

## CHAPTER VII

# The Force of Things

### *Aspects of Leadership*

**I**N EARLY 2002, in both America and Europe, leadership appeared on the diplomatic stage in the form of appallingly bad manners. The display of unbalanced judgment lasted more than three years, as a healthy segment of European and American media, fed with the observations of patronizing intellectual, educational and government leaders, successfully personalized transatlantic differences. There were no beneficiaries, but there were many casualties.

Their public statements, phrased in a way which both common sense and civility would normally preclude as unacceptable, insulted our intelligence and belittled the values we have in common. Possibly these public figures believed that their tough talk, their telling-it-like-it-is, were aspects of leadership. But their abrasiveness weakened the merit of their positions, focused attention where it did not belong, and set a contagious example. Many Americans and Europeans found the use of invective inexcusable, but fewer found the courage to condemn publicly behavior which, by any standard, was childish, irresponsible, and rude.

The period of contention produced, in addition to exasperation and disappointment, self-serving conclusions that did linguistic violence to history's lessons. A duplicitous example occurred in the autumn of 2002. After assuring American president Bush, on two occasions, that he would not make a German electoral issue of American policy toward Iraq, Chancellor Schröder publicly accused Bush of "adventurism." During the same

campaign Germany's minister of justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, asserted that Bush's contemplation of war against Iraq was designed to divert attention from American domestic problems, and compared his leadership to that of Adolf Hitler. The minister was subsequently forced to resign; but the German illustration was not unique in Europe, nor was this practice confined to the continent.

Incredulous Americans also excelled at the use of ridicule. Critics in Belgium, France, and Germany who opposed preemptive war against Iraq were described in America as an "axis of weasels." The countries themselves were described as "EU-nuchs" and the French as "cheese-eating surrender monkeys." To take matters from the ridiculous to the absurd, the name "French fries" on congressional restaurant menus was changed to "Freedom fries," while officials at the French embassy observed that French fries were actually a Belgian invention. Meanwhile, Americans, exhibiting inventive but illogical behavior, purchased French wine and then poured it into the streets in front of French government diplomatic offices.<sup>1</sup>

California congressman Tom Lantos, a Hungarian immigrant and a member of the Democratic Party, declared that French and German failure to "honor their [NATO] commitments is beneath contempt," and accused them of "blind intransigence and utter ingratitude" for their rescue by Americans from Hitler and Stalin. The American secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in dismissing Belgium, France and Germany as "Old Europe," pronounced the Franco-German position a "disgrace," praised those European countries supporting the American position as members of "New Europe," and compared Germany's stance on Iraq with that of Cuba and Libya. Not to be outdone, Robert Kagan, who had coined the power-versus-weakness comparison, wrote in the autumn of 2002 that France found it "more fun to play Don Quixote, tilting at American windmills."<sup>2</sup> And, to deliver what he undoubtedly thought was the *coup de grâce*, Richard Perle, at the time chairman of the advisory U.S. Defense Policy Board, recommended at a conference in Munich in early February 2003 that America "should come up with an anti-French strategy." His proposal did not contain the disclosure that he owned vacation property in France.<sup>3</sup> Almost four years later, in an article published in a

leading French newspaper, Perle wondered why the sentiment expressed in *Le Monde* after September 11—“We are all Americans now”—had disappeared. Answering his own question, in effect, he concluded his article with the insulting and incorrect observation that the Europeans, “in their ‘wisdom,’ prefer words to action and the status quo to democratic progress.”<sup>4</sup>



Americans did not appreciate European comparisons of American leadership with Nazi dictatorship, especially coming from Germany. Nor did they find amusing European claims that American military power posed a greater threat to peace than the tyranny practiced by Saddam Hussein. And they took special offense to the desecration of graves of American and British soldiers buried on French soil, as well as to French public opinion polls which indicated that one-third of the French population hoped Iraq would win the war.

