The Only Honest Man?  
General Liu Yuan Calls Out PLA Corruption  
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On 18 January 2012, General Logistics Department Deputy Director Liu Yuan (刘源) reportedly gave a Chinese New Year speech in which he directly attacked military corruption in the ranks and promised a “do-or-die” fight against it. Within days, General Logistics Department Deputy Director Gu Junshan was arrested on charges of profiting from the illegal sale of military property. Analysts buzzed that the combination of General Liu’s high princeling status, his pending elevation to the Central Military Commission, and the support of heir apparent Xi Jinping may make this anti-corruption effort different and more effective than those in the past. This article examines the issue of PLA corruption, reviews recent cases, and assesses the likely success of General Liu’s efforts.

General Liu or General Quixote?

On 18 January 2012, General Logistics Department Deputy Director Liu Yuan addressed 600 officers in his annual Chinese New Year speech. He reportedly described corruption in the General Logistics Department—which was the greatest financial beneficiary of the PLA’s foray into business in the 1980s and 1990s and still controlled enormous marketable resources and contracts in land, housing, food, finance, and services—as “huge,” though “visible” and “reachable.” General Liu was also clear about the stakes, asserting that it was a matter of “life and death for the Communist Party and the PLA,” requiring a “do-or-die struggle.” At the same time, General Liu was not naïve about the entrenched resistance from powerful forces to this campaign he expected to encounter, telling the assembled: “I’d rather risk losing my position than refrain from fighting corruption to the end. No matter how high one’s position is or how powerful their background, I will see it through.”

Gu Junshan Case

Within days of General Liu’s speech, General Logistics Department Deputy Director Gu Junshan was reportedly “detained for economic problems,” which is PLA-speak for corruption. Born in Puyang County, Henan Province in October 1956, Gu was previously the head of the GLD Capital Construction and Barracks Office, chief of the GLD Barracks and Land Management Bureau, and deputy head of the GLD Capital Construction and Barracks Department. Hong Kong sources claim that Gu “bought land in central Shanghai for 20 million yuan per mu [US$3.17 million per 666 square meters]” and sold it to private developers for two billion yuan ($317 million) per mu. The deal allegedly involved Gu’s younger
brother, who is a housing developer in their hometown in Henan province. Spreading the wealth and perhaps buying their silence, Gu allegedly gave friends more than 400 upmarket houses meant for retired senior cadres. His malfeasance had reportedly gone on for a significant period of time, thanks to an unnamed patron that had sheltered him further up the chain of command. Gu’s last public appearance was a Spring Festival event for military vets on 18 January. In February 2012, his Baidu Encyclopedia entry was revised to say that because of “adjustments in GLD personnel affairs,” he was no longer in his position.

Wang Shouye Case

Before Gu Junshan’s arrest, there had not been a high-profile PLA corruption case in more than five years, which says more about the political constraints on corruption enforcement than the actual level of corruption in the PLA. On 30 June 2006, the primary organs of state propaganda made the shocking announcement that Admiral Wang Shouye, deputy commander of the Chinese navy, had been dismissed from his post by the Central Military Commission and expelled from the National People’s Congress.

A native of Yexian County, Henan Province, Wang Shouye was born in September 1943 and joined the PLA at the age of 24 as a civil engineering graduate from Tianjin University. After joining the armed forces upon university graduation in 1967, he served the 38th Group Army and Beijing Military Region and worked as an assistant in the infrastructural construction and housing department of the Beijing Military Region’s Logistics Department as an engineer, a section chief, a deputy bureau chief, a bureau chief, and a deputy department chief. He was promoted to director of the General Logistics Department’s infrastructural construction and housing department in 1995 and to deputy commander of the PLA Navy in 2001. Ironically, Wang was honored as “Excellent Party Member” or “Excellent Leader” and conferred the Third Class Merit twice in four of the five years he served in the GLD.

