The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA

James Mulvenon

On 15 March 2012, Chongqing Municipality leader, princeling, and aspiring national elite Bo Xilai was stripped of his party posts, following the dramatic flight of his former deputy police chief Wang Lijun to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and revelations about the possible involvement of Bo’s wife in the murder of a British businessman. In the wake of his purge, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong-controlled media were rife with rumors about Bo’s relationships with senior military officers and even a possible coup attempt in Beijing. This article examines Bo’s ties with the PLA through his career, assesses the validity of various claims about the fallout in the military from his purge, and speculates about any possible implications for party-military relations.

Introduction

On 15 March 2012, Chongqing Municipality leader, princeling, and aspiring national elite Bo Xilai was stripped of his party posts, following the dramatic flight of his former deputy police chief Wang Lijun to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and revelations about the possible involvement of Bo’s wife in the murder of a British businessman. In the wake of his purge, Hong Kong and Taiwan media were rife with rumors about Bo’s relationships with senior military officers and even a possible coup attempt in Beijing. This article examines Bo’s ties with the PLA through his career, assesses the validity of various claims about the fallout in the military from his purge, and speculates about any possible implications for party-military relations.

The PLA and Bo: Insights from Political Work

While rumors of Bo Xilai’s imminent downfall had been circulating since February, important PLA speeches at NPC in March made no mention of political struggle, and the appearance of authoritative commentary in major Party organs on 11 April was the first official announcement of the CCP’s decision. Official, parallel editorials appeared in the military press over the course of the next week. It is always an interesting, if sometimes esoteric, exercise to compare the texts of the editorials for possible differences in tone and content. While the propaganda officials in both the Party and the PLA are theoretically drawing inspiration from the same CCP Central Propaganda Bureau guidance, past experience shows that careful textual exegesis can sometimes reveal subtle splits, though one must always be mindful that the editorials are naturally shaped to reflect particular institutional equities and therefore may emphasize one aspect of the “line” over another.
The main Party commentaries, appearing in *People's Daily*, *Xinhua*, and constituent party propaganda organs throughout the country, contained a number of core themes, including emphases on (1) “governing the country in accordance with the rule of law”\(^2\); (2) “strictly enforcing party discipline”\(^3\); (3) “no tolerance for corruption”\(^4\); (4) “safeguarding reform, development, and stability”\(^5\); (5) equality under the law and the unacceptability of “privilege” in the system with “no exceptions in terms of regulations”\(^7\); and, of course, (6) “consciously maintaining unanimity with the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary.”\(^8\) The last point, while easily dismissed as a standard line, was further buttressed by the defensive statement that Bo’s removal had “nothing to do with a so-called ‘political struggle’,” though this tense assertion of Party unity actually invites more scrutiny than it dismisses.\(^9\) Echoing controversial comments from Premier Wen Jiabao, one CCP commentary even raised the specter of the tumultuous Mao years, asserting that “the rule of law can ensure that China’s development is not affected by uncertain factors and avoid upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution.”\(^10\) Summing up, the editorials instructed Party members to “resolutely implement the party’s disciples, follow the laws of the state, do not forget one’s origin when in prominent position, do not abandon the role of public servants once in public post, do not use power for personal gains, do not overstep the bottom line of the law, discipline, and morality at any circumstance, and have a keen sense of living up to the people’s trust, guarding against wrong doing, and holding oneself to higher standards, can we be able to remain incorruptible as an official, behave like a decent human being, and do things in a law-abiding manner.”\(^11\)