As always, however, the coin had two sides. In this case, the verso was described in a private letter from a longtime French friend of my wife. She was able to keep both her humor and her sense of balance when she wrote in March 2003 from Brussels:

We admire those French who adopted the attitude of an old dog [France] persecuted by a young puppy [America], jumping around, biting ears-nose-tail, while the old dog patiently accepted those tortures and waited until the young puppy would either fall of exhaustion and things to bite, or reflect on how much biting an old dog could stand. Nevertheless, the war in Iraq has brought out to light hard feelings. No mutual love was wasted. It was a slap in the face for France, who thinks that she’s always right in whatever she does, and is thus loved by everyone—*voilà, l’exception Française!* [There it is, the French exception!]. Little does she realise that others are not only throwing Beaujolais in the gutter—it was a bad year—but what she represents is sometimes pure *merde* [*shit*]. Sorry! Personally, I think this “happening” did a lot of good for us all. Now everyone knows where they stand, and what mistakes should not be repeated. Chirac went overboard, but Bush worries us here.<sup>5</sup>



In early April 2003 the tone and tenor of the time were summarized well by former German chancellor Helmut Kohl in an interview with the German newspaper *Die Welt*. “Comments out of Washington,” he said, “by individual Secretaries, like that of ‘Old Europe’ are just as foolish as European comments about ‘the Texas cowboy who shoots from the hip.’ Sometimes the Americans’ view of Europe and the Europeans’ view of America are really dim-witted.”<sup>6</sup>

His point was well taken and was prompted by many strident voices and presumptuous conclusions. Among them, undoubtedly, was Robert Kagan’s artful but fatuous observation that on questions of “major strategic and international” importance today, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”<sup>7</sup> The difference in outlook, he wrote, does “not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans.” Rather, he argued that Europe has a greater tolerance for threat because it is militarily weak, and conversely, America can threaten because it is powerful. Power gives America the ability to lead. Weakness means the Europeans cannot. So Kagan concluded that “if Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong?”<sup>8</sup>

The unmistakable admonition was that if the Europeans would only “get it,” to use the vernacular, everything would be in order. In other words if the Europeans understood the world as it really is, and not as they would like it to be, they would build up their military power to match that of America. But, so argued Kagan, the Europeans did not get it: “Just as Americans have always believed that they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.”<sup>9</sup>



The frank observation that Americans possess an open “secret” called freedom is well known at home and abroad. Less persuasive, however, is

the assertion that the Europeans have a new mission. It sounds clever, but it rings hollow. Europeans are not on a messianic crusade to bring the world perpetual peace any more than Americans are on a perpetual quest for truth. If the Irish, or Spaniards, or those who live in the Balkans, were congratulated by the Secretary General of the United Nations on their new mission, born of their own discovery of perpetual peace, they would respond in disbelief, and say, "What mission? We're still dealing with religious feuds, separatist movements and ethnic cleansing."

The important issue has less to do with missions and more to do with questions. Do Europeans believe that there is no connection between military weakness and strong leadership? With a huge discrepancy in military power separating them can Europeans and Americans continue to lead together, as they have in the past? Do they even want to?

Whether they want to or not is a rhetorical question, because their political and economic strengths thrust responsibilities of leadership upon them, irrespective of whether they are militarily powerful or militarily weak. The real concern is how they want to lead and with what means. Europe and America enjoy a historical regard as imposing figures on the world's stage. They already know that power comes not only from the idea of freedom, but also from the means and the will to protect it. What makes this knowledge valuable for both is that Americans and Europeans acquired it together in the course of the twentieth century. But it is valuable only if they remember it, if they recall that all of history's lessons are important, not just those which support emotional and self-serving judgments.

If Americans and Europeans want to draw on the strengths of their shared historical experiences, they must do so together. They must also agree that the value of military power depends on having it at their disposal, as well as on what they do with it. Then, they must be able to rely on each other. Without that assurance the American-European partnership is made of clay, the friendship is built on sand, and the alliance is not worth the paper it is written on.



Among the greatest possessions belonging to the Old World and to the New World is our common heritage of Western civilization, the majesty of our freedom and the integrity of our trust, affection and respect. It is true that trust, affection, and respect are not weapons in a military arsenal, but without them how effective, in the long term, will be the use of our military power in defense of Western civilization?