The articles revealed that the PLA high command took disciplinary measures against Wang in January 2006, removing him from his post due to his “loose morals” and abuse of power by seeking and taking bribes, both of which were considered “serious violations of both the law and military codes of conduct.” Even the official China Daily account of his dismissal included salacious tidbits about the role of a mistress in exposing his corrupt behavior, asserting that the leadership discovered his activities “after his mistress turned him in for economic crimes.” Wang then reportedly sent a letter to the National People’s Congress at the end of March 2006, in which he admitted his crimes and requested to be removed from the NPC:

Because of my involvement in economic crimes, I have been stripped of the post of deputy Navy commander and thus I am no longer qualified to be a deputy to the NPC. Please remove me from the position.
The discipline inspection commission and the legal affairs bureau of the CMC jointly conducted an investigation, but the CMC handled the case in a low-profile manner, with only officers at and above the army level in the military able to read relevant documents.

The official Baidu Encyclopedia entry on the case, which bears some official imprimatur, confirms that Wang stole RMB160 million and kept five mistresses. A 9 July 2006 article in Yazhou Zhoukan claimed that Wang’s mistresses were military personnel, drawn from the Song and Dance Troupe of the PLA Nanjing Military Region, the Song and Dance Troupe of the General Political Department, the Song and Dance Troupe of Beijing Military Region, a cipher officer of the PLA Military Academy, and a cipher officer of the First Office of the General Logistics Department. One of these mistresses, an actress from a military region song and dance troupe, allegedly gave birth to an illegitimate child, and then demanded RMB3 million in compensation from Wang. Angered by his counter-offer of only RMB1 million and the refusal of the formal military apparatus to accept her child as a legitimate scion of Wang, the mistress in question allegedly began appearing outside Navy headquarters in Beijing every day to distribute leaflets. Unable to ignore the situation any longer, the military leadership ordered Wang Shouye arrested on 23 December 2005. Yazhou Zhoukan also reported that RMB52 million and RMB20 million were confiscated from his apartments in Beijing and Nanjing, respectively, and RMB50 million was found in a safe in his office. This article asserted that Wang Shouye had distributed nearly RMB20 million to military colleagues, and the other PLA high-ranking military officers involved in the Wang case allegedly included four rear admirals and seven senior captains. The Baidu Encyclopedia entry reports that Wang was subsequently sentenced to death for his crimes.

Institutional Solutions

The Gu and Wang cases are widely regarded to be the tip of an iceberg of structural, endemic corruption within the PLA. In response, the military and civilian leadership have promulgated and implemented a series of institutional measures, ranging from regulations to ideological campaigns to aperiodic public arrests.

Promulgation of the June 2011 PLA Regulations

On 1 June 2011 the PLA released a new set of regulations against corrupt behavior entitled “Regulations on the Performance of Official Duties With Integrity by Leading Cadres With Party Membership in the Armed Forces.” These regulations are only the latest in a long line of PLA anti-corruption measures, often in response to embarrassing disclosures of military graft. The 2006 Wang Shouye case, for example, led to a spasm of official moves. In February 2006 the PLA’s four general departments jointly issued “Several Regulations on the Prevention of Job-Related Crimes in the Armed Forces,” which stipulated that education on the prevention of job-related crimes should be incorporated into the armed forces’ ideological and political educational system. The Central Military Commission promulgated “Opinions on Building and Improving the System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption in the Armed Forces,” thus incorporating anti-corruption work into the armed forces’ 11th Five-Year Program. The leadership
established an “All-Army Leading Group for the Work of Auditing Economic Responsibility of Leading Cadres”\textsuperscript{23} and a corresponding initiative against “commercial bribery.”\textsuperscript{24}

One common feature of PLA regulations on corruption is their specificity, cataloging long lists of particular corrupt acts. While the 2011 rules, which can be found in the appendix, prohibit hardy perennial abuses involving military land and construction fraud, they also attempt to ban very detailed, obscure crimes involving gym memberships (Article Seven) and vehicle decoration (Article 10) that must have been motivated by actual internal cases. But this specificity is also their weakness, as they tend to be atavistic, prohibiting yesterday’s swindle but not flexible to deal with tomorrow’s malfeasance. This explains why the PLA must re-publish the same regulations over and over again without a corresponding alteration of behavior.