Piling on, a series of editorials in *Liberation Army Daily* instructed the troops to “deeply understand the warning significance of the incident and the case and firmly support the decisions and plans of the CCP,” and claimed that the Party’s decision on Bo’s fate was “universally accepted among officers and men.”\(^12\) Under the banner of a military ideological campaign of “stressing political awareness, taking the overall situation into consideration, and observing discipline,”\(^13\) the commentaries reiterated key themes from the Party text, emphasizing the need to maintain the CCP’s “purity,” as well as “resolutely safeguard the CCP discipline and the laws of the state.”\(^14\) In the 13 April editorial, three PLA officers were trotted out to make a declaratory statement expressing their adherence to the line, known in PRC political culture as a *biaotai*. Wang Kaijun, commander of the Jiujiang Military Sub-Command of the Jiangxi Provincial Military Command defended the ability of the Party to inspect itself: “The facts have proven that the CPC always represents people’s interests, accepts people’s supervision, never tolerates corruption, and investigates and prosecutes violations of the law and of disciplines.”\(^15\) Pan Yong, political commissar of the Meishan Military Sub-Command of the Sichuan Provincial Military Command, offered dark portents: “The incident has sounded the alarm for the Party members and carders, warning us to effectively check erroneous ideas and harmful tendencies at the outset and combat corruption and moral degeneration.”\(^16\) Finally Li Xilou, political commissar of a division in the Beijing Military Region, read carefully from the cue card though reportedly with “emotion”: “The incident warns us that to keep sober-minded and politically steadfast is an indispensable ideological and political quality of each Party member.”\(^17\)
Yet it is important to place these military editorials within the context of earlier PLA political work related to social stability, anti-corruption, and divisive trends in military development, especially in light of the behind-the-scenes political struggles occurring during February and March and later accusations of PLA factionalism during the Bo purge. Military political work during the National People’s Congress in March highlights many of the key themes. In remarks at a 12 March plenary meeting of PLA deputies to the National People’s Congress on the sidelines of the parliament’s annual session, CMC Chairman Hu Jintao noted that the military “must be aware that development while maintaining stability is the priority,” and called for the PLA to “enhance its fight against corruption,” saying it must “abide by strict political and organizational disciplines to ensure all orders are implemented to the letter,” and “prioritize ideological and political development and unswervingly uphold the CPC’s absolute leadership over the armed forces.”

On 19 March, Liberation Army Daily continued a constant theme of warning the troops to resist the “three mistaken ideas” of “de-Partyization, de-politicization, and nationalization.” A 27 March Liberation Army Daily editorial highlighted the challenges of the particularly sensitive political period in the runup to the 18th Party Congress, averring that “without tightening the string of stressing politics, one may lose one’s bearings in front of the complex political struggle, may be swayed by consideration of personal gains and losses, and may disregard party discipline and military discipline while facing various interest temptations.”

Perhaps the most unique feature of PLA political work before and after the Bo purge, however, is the analysis of the sources of instability and danger. Rather than look inward at structural discontinuities in China, the 27 March Liberation Army Daily clearly points the finger outside of China: “historical experience shows that every time our party convenes a national congress, noise may obviously increase in society, various hostile forces may further intensify ideological and cultural infiltration into our country, and the struggle in the ideological domain may become more acute and more complicated.”

This theme was picked up in a 1 April Liberation Army Daily commentary, which asserted:

Western hostile forces will never relax ideological, political, cultural, religious influence and infiltration on our country, will step up the implementation of the strategy of Westernizing and dividing our nation, and will try by all means to spread the idea of guiding ideology diversification. Reform and development in our country are currently situated in a crucial period, and social interest relations are getting more complex. The hostile forces are trying by all means to stir up trouble by making use of the contradictions and problems in our country’s economic and social development, and various erroneous political viewpoints and values have more severely corrupted people’s thinking.

According to this line, one of the principal targets of Western subversion is the PLA:

At present, the Western hostile forces went all out to advocate “the severance of armed forces from the party and the depoliticizing of the
armed forces” and “turning armed forces to the state.” Their sinister intention is to weaken the awareness of the military soul among our military personnel, corrode the character, fundamental purpose, and nature of the People’s Army, and pull down the mental pillar of the People’s Army in obeying the party’s command.23

What is to be done? At least part of the answer is ignore the Internet and microblogs:

We must resolutely check political liberalism, consciously resist various erroneous words and deeds that do harm to the party’s image and impair the party’s unity, stop listening to, believing, and passing on various hearsays and grey messages. We must seriously criticize and educate people who behave in a way of violating discipline, and sternly punish those who cause adverse influence to a serious extent without any leniency . . . Today, the international political struggle is extremely intense . . . the socialist market economy is developing in depth in our country, such new media as the Internet and cell phones have been widely popularized, various trends of thinking in society are getting more and more complex, various viewpoints and opinions are getting more and more diverse, and various news and hearsays become more difficult to distinguish between true and false.24

