased belligerence.”
122 Okudera and Minemura, “Insight: China increased belligerence.”