As American philosopher Sidney Hook was fond of pointing out, especially to economists, at the heart of policy are values. What we believe determines what we do. If we limit the definition of what unites or divides us to the naive belief that matters of policy are merely a question of who is militarily powerful and who is weak, we will always see the world in black and white. This blind vision limits our choices and weakens our leadership.

The strength of what Americans and Europeans have in common gives both a powerful incentive to renew our concentration on a vision for the future. In doing so we would be well counseled to keep in mind a sense of history. It is not our respective histories that create our difficulties, but our failure to remember the lessons they have taught us. The countries with the richest future of freedom, with peace, and with the means to defend both, are not countries that moralize and then regret. They are the countries whose distinguishing hallmark is great leadership, whose politicians understand that peace alone is not a policy. They are the countries with not only the longest memories, but the countries whose leaders understand that power does not only come out of the barrel of a gun.

This was the distinguishing standard left by then-candidate George W. Bush during the second presidential campaign debate of 2000. He was talking about confronting anti-Americanism: "It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us." Two years later, however, in August 2002, a pro-American human rights activist in Sri Lanka made an observation which many of America's friends had come to share in Europe, and elsewhere: "America as an idea, as a source of optimism and as a beacon of liberty is critical to the world—but you Americans seem to have forgotten that since 9/11. You've stopped

talking about who you are, and are only talking now about who you're going to invade, oust or sanction."<sup>10</sup>

There is a lesson here, for America. It is about wise leadership so well expressed by an American president Theodore Roosevelt, more than one hundred years ago, and echoed a century later by George W. Bush. Roosevelt's adage is beyond challenge. There is the wisdom of both diplomacy and defense in speaking softly and carrying a big stick. But the advice is only helpful if all of it is followed.<sup>11</sup>

In turn another conclusion also has merit, and provides a lesson as well, for Europe. Classicist and historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that "the U.S. cannot remain a true ally of a militarily weak but shrill Europe should its politics grow even more resentful and neutralist, always nursing old wounds and new conspiracies, amoral in its inability to act, quite ready to preach to those who do."<sup>12</sup> If, indeed, that Europe exists which Hanson describes, there is no hereafter for the American-European alliance. But is this the shape of things to come or is the American-European future still in the making? One answer was given by a member of the French National Assembly following the reelection of America's president in November 2004:

Our old Europe is no longer sure about its roots or its frontiers. Young America is just as sure of its past as it is of its future. America has managed to preserve its faith while we have consigned much of ours—either faith in God, or in our countries, or in liberty—to history. . . . Much misunderstanding between America and Europe (and especially between America and France) stems from our loss of confidence in ourselves. . . . Americans still have faith in themselves. In order for us to heal the breach with the United States, we must first reconcile with ourselves. We must revive our love for freedom.<sup>13</sup>



No one should be surprised if America and Europe—that is to say, individual European countries—take positions which are not always in concord. In other words, if Americans and Europeans act as though they are independent, it is because they *are*, in spirit and in nature and in fact.

Americans and Europeans are not yet, however, irrevocably embarked on a path leading to separation, although the temptation to take it is becoming stronger and to some, appealing. But if we take that path sooner or later the friendship so carefully built through adversity and strife during the twentieth century will find itself in pieces. Would America and Europe be able to put it back together again?

If the friendship is broken so will be the strength it gives Americans and Europeans as partners in the common enterprise called “dealing with life’s challenges and opportunities.” We will start to go our own ways. We will, of course, in stentorian voices announce that we are right to march to our own drummer. But eventually we will discover that we need each other’s help. It will not be forthcoming, because we will no longer trust each other. Americans and Europeans should be careful what kind of independence they practice.

If we allow ourselves to be divided, it is at our peril. We will become rivals, not competitors. The tremendous difference between the two is that, as rivals, each of us will be alone. The consequences for America and Europe will be many. We will become much more aware, in our splendid isolation, that threats await us everywhere, and that we face them separately. Those who once looked to us—to America and Europe—with admiration and respect, will become our critics, and ultimately our enemies. Only the opportunistic will listen to us, as they wait in the wings to capitalize on our weaknesses.