A 10 April article in Liberation Army Daily, by PLA academics from the Organization Department of the PLA General Political Department and the Center of Political Work Studies at the Academy of Military Science, continued this siege mentality, warning the troops to “be highly vigilant in guarding against and resisting the negative influence of such erroneous political viewpoints as ‘detaching the armed forces from the party, depoliticizing the armed forces’ and ‘putting the armed forces under the state.’” Readers were also counseled to “assume a clear-cut attitude in refuting the political opinions that attack the party’s theories and the party’s line, principles, and policies, and vilify the image of the party and the state.”

With China facing “many political events” and a “special security and stability situation,” a commentator writing 15 May warns of “international hostile forces” employing “Westernization and splittist” strategy, improper conduct by spouses and children, and a “conspiracy” within PLA to pursue “de-partyization, de-politicization, and nationalization” that “has always been prevalent.”25 On 18 May, Global Times, well known for its willingness to tackle sensitive subjects, published an article entitled “Experts Go on the Offensive against Military Nationalization,” which contained quotes from supporters and opponents of the idea.26 Finally, a 1 July editorial in Liberation Army Daily marking the 91st anniversary of the founding of the CCP warned, “a hostile force has taken our army as a main target to infiltrate and sabotage and attempted to change our army’s nature by wantonly attacking the party’s absolute leadership of the army, which is a fundamental principle and institution.” As a result, the troops must “resist the wrong political ideas of ‘nonparty affiliation and de-politicization of the military’ and ‘army nationalization’ and always obey the party’s commands and follow the party.”27
But what to make of this ominous language of plots and subversion? First it must be pointed out that many of these feverish conspiracy theories are not new. As discussed in many past issues of CLM, PLA editorials, particularly on important anniversaries and dates, are regularly replete with standard tropes about military loyalty to the Party and often indulge in paranoid “othering” of hostile foreign forces to distract from serious structural dysfunctions within the institution. This is especially true during periods of political instability or crisis, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the 1992 Yang brothers purge, the 1999 Belgrade bombing riots, the 2001 EP-3A hostage crisis, and the various Taiwan-related conflicts. Is there anything different about the current spate of articles, or do they fit the traditional pattern? Frequency analyses of key terms like “nationalization” actually show that the current spike in articles is slightly above normal but not excessive, suggesting that outside analysts are assigning too much significance to them.

Bo Xilai and the PLA: Fallout from the Purge

Bo and the PLA Before the Purge

Bo Xilai’s relationships with the PLA can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) his ties with local military elites in the geographic area under his official supervision and (2) his longstanding connections to PLA “princelings.”

Bo’s Ties with Local Elites

Bo is well known for his active cultivation of ties with local military elites, beginning with his long posting in Dalian and Liaoning Province, and continuing through his final tenure in Chongqing Municipality. Former Taiwan defense minister Lin Chong-pin, a longtime PLA analyst, asserted in a recent article that “when Bo was in Chongqing, he paid close attention to the needs of the military, making sure he could maintain his ties with the military.” Bo reportedly paid a great deal of attention to military leaders and units in the area. In 2011, Bo was reported to have made “generous donations for troops in Xinjiang” and visited a military unit in another province in 2012. The military was also attracted to Bo’s campaign to promote red songs and ultra-conservative ideology in Chongqing, as well as with his tactics to cover up the wrongdoings of the PLA. For example, after Bo’s downfall, a Chengdu property developer, Li Jun, said he was involved in a dispute with a senior PLA princeling friend of Bo, Zhang Haiyang, but was arrested by Bo and tortured during interrogation. These ties paid off during the early stages of his high-profile crackdown on mafia gangs in Chongqing, when Bo allegedly took shelter from possible reprisals by gangs within the walls of the Chongqing Garrison.