\textit{Establishment of the “Armed Forces Theoretical Research Center on Fighting Corruption and Building Clean Administration”}\textsuperscript{25}

On 3 November 2011 the PLA National Defense University cut the ribbon on a new General Political Department–sponsored “Armed Forces Theoretical Research Center on Fighting Corruption and Building Clean Administration” (\textup{军队反腐倡廉建设理论研究中心}).\textsuperscript{26} According to the official account of the event, the center “integrates the functions of teaching, scientific research, consultations, and services.”\textsuperscript{27} It will “organize basic theoretical and major issue research on fighting corruption and building clean administration under the guidance of the PLA General Political Department; organize relevant important theoretical studies, discussions, propaganda, lectures, and other activities on fighting corruption and building clean administration in the armed forces; and undertake relevant important tasks entrusted by the Central Military Commission, PLA general departments, and the National Defense University.”\textsuperscript{28} It will also “invite relevant department leaders and experts from major units in the whole army as advisors and liaison personnel and absorb forces from within and outside the university and the armed forces to take part in its research work.” The center’s first deputy director is Major General Wu Jieming (吴杰明), a political department cadre with a Ph.D. who has served as political commissar of combat units, NDU researcher, and editor of \textit{Military Political Work} (\textup{军队政治工作}) magazine.\textsuperscript{29} The center is too young to have achieved anything yet, but it is likely to focus on publishing descriptive reports and have little real impact on corrupt activities within the military.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In my 2006 contribution to \textit{China Leadership Monitor}, entitled “So Crooked They Have To Screw Their Pants On,” I documented endemic corruption within the PLA, and the leadership’s flailing attempts to deal with it. Five years later, nothing appears to have changed, as evidenced by the arrest of Lieutenant General Gu Junshan and another spate of anti-corruption regulations and institutional moves like the creation of the Armed Forces Theoretical Research Center on Fighting Corruption and Building Clean Administration. CCP General Secretary Hu told the Central Discipline Inspection
Commission in January 2012 that “the fight against the corruption situation remains severe” (腐败斗争形势依然严峻), while Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Caihou now talks about a “crisis mentality” (危机意识) regarding corruption. The reason for the lack of progress is structural, which is why it can overcome ideology and even the political will of determined reformers. As Tai Ming Cheung recently put it: “There has been hope that [large pay rises] would lead to less corruption, but given the power and special privileges that the PLA enjoys within Chinese society, the structural incentives for corrupt practices remain prevalent.”

Which brings us back to General Liu and his quixotic quest to reform the PLA and clean up corruption. As a member of a protected class of elite princelings, General Liu is likely untouchable politically, and therefore has the potential freedom to pursue malefactors regardless of their rank or position. Yet the PLA corruption may simply be too big and intractable even for a well-connected, powerful player to overcome. And General Liu and his benefactor Xi Jinping may not want to mercilessly attack corruption in the ranks if it causes serious disruption in leadership, morale, and professional proficiency at a time of turmoil and uncertainty in China’s security environment. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that even Liu’s possible future appointment to head arguably the most corrupt PLA organ, the General Logistics Department, will result in eradication of military graft and malfeasance.
Appendix: Regulations on the Performance of Official Duties With Integrity by Leading Cadres With Party Membership in the Armed Forces

Chapter I General Principles

**Article One.** These regulations are formulated in accordance with the “Guidelines of the Communist Party of China for Leading Cadres With Party Membership To Perform Official Duties With Integrity” and other related regulations to further strengthen the efforts to build the party style and a clean government and to promote integrity in the performance of official duties by leading cadres with party membership in the armed forces.

**Article Two.** Leading cadres with party membership in the armed forces as stated in these regulations refer to standing committee members of party committees (party committee members where standing committees are not set up) of units at or above the regiment level and leading cadres with party membership who hold deputy regiment posts (at the deputy office level) in organs and departments.

**Article Three.** To promote integrity in the performance of official duties by leading cadres with party membership in the armed forces, we must use Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thinking of the “Three Represents” as a guide; implement the scientific development concept in an in-depth manner; insist on being strict in the administration of the party, the army, and officers; uphold the principle of treating both the root cause and symptoms, compressive treatment, punishing and preventing at the same time, and paying attention to prevention; and enhance education, perfect systems, strengthen supervision, deepen reforms, strictly enforce discipline, and insist on combining self-discipline and discipline by others in accordance with the requirements for building a sound institution for punishing and preventing corruption in the armed forces.