If our relationship deteriorates to the extent just described the world will become even more unbalanced than it is now. The only element of control will be American military power, but its well-intended and unilateral use will not preserve freedom and maintain peace in the long term. On the contrary, it will call forth violence and counter-violence, as force fails to cure what ails the planet; namely, the absence of American-European leadership in a world badly in need of it.

What Americans and Europeans believe will determine whether we take the same path, jointly, or follow different ones, independently. Americans and Europeans are fortunate to still have the freedom to choose.

*New Crossroads*

In the late 1930s Europe and America both arrived at crossroads. The paths open to them led to war or peace, to freedom or oppression, to weakness or to courage of conviction. Europeans and Americans made choices about which paths to take. One result was a devastating war of unprecedented nature. Another was the division of Europe for fifty years, until 1989–1990. And for many, both Europeans and Americans, the consequences were a painful reminder of words written by an Englishman, Edmund Burke, toward the end of the eighteenth century, that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

Now, more than sixty years later, Europeans and Americans have come to new crossroads. This time we will decide whether our “interests” are more important than our friendship, or whether they are in fact the same. The choice we make will affect the quality of the leadership and influence we will bring to bear on shaping affairs in the world.

Some Europeans and Americans believe we continue to have common interests, and that those of lasting value are found precisely in the friendship shaped by our hearts, heritage, and history, and not in short-term coalitions of the willing and opportunistic. This path, preferred by the “Atlanticists,” contrasts with that of the “Realists.” They argue that it is naive, sentimental and unrealistic to claim that our friendship is more important than our interests, that there is a difference between the two. Still others, known as the “Dreamers,” assert that “the American spirit is tiring and languishing in the past,” while “a new” European dream is being born.<sup>14</sup>

Do these paths lead to different places, or are they all part of one path leading to the same place? How can we know? How do we choose? Europeans and Americans cannot escape the answers to these questions, because there is no safe place to go. Some recognize that the nature of the relationship may be changing in ways that we can neither predict nor manage. Some know also that an absence of American-European leadership will create a vacuum, and that there are those around the globe who

will try to fill it with chaos and terror. And some are aware that Benjamin Franklin, more than two centuries ago, admonished the thirteen American colonies at the time they signed their Declaration of Independence. “We must all hang together,” he urged, “or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

That warning, were Franklin to give it today, would surely be directed to Europe and America—and, it might also be accompanied by the suggestion that Americans, who are ignorant of how little they know about Europeans, and Europeans, who presumptuously think they understand Americans, spend more time talking to each other. Should we follow this advice, we may rediscover the responsibility to respect our differences and the obligation to value what we have in common.

If it is the essential difference that separates us, it is the values of Western civilization that unite us. Half a century ago Friedrich Hayek described them as “the sacredness of truth . . . the ordinary rules of moral decency . . . a common belief in the value of human freedom . . . an affirmative action towards democracy,” and “opposition to all forms of totalitarianism, whether it be from the Right or from the Left.” These convictions were then, and are today, our most important foreign policy asset.



Like any art, that of conversation improves with practice, which bodes well for the future because Americans and Europeans have a great many things to discuss. Among these are the lessons and legacies of history. Irrespective of whether Americans like it or admire it, European history affects how many Europeans think about freedom and order, and about war and peace. In turn, their history colors the eye-glasses through which they see and judge American motives and behavior. Europeans are saddled with a heritage of warfare which they do not want to leave as a legacy in the future. If they often seem to be preoccupied with peace, and with freedom as a second-order effect, it is because they are.

Another subject for discussion is selective European interpretation of American history. Most Europeans critical of America are certain that Americans consider themselves the world’s policemen. That is how many

interpreted the American initiative in the Middle East in 2003, which is why critics continue to ask, “Who appointed you?” They believe this question is legitimate and accuse America of peremptory behavior on the world’s stage. Here Europeans ignore America’s historical commitment to freedom, demonstrated in Europe on three different occasions during the twentieth century, and arbitrarily dismiss contradictory historical facts, such as Jean-François Revel’s observation that American “unilateralism . . . is the consequence, not the cause, of power failures in the rest of the world.”