Bo’s Relations with PLA Princelings

While Bo, like all successful party officials, successfully cultivated relationships with the military officers leading units in his area of responsibility, he is perhaps better known for his alleged high-profile ties to military “princelings.” Though he never served in the PLA, Bo Xilai’s relationships with military princelings in part derive from the
revolutionary legacy of his father, Bo Yibo, one of the eight “immortals” associated with Chairman Mao and the earliest history of the Chinese Communist Party. Over the course of the revolutionary period, Bo Yibo played key leadership roles in the Eighth Route Army, Second Field Army (with Deng Xiaoping), and the North China (Fifth) Field Army, where he served as political commissar under Nie Rongzhen.

The other sources of Bo’s relations with PLA princelings include childhood and professional ties, as well as connections through marriage. Bo is closely linked with General Liu Yuan, the current political commissar of the General Logistics Department. Born in Beijing in 1951, General Liu Yuan (刘源) is the son of Liu Shaoqi, who served as president of the PRC from 1959 to 1968. President Liu raised his family in the elite Zhongnanhai leadership compound, where Bo Xilai and Liu Yuan were contemporaries and likely knew one another. Similarly, Bo is often connected to General Zhang Haiyang, current political commissar of the Second Artillery and the son of PLA elder Zhang Zhen. While Bo and Zhang may have known each other earlier, Zhang served as political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region from 2005 to 2009, overlapping two years with Bo’s tenure in Chongqing, which is directly subordinate to the Chengdu MR. When Bo was in Beijing in 2011 with a Chongqing delegation to promote “red songs,” Zhang allowed him to stage the first of such shows at the headquarters of the Second Artillery.

Finally, Bo’s marriage to Gu Kailai connected him to the social networks of her father Gu Jingsheng, a famous PLA leader in the 1930s and 1940s, a former general in the Vietnam war, and former head of the Xinjiang Production Brigade. Her military princeling background was one of the most important reasons cited by elite gossip hounds to explain why Bo dumped his first wife and married Gu.

**Post-Purge Fallout Within the PLA**

After Wang Lijun visited the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong-controlled media focused intensely on Bo’s relationship with the PLA, speculating about how Bo’s ties with the military might help him survive the political struggle. In early February, outside observers ascribed special political significance to Bo’s visit to the Kunming, Yunnan, museum of the 14th Group Army, which was founded by his father during the second Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945). The politically sensitive timing of Bo’s visit was interpreted at the time as a reminder to observers of his historic ties to the PLA, perhaps even as a warning that Bo might enjoy support among active military units, though ultimately this gesture did not succeed in deterring the Beijing Authority from purging him. After Bo’s controversial press conference with the Chongqing National People’s Congress delegation on 9 March, which many believe forced the hand of the Beijing leadership to strip him of his positions, analysts noted the public handshakes Bo received from PLA delegates.

After the CCP propaganda apparatus announced that Bo had been stripped of his positions, the intensity of speculation by foreign media increased markedly. One newspaper in Hong Kong, *Apple Daily*, reported that Bo had been building a “private army” in Chongqing. On 19 March, four days after Bo’s removal, Chinese microblogs were abuzz with rumors of a military coup in Beijing, implicating public security supremo Zhou Yongkang and PLA supposedly loyal to Bo Xilai.
Post reported that five inspection teams had been sent down from Beijing to investigate senior officers in the Chengdu Military Region, including the 14th Group Army whose museum Bo had visited in February. A Hong Kong–based human rights organization alleged that Chongqing Garrison Commander Zhu Heping was being investigated “by the relevant departments of the Chengdu Military Region for a series of recent capital construction, including the ‘613 and 803 projects’ that involved 2.7 billion yuan.”

Another Hong Kong newspaper reported that “Zhang Qinsheng, deputy chief of the PLA general staff, had been suspended from duty for advocating the ‘nationalization’ of the armed forces.”