**Article Four.** A leading cadre with party membership in the armed forces must have lofty Communist ideals and a firm conviction in socialism with Chinese characteristics, uphold the basic principle and system of the party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces, and practice the core values of contemporary revolutionary soldiers in an exemplary way. He must uphold the purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly; establish a correct world view, view on power, and career view; conduct himself with dignity, be introspective, have self awareness, and exert himself; and play an exemplary role among the vast numbers of officers and men. He must strictly observe party discipline and abide by the laws of the state and the laws and regulations of the armed forces; he must be upright and just, be devoted to his duty, and correctly exercise his authority; and he must always maintain his integrity in his official conducts. He must strengthen ideological and moral accomplishments; stress party character, emphasize moral conducts, and set examples; solidly foster the socialist concept of honor and disgrace; and cultivate healthy interest in his life. He must vigorously enhance
ideological and style building; carry forward the party’s fine style; energetically encourage the practice of maintaining close ties with the masses, seeking the truth and being pragmatic, waging hard struggles, and making criticism and self-criticism; and keep alive the true political qualities and noble spirit of a Communist.

Chapter II Code of Conduct for Performing Official Duties With Integrity

Article Five. One is prohibited from using the authority of his office and the influence of his job to seek illegitimate gain. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Extorting, accepting, or occupying by other means the property of subordinate units and individuals and the property of other units or individuals who are connected to the exercising of the authority of his office;
(2) Accepting gifts, feasts, and travel, gym, entertainment, and other activity arrangements that may affect his ability to perform his official duties impartially;
(3) Accepting cash gifts and all kinds of negotiable securities and certificates of payment in official activities;
(4) Capitalizing on inside information that he learns about to seek gain; and
(5) Occupying extra housing and using public money to furbish or renovate housing in violation of regulations; engage in the sales and purchases of economical and practical housing, houses built with funds collected from the buyers and other affordable housing in violation of regulations; and failing to make housing purchase payments according to regulations.

Article Six. One is prohibited from engaging in profit-seeking activities in violation of regulations. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Engaging in business or operating an enterprise under one’s own name or in other people’s name;
(2) Buying and selling shares or making other securities investments in violation of regulations;
(3) Making equity investments outside the country (boundaries);
(4) Holding concurrent posts or getting paid for holding concurrent posts in economic entities, social groups, and other units in violation of regulations and engaging in the activity of paid intermediaries; and
(5) Organizing and conducting external-oriented activities for paid services in violation of regulations.

Article Seven. One is prohibited from exploiting his public office for private gain and turning public property into private property in violation of regulations on the management and use of public property. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Using public money to reimburse or pay for expenses that shall be borne by individuals;
(2) Borrowing public money and public property or lending public money and public property to other people in violation of regulations;
(3) Depositing public money in personal accounts or releasing public money as private loans;
(4) Traveling using public money or using public money for traveling in a disguised manner;
(5) Taking part in costly recreational and gym activities or obtaining all kinds of club memberships with public money;
(6) Using public money to indiscriminately give out allowances, subsidies, and cash awards in violation of regulations;
(7) Setting up “private coffers” or using funds from “private coffers”;
(8) Illegally occupying public property or illegally occupying public property by making token payments of money or by other means;
(9) Examining and approving or approving the appropriation of funds not in accordance with the budget, the plan for expenditures, and the prescribed procedures; and
(10) Withholding, diverting, and pocketing special funds.

**Article Eight.** One is prohibited from selecting and appointing cadres in violation of regulations. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Using illegitimate means to get a post or to obtain remunerations for a job grade for himself or for others;
(2) Recommending, assessing, deliberating on, discussing, and deciding on the appointment or removal of a cadre without following the prescribed contents, standards, and procedures;
(3) Leaking the situation concerning the recommendation, assessment, deliberation, discussion, and decision about a cadre;
(4) Falsifying, covering up, or distorting the truth or the real situations during the assessment of a cadre;
(5) Canvassing for votes, colluding, or engaging in other illegitimate activities during recommendations, assessments, and elections;
(6) Taking advantage of his post to intervene in the selection and appointment of a cadre at a subordinate level or in a unit where he formerly holds a post;
(7) Unexpectedly promoting and reshuffling cadres during a job transfer or a structural and staffing adjustment; and
(8) Handing out official posts, making promises to grant special favors, appointing people by favoritism, and engaging in fraud for selfish ends during the selection and appointment of cadres.