A third matter of concern is the future of Europe and the European Union. This discussion will take place among Europeans themselves, but Americans must listen to it closely. In June 2005, following French and Dutch rejection of the EU constitution, the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, defined rival opinions as representing two ideas of Europe: (1) a European market with a big and free trade zone, or (2) an integrated Europe.<sup>15</sup> In his judgment the issue is which view of Europe will prevail.

It would be reassuring for Americans and Europeans if the choice were that simple, but the history of the EU sends another message. Differing views concern many things and represent many struggles, of which the following three are primary: (1) rule from the top down or rule from the bottom up, (2) free and open competition in a single European marketplace or a union dominated by the old *European socioeconomic model*, and (3) strong European leadership in concert with America or a union of Europeans in opposition to America. How these matters are decided will be of vital importance for the health of the Atlantic relationship, just as it will be for the success of the European dream.



Americans and Europeans, of course, have always known that they look at the world through different glasses, and that they are not always aware of what the other sees. An attempt to explain why this is so was made by the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, during a visit to Washington, D. C., in May 2002:

Americans, correctly and rightly, consider that it is they as Americans who created the modern world's greatest democracy. But Europeans tend to see the U.S. through a different prism. They see a U.S. born out of Europe; born from those with the courage, imagination, iconoclasm to break away from the straitjacket not just of poverty but of institutional and political constraints in Europe to form what has long represented, in an almost idealized form, the best of European values and institutions.<sup>16</sup>

Disputatious Americans may be tempted to respond that Europeans should not take credit for what descendants of European immigrants achieved on their own, but that was not what Straw had in mind. His point was that millions of Americans and Europeans recognize the significance of what unites. At the end of his speech Straw spoke specifically about the alliance, but he could just as well have been speaking about friendship, "founded," as he put it, "not just on interests but on values. . . . Our unshakeable faith in democracy and the rule of law is the foundation not only of our freedom, but also of our security and prosperity. There will be debate, and there will be differences of approach. Yet neither will undermine an enduring alliance of enduring values."<sup>17</sup>

There are millions of Americans and Europeans who believe in these words, and who know they are full of meaning, not devoid of it. Less than one year later Straw's emphasis found its reflection in "a vision of Europe" described by Germany's ambassador to the United States, Wolfgang Ischinger. He spoke of a Europe "that manages to become stronger without making the Atlantic wider, that thinks about the transatlantic relationship in terms of real partnership, not in terms of confrontation."<sup>18</sup>

Ischinger's vision is held by many in America and Europe who believe it is time to give it substance. This is a challenge which cannot be met with the deceptive claim that "Europe's vision of the future is quietly eclipsing the American dream," or with the idea that the purpose of "The United States of Europe" is to contain America.<sup>19</sup> On the contrary, if the Europeans are as confident in their "unshakeable faith in democracy and the rule of law" as Britain's foreign minister argued in May 2002, they must decide what Europe stands *for*, and not just what it stands *against*. Europe's challenge is to earn respect as a union that possesses courage and

conviction, that assures security with credible military balance, and that pursues peace and prosperity, in freedom.

### *Obligations Written in the Heart*

Americans and Europeans who know each other well seek a transatlantic relationship defined by faith in freedom and in order, and by the commitment to defend both. They understand that the real choice Europeans and Americans face, together, is not between rule from the top down and rule from the bottom up, not between *the European socioeconomic model* and *the American model*, not between power and weakness, and not between the American who “does” things and the European who “sees” things. It is Franklin’s choice. Shall we, Europeans and Americans, decide that our future lies in hanging together, or shall we all hang separately?

The quality of the choice, lest one be deceived by arguments to the contrary, is not measured by degrees of military force. It is self-evident that in the short term the ability to project power is decisive, just as is the willingness to use it. This is why Americans focus so intently on it. If the ability to defend ourselves is not credible and our willingness to do so is in doubt, stronger enemies will rise to challenge the weaker. History teaches both Americans and Europeans that this is a distasteful part of the human condition. That is a lesson which Americans have learned very well from the histories of Europe and America.