Yet empirical examination of these claims finds little more than journalistic speculation and exaggeration. Case in point is Bo’s relationship with Liu Yuan, who Apple Daily accused of being part of a Bo Xilai “coup plot.” Four days later Sing Tao Daily reported that Gen Liu had been put under house arrest following his objection to the dismissal of Mr. Bo from his Chongqing post last month, ending his hopes of being promoted to a position on the Central Military Commission at the 18th Party Congress. In fact, official Chinese media sources show that General Liu since Bo’s dismissal has been maintaining the predictably hectic public schedule of a senior PLA leader:

- Met with the Beijing Planning Commission on 10 April
- Accompanied CMC Vice-Chairman Guo Boxiong on inspection of PLA universities in Beijing on 25 April
- Attended All-PLA Forum on Internet-based Ideological and Political Education chaired by Xu Caihou on 26 April
- Chaired a 9 May GLD meeting to discuss the implementation of the PLA Serviceperson’s Insurance Law
- Visited a medical school in Shijiazhuang on 14 May accompanied by Hebei party secretary Zhang Qingli and Governor Zhang Qingwei
- Attended meeting in Beijing on 16 May to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Logistics Academy
- Attended the working conference of the GLD “Military-Civilian Integrated Packing Development and Construction Committee of the Construction Leading Group of the Asian Packing Center under the World Packing Organization” on 27 May 2012
- Visited the PLA GLD 1 May Kindergarten to see teachers and workers and celebrate the “1 June” International Children’s Day
- Chaired 4 June “PLA General Logistics Department Financial Expenditure Standardization Work Conference”
- Attended a report meeting on the advanced deeds of an informatization research institute of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) at the GLD on 5 June
- Visited the provincial branch of the Beijing-based PLA General Hospital—commonly known as the No 301 Hospital—with Hainan party secretary Luo Baoming on 9 June
- Attended a variety evening show entitled Bringing Affection and Warmth to Frontier Passes on 22 June with CMC members and GPD Director Li Jinai
- Attended a PLA conference on grassroots construction from 25–27 June
Things are not completely rosy for General Liu, however. In early April, the Central Military Commission set up an audit steering group to examine procurement, construction projects, and real estate income in the armed forces. “Thoughts and actions must be united to the decisions and instructions made by Chairman Hu and the Central Military Commission,” said General Liao Xilong, head of the General Logistics Department, who was appointed to lead the new committee. This new steering group directly undermined a major anti-corruption initiative, spearheaded by Liu Yuan and launched with great fanfare with the arrest of GLD Deputy Director Gu Junshan.\textsuperscript{55} A retired officer who teaches at a military academy says the new audit steering group has the purpose of taking this tool out of General Liu’s hands. “It doesn’t mean he is in trouble. But it reminds us that it is party central who will determine who gets in trouble.”

As with Liu Yuan, Second Artillery Political Commissar Zhang Haiyang’s fate has been the subject of intense media speculation. On 16 April, \textit{Want China Times} reported that Zhang had been missing for several days, presumably under arrest.\textsuperscript{56} Actually, Zhang was missing from China, because he was leading a 10-person PLA delegation to Finland and Hungary.\textsuperscript{57} When he returned he also maintained a surprisingly busy public schedule for someone under criminal investigation:

- Accompanied CMC Vice-Chairman Gu Boxiong on investigation visits to a Second Artillery Corps guided-missile brigade and the Second Artillery Engineering Academy\textsuperscript{58}
- Attended a ceremony in Beijing on 23 May to inaugurate \textit{Liberation Army Daily}’s Second Artillery branch office
- Attended a report meeting on the advanced deeds of an informatization research institute of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) at\textsuperscript{59}
- Attended a PLA conference on grassroots construction from 25–27 June
- Addressed Armed Forces Work Conference on Grassroots Force Building held in Beijing on 4 July\textsuperscript{60}

For his own part, Zhang allegedly told sources that he is not being investigated for his ties to Bo and that the government’s supposed purge of Bo’s supporters in the PLA is not as severe as reported.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{Conclusion}