**Article Nine.** One is prohibited from seeking gain for his relatives and for staff members who work beside him by using the authority of his office or the influence of his post. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Asking or instigating others to promote his spouse, his children and their spouses, other relatives, and staff members who work beside him;
(2) Using public money to pay for the studies, training, traveling, and other expenses of his spouse, his children and their spouses, or other relatives and accepting and exacting financial assistance from units or individuals who are connected to the exercising of the authority of his office for his spouse, his children and their spouses, and other relatives to travel out of the country (boundaries) to settle down, study abroad, visit relatives, and so on;
(3) Obstructing the investigation and handling of a case involving his spouse, his children and their spouses, other relatives, or staff members who work beside him;
(4) Taking advantage of his job to seek gain for others and having his parents, spouse, children and their spouses, and other designated persons who have dealings with him accept money and goods from other parties;
(5) Giving tacit consent to, conniving with, and suggesting to his spouse, his children and their spouses, other relatives, and staff members who work beside him to seek gain in his name; and
(6) Providing the convenience for his spouse, his children and their spouses, and other relatives to engage in business or operate an enterprise, or leading cadres with party membership using the authority of their offices to provide the convenience for each others’ spouses, children and their spouses, and other relatives to engage in business or operate an enterprise.

Article 10. One is prohibited from going in for ostentation and extravagance, competing with others in parading wealth, squandering public money, and being extravagant and wasteful. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Providing or accepting receptions that exceed the prescribed standards in official activities or exceeding the prescribed standards for reimbursing expenses related to receptions, business trip allowances, and others;
(2) Taking advantage of participation in meetings, studies, and training to use public money to fete each other or present cash and material gifts to each other;
(3) Making decisions on or approving the construction and renovation or furbishing of office buildings, training centers, and other buildings, halls, and guesthouses in violation of regulations, or exceeding the standards for outfitting with and utilizing office buildings and office stationery;
(4) Using public money without authorization to rent or occupy guestrooms for personal use;
(5) Outfitting with, purchasing, changing, decorating, or using vehicles in violation of regulations; and
(6) Making decisions on or approving the use of public money for holding all kinds of celebration events in violation of regulations.

Article 11. One is prohibited from meddling and intervening in project construction in violation of regulations to seek personal gain. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Making unauthorized changes to a construction project and the scale, standard, and investment involved;
(2) Breaking up a whole construction project into parts or avoiding bid invitations under the pretext of keeping the project secret and so on;
(3) Manipulating, hinting at, suggesting, and using other ways to influence the determination of the tenderee qualifications and the bid evaluation and bid winning results during project construction bid invitation and bid tendering activities;
(4) Making unauthorized changes to the bid winner of a construction project or directly appointing a contracting unit;
(5) Asking a bid winner to subcontract and outsource a construction project or asking the contracting unit to accept a designated construction team, construction materials, and equipment; and
(6) Colluding with the contracting, supervision, and management units to jack up the construction cost of a project.

**Article 12.** One is prohibited from meddling and intervening in armament, goods, and material procurement work to seek private gain in violation of regulations. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Making unauthorized changes to a procurement plan;
(2) Using other unauthorized procurement methods when the bid invitation method should have been used or subcontracting procurements in violation of regulations;
(3) Setting unreasonable demands in order to restrict or exclude potential suppliers from tendering bids and influencing the procurement assessment and bidding results with such methods as manipulating, hinting at, or suggesting;
(4) Making unauthorized changes to the bidding results and the deals concluded or directly designating a supplier; and
(5) Colluding with suppliers or contracting units and harming the interests of national defense and the armed forces.

**Article 13.** One is prohibited from handling the armed forces’ assets for private gain in violation of regulations. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Failing to enforce the procedures for handling the armed forces’ assets and relevant regulations on the limits of authority for examination and approval, and handling the assets of the armed forces without authorization;
(2) Intentionally omitting the evaluation of, undervaluing, leaving out the evaluation of, or selling off at a low price the assets of the armed forces;
(3) Making unauthorized changes to the purpose of land that should be reserved for military use, meddling in or intervening in the transfer or replacement of such land, or colluding with the transferees, and harming the interests of national defense and the armed forces;
(4) Renting out real estate in violation of regulations or hinting at or suggesting the renting out of real estate at a low price to a designated unit or individual;
(5) Redistributing or allocating armaments, goods, materials, and equipment in violation of regulations;
(6) Secretly dividing up and seizing the assets of the armed forces or withholding and embezzling the profits from the disposal of the armed forces’ assets; and
(7) Selling, renting out, and lending or violating regulations in the use of military vehicles, military vehicular number plates, and other valid military vehicle documents.