The choice, however, will not be made by armed forces, but will be determined by whether Americans and Europeans recognize another history lesson, of greater weight. It is that in the long term our fate rests in the power of our ideas. This is why the cultural, economic, and political ties that bind Europeans and Americans so closely together are invaluable. By themselves they cannot make a friendship. We have to do that deliberately. But if the choice is made, it is the quality of the ties that will form the substance of the relationship, that will endow it with meaning, and that will give it resiliency.



What makes these ties essential in our contemporary world is their historical nature. A perfect description was given more than two hundred years ago, in the wake of the French revolution, by Edmund Burke in “Letters from a Regicide Peace.” He wrote,

Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in law, customs, manners and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart.

Symbols of these obligations appear in cities throughout Europe, in the form of boulevards, streets and squares named after America and Americans. And in America similar symbols, such as the names of towns and cities in the American Middle West, are found throughout the country and begin in Washington, D. C. There the streets were laid out by a Frenchman, l’Enfant, and the public square opposite the White House is named after Lafayette. During the Revolutionary War he was made a general, and he became the first foreign dignitary to address a joint session of the Congress. Today the portraits of George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette hang on either side of the rostrum in the United States House of Representatives.

When Lafayette married on his return to France, he and his wife gave their first son the name of George Washington. He also brought with him a trunk of earth to be put on his grave, over which the American flag flies today. But perhaps the most eloquent sign of amity is also the most famous symbol of freedom in the world, the Statue of Liberty. It was a gift from the people of France. On the bronze plaque at the base of the statue are words written in 1883 by Emma Lazarus, a member of a fourth-generation New York Jewish family:

Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.



Americans generally prefer freedom to order and Europeans prefer order to freedom. But our views are remarkably similar, even as we consider the world from our different perspectives. The root and branch of what unites us is our shared desire to preserve and advance freedom and order.

This commitment is also one of the unique and precious legacies of Western civilization. The political form is democracy. The social norm is freedom of conscience in the context of the dignity and worth of the individual. Americans and Europeans have a common interest in the survival of both.

The obligation and the interest compel us to forge an indivisible covenant to recall where we have come from, to understand who we are, and to decide together where we want to go. In doing so, it will stand us in good stead to ask each other—“Why is it that I know you?”—and to remember that the answer is important. But should we find one day that we have forgotten why, an old French adage exists to give our ignorance sad and modern meaning . . . *qui s’excuse, s’accuse* !—whoever excuses himself, accuses himself.

If our memories serve us well neither of us will ever become forced to invoke the adage, because we will be able to explain why our most important asset is ourselves. It is with this conviction that these pages have been written, and why they have dealt with our differences and affinities, our interests, and our habits of life. Many of these are complementary, just as many are also contradictory. That is to say, Europeans and Americans, as friends and allies, enjoy an unmatched wealth of both different and shared perspectives. If we make the effort to learn what *the essential difference* teaches us about ourselves, and to draw on the vitality of the affinities we share, we are stronger, not weaker.



Many Europeans and Americans have not given these matters serious thought in a long time. So it may not be easy to begin anew the interrupted conversations of yesterday. But the commanding force of things obligates us to stop dancing in the dark in a world filled with turbulence, and with new threats to freedom and order which we are just beginning to learn about.

This point was reinforced, with unequivocal emphasis, in an essay by the French historian Nicole Bacharan that appeared in the French daily *Le Figaro* in the autumn of 2006. Following the observation that democracies occupy too small and fragile a planet to afford the luxury of being divided among themselves, she concluded,

There will be no safety and advancement of law and justice without an American engagement that . . . is wise, strong, and durable. In order to convince the next Congress and the next American president [of this point] France and Europe must proclaim clearly their fidelity to common values and alliances and demonstrate their determination to exercise their responsibilities.

A France and a Europe that invents a new Atlanticism, enlightened and balanced. The future [does not lie] in American hegemony, that will surely call forth fanaticism, but in sharing tasks and in a united front of all democracies.”<sup>20</sup>

“So, where do we begin?” an American might ask. “Let’s start by kissing the lady’s hand,” a European might answer. In the question, as in the answer, there is also a force. It is made of manners, judgment and leadership, of individualism, liberty and freedom, of power, courage and conviction, and of trust, affection and respect.