After examining the facts, two things seem relatively clear. First, Bo paid close attention throughout his career to cultivating close relationships with local military elites and high-ranking princelings. Second, the breathless reporting of military purges and coups following Bo’s dismissal appears to be the product of the feverish imaginations of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong journalists.
In the end, Bo Xilai’s fall from power will have a mixed impact upon Chinese party-military relations. While the fundamental dynamic between the CCP and the PLA will remain unchanged, the discipline inspections of Bo’s activities will likely negatively affect the career prospects of individual PLA officers, especially senior elites like Liu Yuan and Zhang Haiyang, as well as local military leaders in the Chengdu Military Region. It would not be surprising, for instance, if neither Liu nor Zhang is promoted in the fall personnel moves, at the very least because of the bad publicity they have received during the Bo political theater. In this way, the Bo purge bears greater resemblance to that of Yang Baibing in 1992 than the purges of Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong in 1995 and Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006, since “neither of the Chens enjoyed anywhere near Bo’s level of support from the army.” It is also not clear how Bo’s purge and its PLA fallout will affect the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Some analysts, for example, have speculated that the questions raised during the investigations will compel Hu to stay on as CMC Chairman past the 18\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress. Yet the largely ephemeral nature of many of the supposed PLA factional behaviors after Bo’s removal strongly suggests that their impact upon the handover of CMC authority will be marginal at best.

Notes
2 Staff Commentator, “Resolutely Support Correct Decision of CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, 10 April 2012. A separate 14 April Xinhua commentary clarified the meaning of this phrase: “The ‘rule of law’ does not only mean running state affairs according to law, it also indicates that administrators must obey the law and handle state affairs through legal means. It is a comprehensive and profound change from the tradition of ‘rule by man,’ which had been practised in China for thousands of years.” See Commentator, “Law And Party Disciplines Brook No Violation,” Xinhua, 14 April 2012.
3 Staff Commentator, “Resolutely Support Correct Decision.”
4 Ibid.
5 People’s Daily commentator, “Consciously Safeguard the Good Situation of Reform, Development, and Stability,” Xinhua, 11 April 12.
8 People’s Daily commentator, “Consciously Safeguard the Good Situation.”
9 Commentator, “Law And Party Disciplines Brook No Violation.”
10 Ibid.
11 People’s Daily commentator, “Consciously Observe Party Discipline.”
14 “PLA and PAP Officers and Men Firmly Support Decisions.”
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 “Hu Stresses Military’s Safeguarding Social Stability,” Xinhua, 12 March 2012.
19 Staff commentator, “Always Putting Ideological and Political Construction First—First Commentary on
Studying and Implementing Chairman Hu Jintao’s Important Speech to the PLA Delegation to the Fifth
Session of the 11th NPC,” Liberation Army Daily, 19 April 2012.
20 “Be Highly Conscious in Stressing Politics, Complying With the Overall Interests, Observing
21 Ibid.
22 Organization Department of the PLA General Political Department and the Research Center of Political
Work in Military Units at the Academy of Military Science, “More Solidly Implement the Requirement of
Stressing Politics,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 April 2012, p. 7.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Liu Huanmin, “Leading cadres should set an example by talking about the overall situation of political
content/2012-05/15/content_5290.htm.
27 “Unswervingly Holding High the Banner, Obeying the Party’s Commands, and Performing the
Mission—Marking the 91st Founding Anniversary of the CPC,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 July 2012, p. 2.
28 Teddy Ng, “Marching To a Different Beat?” South China Morning Post, 24 April 2012.
30 Teddy Ng, “Marching To a Different Beat?”
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
35 Teddy Ng, “Marching To a Different Beat?”
36 Kathrin Hille, “Show of Might Over Bo’s Military Allies.”
37 “Bo Xilai visits museum of Group Army based in Yunnan,” news.163.com, 11 February 2012; “The
Uncertain Future of Bo Xilai,” Want China Times, 25 February 2012.
38 “Bo Scandal Fallout Spreads to PLA Generals,” Straits Times, 16 April 2012.
40 “Chinese Security Chief’s Fate Attracts Persistent Speculation,” BBC Monitoring, 16 May 2012.
41 Choi Chi-Yuk, “Bo’s Links To Armed Forces Probed,” South China Morning Post, 15 April 2012.
42 “Chongqing Garrison Commander Zhu Heping Subject to Investigation,” Information Center for Human
Rights & Democracy, 29 March 2012.
43 Sun Chia-yeh, “China Commentary,” Ming pao, 7 March 2012.
44 “Bo Xilai Raising an Army Plotting to Rebel; Hu, Wen and Xi Jinping Putting the King of the Southwest
out of Business With One Knockout Blow,” Apple Daily, 12 April 2012.
45 “Bo Scandal Fallout Spreads to PLA Generals,” Straits Times, 16 April 2012.
46 An Puzhong and Yin Hang, “Xu Caihou Attends All-PLA Forum on Internet-based Ideological and
Political Education, Calls for Actively Exploring and Vigorously Strengthening Internet-based Propaganda
and Education Work, Promoting the Innovative Development of Ideological and Political Building,”
47 Jiang Yuming and Fan Juwei, “PLA General Logistics Department, Chinese Ministry of Labor, Social
Security jointly hold teleconference in Beijing to plan ‘PRC Armed Forces Service Personnel Insurance
Law’ enforcement countrywide—Central Military Commission Member, PLA General Logistics
Department Chief Liao Xilong; Chinese Minister of Labor, Social Security Yin Weimin address
teleconference; PLA General Logistics Department Political Commissar Liu Yuan presides over
teleconference; PLA General Staff Department Assistant Chief Chen Yong, PLA General Political
Department Assistant Chief Wei Liang attend teleconference,” Liberation Army Daily, 10 May 2012,
48 “Top General, Bo Xilai Ally Liu Yuan Dispels Rumors,” South China Morning Post, 12 June 2012.