**Article 14.** One is prohibited from meddling and intervening in sensitive matters of immediate interests to officers and men in violation of regulations. The following conducts are not allowed:
(1) Meddling and intervening in the selection and appointment of cadres, the sending of cadres for academic studies and training, the appraisal and appointment of cadres for specialized technical posts, and specialized technical grade adjustments for cadres;
(2) Meddling and intervening in the transfer of cadres and enlisted personnel and their transfers to civilian posts, demobilization, rewards and punishments, injury and disability grade assessments, housing allocations, and other matters;
(3) Meddling and intervening in the selection of non-commissioned officers [NCOs] and their promotion to higher military ranks, or in the promotion of enlisted personnel to the position of cadres and their party membership, academic entrance examinations, and technical training;
(4) Meddling and intervening in military academy enrollment and officer cadet allocation or meddling and intervening in the recruitment of national defense students and the acceptance of graduates from schools such as ordinary local colleges and universities;
(5) Meddling and intervening in conscription and the direct recruitment of NCOs from non-military departments; and
(6) Meddling and intervening in the employment of civilian staff in the military and non-active-duty office attendants.

Article 15. One is prohibited from being divorced from reality and resorting to deception, affecting the general mood of units, and damaging the image of the armed forces. The following conducts are banned:
(1) Engaging in “image projects” and “official career achievement projects” that affect the all-round building of units and long-term development;
(2) Falsifying reports on work results;
(3) Covering up in reports or delaying reports on incidents, cases, or other important situations;
(4) Making grand arrangements for weddings, funerals, and joyous occasions and thus producing an adverse impact or making use of such opportunities to accumulate wealth by unfair means;
(5) Obtaining honors, job titles, academic qualifications, academic degrees, and other interests with illegitimate means; and
(6) Engaging in activities that go against social ethics, professional ethics, and family virtues.

Chapter III Enforcement and Supervision

Article 16. Party committees at all levels are responsible for the implementation of these regulations in their respective units and shall effectively carry out the following work:
(1) In accordance with the policy decisions and instructions of the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and the demands of party committees at the higher levels, they shall study and make arrangements for work concerning the performance of official duties with integrity by leading cadres with party membership and focus on the implementation of work concerning the performance of official duties with integrity within the scope of their duties;
(2) They shall organize study sessions on the regulations on the performance of official duties with integrity by leading cadres with party membership and conduct education on performing official duties with integrity;
(3) They shall organize and implement the inner-party supervisory system and the economic responsibility auditing system, such as by holding democratic life meetings,
circulating notices on important situations, asking for instructions and submitting reports, holding conversations to admonish and encourage, reporting on work and integrity, and handling letters and calls, and they shall set up a sound mechanism of long-term effects for focusing on the performance of official duties with integrity by leading cadres with party membership; and

(4) They shall supervise and inspect the progress made by leading cadres with party membership in implementing these regulations, regularly analyze the progress made by leading cadres with party membership in performing official duties with integrity, and study ways to solve existing problems.

**Article 17.** Discipline inspection commissions at all levels shall assist party committees of the same levels to effectively implement these regulations, they shall be responsible for supervising and inspecting the progress in implementation, and they shall effectively carry out the following work:

(1) They shall investigate and analyze the progress made by their respective units in implementing these regulations and propose measures and methods for intensifying work on the performance of official duties with integrity by leading cadres with party membership;

(2) They shall sum up and publicize the experience and typical cases of leading cadres with party membership who perform their official duties with integrity and use cases to serve as warnings and education;

(3) They shall organize and coordinate with relevant departments to focus on work concerning performing duties with integrity within the latter’s scopes of duty and they shall conduct special inspections that are targeted at existing prominent issues and launch special projects to address such issues; and

(4) They shall inspect and handle cases and problems concerning leading cadres with party membership who violate the regulations on performing official duties with integrity.

**Article 18.** Party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries shall set a good example with their own conducts and abide by these regulations in an exemplary way, and they shall effectively carry out the following work in the process of implementing these regulations in their respective units:

(1) They shall supervise and urge leading cadres with party membership in their respective units to earnestly implement the regulations on performing official duties with integrity, promptly give reminders and warnings when they discover tendencies toward a problem, promptly report important situations to party committees, and report major problems to the higher levels according to regulations;

(2) They shall intensify supervision on party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries at the levels immediately below them, hold at least one conversation per year with party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries at the levels immediately below them, find out about and grasp the situations concerning the latter’s ability to perform their official duties with integrity, and promptly point out and correct existing problems; and

(3) They shall promptly request party committees to study and solve prominent problems in work on leading cadres with party membership performing their official duties with integrity.
Article 19. Organs at all levels and the departments under them shall formulate sound measures for performing official duties with integrity according to the characteristics of their work, strictly enforce work discipline and operating procedures, routinely inspect the progress in implementing the regulations on performing official duties with integrity in work, and strengthen supervision and restrictions on the exercise of authority.

Article 20. Leading cadres with party membership who attend democratic life meetings and who report on their work and integrity shall be cross-checked based on these regulations. Materials from the cross-checking shall be retained by discipline inspection commissions and political organs of the respective levels.

Leading cadres with party membership shall truthfully report matters concerning themselves to party organizations according to regulations and shall take the initiative to accept supervision.

Article 21. Party committees shall include the progress made by leading cadres with party membership in implementing these regulations, as an important part, in the responsibility system for building the party style and a clean government and the assessments of cadres, and the results of the assessment shall be used as an important basis for the appointment, removal, reward, and punishment of cadres.

Article 22. Leading cadres with party membership who violate the regulations on performing official duties with integrity shall, in accordance with the relevant regulations, be criticized and educated, be handled by organizations, and have disciplinary actions taken against them; criminal responsibilities shall be affixed according to law if a violation constitutes a crime.

Chapter IV Supplementary Articles

Article 23. Cadres with party membership who hold the non-leadership posts of deputy regiment posts (at the deputy office level) or the specialized technical grade nine or above, leading cadres with party membership who hold principal battalion posts or below in organs of units at the brigade or regiment levels or in the departments of such units, and party committee (party branch) secretaries and deputy secretaries of grassroots battalion- and company-level units shall implement these regulations as reference.

Article 24. These regulations shall be enforced by the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force.

Article 25. The General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army and the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission shall be responsible for interpreting these regulations.

Article 26. These regulations shall be enforced on the day of their promulgation.
Notes
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Choi Chi-Yuk, “PLA General Fired in Graft Probe,” *South China Morning Post*, 1 February 2012.
6 Choi Chi-Yuk, “PLA General Fired in Graft Probe.”
7 *Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 31 January 2012.
8 Choi Chi-Yuk, “PLA General Fired in Graft Probe.”
10 Choi Chi-Yuk, “PLA General Fired in Graft Probe.”
14 Ibid.
18 Wang Chien-min, “Crash of Chinese Naval Vessels Uncovers Corruption.”
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
24 Li Xuanliang, “All Units of the Armed Forces to Deal With Commercial Bribery,” Xinhua, 2 August 2006.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
“CPC Central Committee General Secretary Hu Jintao addresses CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission Membership meeting held in Beijing; Hu Jintao calls for pressing ahead with fine party style building, clean administration building, fight against corruption—CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee Member, CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary He Guoqiang presides over meeting,” PLA Daily, 9 January 2012.

“CCP Central Committee Political Bureau Member, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou addresses Armed Forces Discipline Inspection Work Conference Held in Beijing; Xu Caihou calls for greeting upcoming convocation in Beijing of 18th CCP National Congress with fresh headway in opposing corruption, advocating clean administration—Central Military Commission Member, PLA General Political Department Chief Li Jinai presides over conference,” PLA Daily, 11 January 2012 accessed at: http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/gc/2012-01/11/content_4765406.htm.


“Regulations on the performance of official duties with integrity by leading cadres with party membership in the armed forces,” PLA Daily, 1 June 2011, p.10.