50 “Central Military Commission Member, PLA General Logistics Department Chief Liao Xilong; PLA General Logistics Department Political Commissar Liu Yuan in Beijing Join PLA General Logistics Department Kindergarten children in celebrations marking upcoming ‘International Children’s Day’,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 June 2012, accessed at: http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/head/2012-06/01/content_4881873.htm; and Yang Lijun and He Yongliang, “Four PLA General Departments separately hold ‘1 June’ literary and artistic performances, with Chen Bingde, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, and Chang Wanquan extending festive greetings to young children and regards to vast number of workers and staff members of preschool education,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 June 2012, p.3.

51 Central Military Commission Member, PLA General Logistics Department Chief Liao Xilong in Beijing addresses PLA General Logistics Department Financial Expenditure Standardization Work Conference—PLA General Logistics Department Political Commissar Liu Yuan presides over conference; PLA General Logistics Department Deputy chiefs Ding Jiye, Qin Yinhe; PLA General Logistics Department Deputy Political Commissar Liu Xiaorong attend conference,” Liberation Army Daily, 5 June 2012, accessed at: http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/gc/2012-06/05/content_4886449.htm; and Li Hongjun and Fan Juwei, “Tightly seize without relaxing on building system for funding standards and promote transformation of financial resources into combat power and support capabilities,” Liberation Army Daily 5 June 2012.

52 “Liao Xilong attends report meeting on PLA GSD Institute’s deeds,” Liberation Army Daily, 6 June 2012, p.2.

53 “Top General, Bo Xilai ally Liu Yuan dispels rumors,” South China Morning Post, 12 June 2012, citing article in Keji ribao.

54 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-07/04/content_4928947_2.htm


56 “PLA Political Commissar Close to Bo Xilai Is ‘Missing’,” Want China Times, 16 April 2012.


58 Ge Song, “During His Investigation Visits to a Second Artillery Corps Guided-Missile Brigade and the Second Artillery Engineering Academy, CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Member and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong Stresses the Need to Usher in the Successful Convening Of The 18th CPC National Congress With Practical Actions That See The Proper Accomplishment of All Tasks; Guo is Accompanied by Jing Zhiyuan, Zhang Haiyang, Chen Yong, Zhang Yulin, and Gao Jin During the Visits,” Rocket Forces Daily, 24 March 2012, p. 1.

59 “Jing Zhiyuan meets report team on PLA GSD Institute’s deeds,” Liberation Army Daily, 8 June 2012, p. 4.

60 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-07/04/content_4928947_6.htm


62 Teddy Ng, “Marching To a Different Beat?”